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Glossary 
BasicsCard A pin-protected key card that can be used with standard EFTPOS 
facilities to enable access to income-managed money. The BasicsCard 
can only be used at merchants approved by the Department of Human 
Services.    
Breach or breach 
notification 
A notification received by the FRC that a client has breached an agreed 
social obligation trigger outlined in the Family Responsibilities 
Commission Act 2008 (Qld) (‘FRC Act’). Notifications can be received 
for school attendance (s40), school enrolment (s41), child safety (s42), 
conviction in court (s43), domestic violence (s43), or housing tenancy 
agreements (s44). See Introduction for more detail. 
Cape York Income 
Management 
The scheme of income management (i.e. quarantining of welfare 
income) that specifically applies to the CYWR communities of 
Aurukun, Coen, Hope Vale and Mossman Gorge on Cape York. Under 
CYIM, the FRC advise the Department of Human Services as to whom 
should be placed on CYIM, what amount of their income should be 
quarantined (that is, 60, 75 or 90%), and for what time period. The 
Department of Human Services then administers CYIM, based on the 
FRC’s advice.  
Commissioner The Commissioner heads the FRC and is appointed under the Family 
Responsibilities Commission Act 2008 (Qld). 
Comparison areas For the purpose of this evaluation, data was obtained from other 
Indigenous communities where the FRC and CYIM were not in place. 
These communities are: Bamaga, Cherbourg, Doomadgee, Kowanyama, 
Lockhart River, Mornington Island, Palm Island, Pormpuraaw, Weipa, 
Woorabinda, Wujal Wujal, and Yarrabah. 
Conferencing Once receiving a notification (see definition of notification below), the 
FRC has discretion over whether or not to proceed to conference. An 
FRC conference involves Local Commissioners meeting with a client in 
a restorative setting to discuss the reasons behind notifications and to 
agree on the best way forward. The conference setting is the forum 
within which CYIM is typically applied, though CYIM can also be 
applied ex parte if a client consistently refuses to attend conferencing.  
Difference-in-difference 
analysis 
A statistical analysis to assess the impact of an intervention. The 
analysis requires two groups – one that received an intervention (the 
treatment or intervention group) and one that did not (the comparison 
group). The average level of an outcome is measured twice for each 
group: once before and once after the time of the intervention. The 
analysis assesses whether the change between the before and after 
measures in the intervention group is statistically different to the change 
in the comparison community in the absence of the intervention.  
Discrete time event 
history analysis 
A statistical analysis to assess the impact of one or more explanatory 
variables on the time to an event occurring. The analysis uses 
longitudinal data that has been measured or observed at regular 
intervals, and can model repeated events in a history. 
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Fitted values The predictions from a statistical model; that is, statistical predictions 
that are ‘fitted’ to the actual data. 
Humbugging As opposed to the traditionally productive and generous social practice 
of demand-sharing (Altman, 2011; Peterson, 1993), ‘humbugging’ 
refers to particularly aggressive and unremitting requests for money or 
alcohol, which are not always predicated on the need for reciprocity or 
exchange (Altman, 2011; Gerard, 1989). 
Incidence The number of occurrences of an event over a set period of time.  
Income management Income management refers to the quarantining of a portion of an 
individual’s welfare-derived income, which removes the ability to spend 
the quarantined portion on non-approved items (e.g. alcohol).  
Income management 
spell 
A spell is any set of consecutive months where the client had been on 
CYIM at least once during that month. Spells are measured from the 
date the CYIM order is received until the CYIM period ends or is 
revoked, whichever is earlier. There must be at least one month without 
CYIM between each spell. This measure differs from the number of 
times a client received a CYIM order, for example two consecutive 
CYIM orders that were not separated by at least one calendar month 
would count as one spell. 
Interrupted time-series 
analysis 
Time-series analyses are a family of statistical techniques for analysing 
trends in time-series data (that is, data that have been observed or 
measured for one individual or group, at regularly repeated time points 
over an extended period of time). Interrupted time-series analysis 
specifically assess whether an “interruption” to a time series (for 
example, a treatment or intervention) changes the overall trend in the 
data, either immediately following the interruption, or in the long term. 
Local Commissioner Local Commissioners are statutory appointments and are Elders or 
community leaders who are selected according to the process outlined in 
s14 of the Family Responsibilities Commission Act 2008 (Qld). 
Wherever practicable, Local Commissioners should be representative of 
all clan or family groups in their community, and include both males 
and females. Local Commissioners play key roles in supporting and 
leading FRC conferences with clients, and deciding which clients 
should be subject to income management (and/or other determinations).  
Longitudinal data Data that has been observed or measured for a sample (for example, a 
set of individuals, households, or communities) at different points in 
time, allowing the sample to be tracked over time. 
Mantra speak The process by which an individual, or group of individuals, become 
familiar with and internalise the ‘official line’ or discourse that aligns 
with their organisation’s aims and objectives, rather than necessarily 
providing objective accounts. 
Meta-analysis A statistical technique used to combine the results of multiple individual 
analyses, and demonstrate not only the overall effect of an intervention 
seen in those analyses, but also the level of variability or uncertainty 
around that effect.  
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Multilevel logistic 
regression 
Logistic regression is a statistical analysis used to estimate the 
relationship between one or more explanatory variables and an outcome 
variable, where the outcome variable has only two values. A multilevel 
logistic regression is used for data that has multiple levels or “nested” 
data (for example, repeated observations for the same individual; 
individuals living in the same community). This approach statistically 
accounts for the subgroups within nested data, whereby the members of 
one subgroup are more similar to each other than they are to members 
of other subgroups.   
Notifications When a social obligation trigger is breached, the FRC receives a 
notification from the relevant agency (under ss.40-44 of the Family 
Responsibilities Commission Act 2008 (Qld)).  
Ordinary least squares 
regression 
A statistical analysis used to estimate the linear relationship between 
one or more explanatory variables and an outcome variable, where the 
outcome variable is measured on a continuous scale. 
Prevalence The proportion of a population who have experienced an event in a 
given period of time. 
Social obligation trigger Social obligation triggers are outlined in the Family Responsibilities 
Commission Act 2008 (Qld), and concern school attendance (s40), 
school enrolment (s41), child safety (s42), conviction in court (s43), 
domestic violence (s43), and housing tenancy agreements (s44). Where 
an individual breaches a trigger, the FRC receives a notification from 
the relevant agency (see definition of notification above).  
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Executive summary 
Implemented in 2008, the Cape York Welfare Reform (CYWR) initiative aims to address passive 
dependence on welfare and commit people in the communities of Aurukun, Coen, Hope Vale, and 
Mossman Gorge to resume primary responsibility for the wellbeing of their families and their 
communities. This review examines one aspect of CYWR—income management (IM). Under the 
Cape York IM (CYIM) model, IM is administered by the Department of Human Services based on the 
guidance and decisions of the Family Responsibilities Commission (FRC).  
Ultimately, only a relatively small proportion of FRC clients have ever been subject to a CYIM order. 
At its peak in 2008–2009 the percentage of FRC clients placed on a CYIM order was 20.7%, a figure 
which has declined annually to the 2017-2018 figure of 7.7%.    
This review seeks to understand the impact of CYIM over the past ten years (2008–2018) in the 
original CYWR communities (i.e. excluding Doomadgee1), drawing on available qualitative and 
quantitative data (e.g. qualitative accounts in the existing literature, FRC reports and FRC client data). 
Cape York communities are looking to make a decision about evolving from CYWR towards new 
arrangements based on the empowerment/development model. There is an expectation from 
communities that this review will inform a decision about the future of welfare quarantining in Cape 
York and what role the current CYIM approach can/should have in any future models. Different 
communities have different needs and may come to different conclusions. 
CYIM is unique and, thus, conclusions arising from this review may not be able to be transferred to 
IM in other contexts. In fact, many of the conclusions depend on the unique IM delivery system that 
is peculiar to the CYIM model, rather than simply IM alone.  
Brief summary of key findings 
This review finds that, notwithstanding the detailed and extensive consultation process described by the 
Cape York Institute (2007), there was nevertheless a lingering feeling by some CYWR community 
members and leaders that CYWR, the FRC and CYIM were imposed, rather than agreed to. This lessened 
over time, but indicates a potential need to more carefully consider any future rollout of the scheme (or 
similar schemes).  
The context within which CYIM is delivered (namely, through the FRC primarily by its Local 
Commissioners) is a key driving factor for any successes that can be attributed to it. This sets CYIM 
apart from other models in Australia, and enables it to be delivered in a way that is more culturally 
appropriate, promotes the restoration and rebuilding of Indigenous authority, and is uniquely matched to 
the individual circumstances of FRC clients. This is not the case with IM models being delivered in other 
parts of Australia. This delivery mechanism could provide useful lessons for future Cape York models, 
as well as other Australian models.    
Because of the flexibility that is built into the CYIM model (e.g. the ability to quarantine 60, 75 or 90% 
of income), the FRC is able to design the right mixture of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors that meet the needs 
of each individual client’s unique circumstances. This involves applying CYIM in different ways—to 
coerce, incentivise, and more. The option of applying compulsory and voluntary IM is also apparently 
useful, particularly for community members who derive value from the perception that they have been 
placed on compulsory IM (even where they have asked that the FRC do so).   
Evidence concerning the outcomes and impacts of CYIM is mixed. In many cases, there is good 
qualitative evidence that the FRC and CYIM have contributed to a reduction in alcohol (and in particular, 
harmful consumption of alcohol), drugs, violence and crime. There is also evidence that outcomes have 
improved in terms of children’s overall health and wellbeing, and engagement in school. The BasicsCard 
has been a helpful tool for assisting some community members to manage household budgets, provide 
for their families, and reduce opportunities for humbugging.  
                                                     
1 The FRC also began operating in Doomadgee in late 2014, and CYIM was also later introduced (though with fewer 
notification triggers) in April 2016 (FRC, 2015e, 2016e).  
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In general, many accounts from FRC personnel and community members (including FRC clients) 
indicate a sense that their communities have improved under CYWR, and at least partially as a result of 
the FRC and CYIM. At the very least, CYWR, the FRC and CYIM appear to have helped to create a 
context that is conducive to positive outcomes, for example, where social capital is improving over time. 
They have also enabled some community members to feel more empowered to pursue positive changes 
in their own lives, and to set similar expectations for their friends, families and kin.     
Although these qualitative data indicate a largely positive view, they are not always supported by the 
available quantitative data. Analyses of aggregated data at the community level show mixed results, 
whilst analysis of the data records of individual FRC clients indicate that whilst CYIM did not eliminate 
further breaches, it extended the time between breach notifications.2 
One explanation for the discrepancies in the qualitative and quantitative data may be provided by the 
concept of collective efficacy, whereby the qualitative data suggests improved social integration and 
strengthening social structures and institutions, while the quantitative data indicates fluctuating 
indicators of social engagement. 
There are also important limitations in both datasets that should be carefully considered, and which may 
also go some way to explaining the discrepancies between the data. For example, the potential for ‘mantra 
speak’ may reduce the validity of the qualitative data, while a great deal of the quantitative administrative 
data is particularly susceptible to changes in reporting behaviours, detection of certain behaviours and 
activities (e.g. by police), and by broader policies and programmes that operate alongside CYWR, the 
FRC and CYIM. These broader policies and programmes may contribute to the outcomes being sought 
under CYWR, or detract from them.  
Most quantitative data around key outcome areas (e.g. schooling and safety) were also only available at 
the community level and, thus, include individuals who have had no contact with the FRC and CYIM.3 
Unfortunately, due to timing and potential privacy issues, datasets that link individuals across multiple 
data points (e.g. school attendance, offending, child safety, welfare status, FRC exposure, etc.) were not 
available to inform this review. These would, however, enable a more valid analysis of outcomes that 
might be more closely associated with the FRC and CYIM.     
  
                                                     
2 A breach refers to a notification received by the FRC that a client has breached an agreed social obligation trigger outlined 
in the Family Responsibilities Commission Act 2008 (Qld) (‘FRC Act’). Notifications can be received for school attendance 
(s40), school enrolment (s41), child safety (s42), conviction in court (s43), domestic violence (s43), or housing tenancy 
agreements (s44). See Introduction for more detail. 
3 The FRC only holds jurisdiction over welfare recipients, which account for around 60% of the CYWR communities’ 
populations (Bligh, 2008). Of these, only around 10% of the total client population are on CYIM orders at any one time 
(FRC, 2017e, p. 52), meaning community-wide data are being drawn upon to measure outcomes for a much smaller group.   
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The future of CYIM 
There is a strong sense in the available qualitative data that both the FRC and CYIM should remain into 
the near future, though their shape and structure may evolve to accord with new arrangements based on 
the new empowerment/development framework. This is subject to ongoing consultation. Nevertheless, 
there are some challenges highlighted, particularly in the qualitative data, which may provide a starting 
point for discussions around future models.  
These include challenges around:  
• how to effect positive change amongst those beyond the FRC’s jurisdiction (e.g. because they 
are not receiving welfare),  
• how to overcome issues with some clients circumventing the BasicsCard,  
• how to improve traction against a group of clients that are frequently described as being ‘hard to 
reach’, and  
• how to improve service-delivery arrangements that support the FRC and CYIM.  
It is also apparent that Local Commissioners derive great value from the support and mentoring they 
receive through the FRC structure, but that transition planning around the take up of these (or similar) 
roles by future leaders (including the potential role of existing structures like Community Justice Groups) 
requires further consideration.     
On the whole, the review finds that the CYIM model has a number of unique characteristics that not only 
distinguish it from other Australian models, but may provide the key to any successes that are attributed 
to it. These factors may offer useful lessons when considering any future rollout of the model, or similar 
models, in Cape York and elsewhere.    
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1. Introduction  
Implemented in 2008, the Cape York Welfare Reform (CYWR) initiative aims to address passive 
dependence on welfare and commit people in the communities of Aurukun, Coen, Hope Vale, and 
Mossman Gorge to resume primary responsibility for the wellbeing of their family and their 
community. The key aims of the initiative are to: ensure that kids are safe, fed and educated; reduce 
passive welfare dependency; support opportunities for economic engagement; and restore other 
positive social norms.  
As part of the CYWR, the Family Responsibilities Commission (FRC) can direct 60, 75 or 90%4 of a 
person’s income support payment to Income Management (IM) to pay for the priority needs of their 
family. The quarantined amount is diverted to a BasicsCard and can be spent on essential needs, like 
food and other consumables, but is not able to be spent on certain prohibited items (e.g. alcohol, 
cigarettes), nor converted into cash. 
The FRC has jurisdiction over individuals who receive certain types of welfare, and who also breach 
agreed social obligation ‘triggers’, which are outlined in the Family Responsibilities Commission Act 
2008 (Qld) (‘FRC Act’). Notifications can be received for:  
• school attendance (s40)—where a student in a CYWR community area is absent from school 
for all or part of any three days during a school term and there is no reasonable explanation 
for the absences (determined by the Principal) 
• school enrolment (s41)—where a child of compulsory school age who lives in, or whose 
parent lives in a CYWR community area, is not enrolled at school 
• child safety (s42)—where the child protection chief executive becomes aware of alleged 
actual or risk of harm5 to a child in relation to conduct within a CYWR community area, or 
concerning a child who lives in a CYWR community area 
• conviction in court (s43)—where a court6 convicts a community member of an offence, or 
makes a finding of guilt about a child7 of a community member of an offence 
• domestic violence (s43)8—where a court makes a domestic violence protection order9 against 
a person    
• housing tenancy agreements (s44)—where a social housing lessor becomes aware that a social 
housing tenant is using their premises for an illegal purpose, has not complied with a remedy 
notice, and/or is in rental arrears for at least seven days.    
                                                     
4 The FRC only gained the power to quarantine up to 90% of a person’s income under CYIM in January 2014. Up until that 
point, the FRC only had the options of quarantining 60 or 75% of an individual’s income.   
5 ‘Harm’, as defined in the Child Protection Act 1999 (s9).  
6 For the purpose of the FRC Act, ‘court’ includes the Children’s Court, Magistrates Court, District Court or Supreme Court.  
7 In accordance with the Youth Justice Act 1992 (‘YJ Act’). However, in 2016 the FRC (2016c, p. 13) reported that it had 
stopped receiving Children’s Court notifications because of changes to the YJ Act, which prohibits the publication of 
identifying information for children dealt with under s301. This has captured notifications to the FRC, rendering the addition 
of the Children’s Court to the courts defined under the FRC Act redundant. The FRC (2017b, p. 14) recently reported that 
discussions with the Queensland Government indicate that “…there is no intention to legislate to provide Youth Justice 
notices to the Commission.”  
8 The FRC did not originally receive notices about domestic violence orders; it began receiving the first notices for domestic 
violence orders on 23 February 2016 (FRC, 2016e, p. 42).  
9 As defined in the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 (schedule).  
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The Cape York model of IM (CYIM) is far more targeted than the original Northern Territory 
Emergency Response (NTER) model, and other Australian models.10 The FRC seeks initially to 
counsel clients about their behaviour and refer them to support services, while CYIM is primarily 
used as a means to reform behaviour if these initiatives do not work.  
Overall, those under CYIM orders also only represent a small proportion of those on IM orders 
elsewhere. For instance, the total number of people being income managed across Australia in 2015 
was reported to be 25,663; only 153 (0.6%) of these were managed under the CYIM scheme (Arthur, 
2015). Furthermore, between 2015 and 2017 the total number of FRC clients on CYIM at any one 
time consistently represented less than 10% of its entire client cohort (FRC, 2017e, p. 52). At 30 June 
2018, only 7.7% of the FRC’s client cohort was placed on a CYIM order (Personal communication 
with FRC, September 2018).     
There is general agreement that CYWR has addressed many of the issues it was designed to address, 
and that further outcomes can only be achieved by evolving the program to meet the changing needs 
of the communities through a place-based approach.11 The purpose of this review is to inform how 
CYIM could be utilised in the future, following any changes to CYWR. 
Cape York communities are looking to make a decision about evolving from CYWR and towards 
new arrangements based on the empowerment/development model.12 There is an expectation from 
communities that this review will inform a decision about the future of welfare quarantining in Cape 
York and what role the current CYIM approach can/should have in any future models. Different 
communities have different needs and may come to different conclusions.  
1.1 Scope of this review 
This review was conducted over a relatively short timeframe (June–September 2018) and as such 
there were strict limits to its scope. It seeks to understand the impact of the CYIM program over the 
past ten years (2008–2018), drawing on available qualitative and quantitative data. Specifically, the 
data collected by the FRC in relation to decisions about income-managed participants, administrative 
data maintained by government agencies, and qualitative data derived from interviews, focus groups, 
FRC publications and other publicly-available reports, reviews and research papers. 
The context within which CYIM is delivered distinguishes it from schemes delivered elsewhere. This 
context, particularly the roles of the FRC Local Commissioners, has undoubtedly influenced its 
operation and impact and, thus, is of critical importance when determining whether there are specific 
lessons to be learned from the Cape York model. For example, in its initial design recommendations 
for CYWR, the Cape York Institute (2007, p. 45) stated,  
 
                                                     
10 At the time of writing this Report, IM was also operating in the Northern Territory, parts of South Australia, Western 
Australia, in Shepparton Victoria, Bankstown in New South Wales, and Logan, Rockhampton and Livingstone in 
Queensland.       
11 The Queensland Government response to the Queensland Productivity Commission final report on its Inquiry into Service 
delivery in remote and discrete communities (both publically released on 22 June 2018) commits the state government to 
working in collaboration with communities to co-design and deliver place-based approaches, subject to the strengths and 
readiness of relevant communities that includes options for: 
• Structural reform to provide for place based engagement, empowered community voice and decision-making and 
collaboration towards community-led service delivery; 
• Service delivery reform that will deliver placed based service delivery models that align with community priorities and 
need; and 
• Economic development facilitated through co-designed supports to Indigenous businesses, the Indigenous community 
owned service delivery sector and to local government. 
12 For example, see Pama Futures (2018).  
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“…conditional payments alone are not a panacea for damaging social norms, yet when they 
form part of a comprehensive strategy involving productive investment and support services, 
the results are likely to be positive.” 
Thus, although this review focuses specifically on CYIM, it also considers the context within which 
CYIM is delivered and the role this has played in shaping how CYIM has been implemented, received, 
and whether or not there is evidence that it has achieved its intended outcomes and impacts.  
Finally, this review focuses specifically on the original CYWR communities of Aurukun, Coen, Hope 
Vale and Mossman Gorge and does not include the newer FRC community of Doomadgee in its scope. 
The FRC was extended to Doomadgee in late 2014, and Local Commissioners were able to also apply 
CYIM from early 2016 onwards (FRC, 2015e, 2016e). However, the FRC in Doomadgee is only 
relatively young, and operates differently insofar as its Local Commissioners do not yet conference 
alone, can only conference based on two types of trigger notifications (school attendance and child 
safety), and are not supported by the broader CYWR service-delivery model. Therefore, comparisons 
between the original CYWR communities and Doomadgee are problematic.     
As discussed throughout this review, CYIM is unique. Therefore, conclusions arising from this review 
may not be able to be transferred to IM in other contexts. 
1.2 Structure of this report 
Initial sections of this Report describe the methods used to collect and analyse both qualitative and 
quantitative data that informed the review (chapter 2). The limitations of both types of data are also 
discussed. The Report then examines the implementation of CYIM as a means of distilling any possible 
lessons that may be helpful for informing the design and rollout of future models (chapter 3).  
Chapter 4 of the Report describes the FRC’s specific approach to delivering CYIM, focusing on four 
distinct themes: its ability to rebuild local cultural authority, draw on often intimate knowledge about the 
circumstances of its clients when applying CYIM, use culturally-appropriate and sensitive modes of 
delivery, and use the conferencing function (i.e. the process by which, after a notification is received, 
FRC Local Commissioners come together with the FRC client in a restorative setting to discuss the 
breach and available courses of action) for standalone benefits, but also as a mechanism through which 
CYIM is delivered. 
The Report then goes on to discuss the different ways in which the FRC appears to apply CYIM (chapter 
5), before outcomes-focused data are examined in chapter 6. In particular, chapter 6 discusses outcomes 
of the FRC and CYIM in relation to alcohol, drugs, violence/crime, money for basic needs, schooling, 
children’s health/wellbeing, and reductions in trigger notifications. (This review does not consider 
community-level outcomes in relation to the FRC’s housing tenancy trigger, because valid data was not 
available.) These outcome areas align with the original intentions of the CYWR, FRC and CYIM models, 
and also arose as key themes from the qualitative data.  
Finally, ongoing challenges of CYIM are considered and potential issues that require further exploration, 
in order to inform possible future models, are summarised (chapter 7). Chapter 8 provides a final 
summary and conclusion.        
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2. Methods 
This review triangulates both qualitative and quantitative data, derived from a range of sources. The 
following sections describe the methods employed to collect and analyse both types of data. Key 
limitations are also described.  
2.1 Qualitative methods 
2.1.1 Qualitative data collection  
In order to enable a broad sweep of the available data, and to incorporate diverse perspectives 
wherever possible, qualitative data for this study were triangulated from a range of different sources. 
These included:  
• all quarterly and annual reports published by the FRC since it was established in 2008 (46 
reports in total);  
• two books published by the FRC (Dean, 2013, 2017); 
• existing evaluations and reviews concerning CYIM; and  
• other public documentation concerning the FRC and CYIM (e.g. peer-reviewed academic 
publications, Hansard debates). 
The research team also drew upon transcripts from: 
• two focus groups conducted by the Department of Social Services with the FRC 
Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Local Commissioners on 10 May 2018, and 
• three semi-structured interviews with the FRC’s Commissioner, Registrar and Senior Advisor 
(Statistics and Research) (interviewed together), and the State Government Senior 
Coordinator for Aurukun conducted by one member of the research team over the course of a 
one-day visit to Cairns on 1 June 2018.  
Each data source is summarised in the data matrix available at Appendix 1.13        
2.1.2 Qualitative data analysis 
The qualitative data was analysed using thematic coding and content analysis. A grounded-theory 
approach was adopted as a means of enabling the findings to emerge organically from the available 
data. Where a consistent theme emerged across multiple sources of qualitative data, it was coded 
accordingly.     
The data covered the full period from the FRC’s inception in 2008 until June 2018. Collectively, it 
enabled insight into the functioning of the FRC and CYIM, the work and views of the FRC 
Commissioners and other key FRC staff, existing evaluative evidence concerning CYIM, and views 
and insights provided by other persons who have played key roles in the design and delivery of 
CYIM. The data also contained a number of client case studies and excerpts of client feedback.14 
These are referred to throughout the Report, and are also included in full at Appendix 2. They were 
particularly useful in terms of providing a ground-level narrative about the use, outcomes and impacts 
of CYIM on community members’ lives.  
Although the qualitative data relied upon for this review were broad and enabled rich analysis, they 
also hold some limitations.  
                                                     
13 All appendices to this Report are contained in a separate appendix document.  
14 Case studies and client feedback were predominantly derived from the FRC reports, though other reports also contained 
smaller excerpts (e.g. von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012; CYWR evaluation, 2012).   
 5 
 
2.1.3 Limitations of the qualitative data 
The qualitative data drawn upon for this review are primarily derived from the FRC (e.g. FRC reports, 
books, interviews with Local Commissioners and other FRC personnel). In many ways, this adds 
great value to the data—members of the FRC are arguably best placed to speak to the inner workings 
of CYIM, including the evidence they see, first-hand, of its impacts. However, this also inevitably 
introduces the possibility of bias.  
FRC Commissioners and other staff, many having dedicated large portions of their lives to their work, 
have a stake in seeing it produce positive outcomes. It is also possible that FRC personnel (and others) 
may unknowingly engage in ‘mantra speak’, whereby they become familiar with and internalise the 
‘official line’ or discourse that aligns with the FRC’s aims and objectives, rather than necessarily 
providing objective accounts of outcomes and impacts (von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 4).  
Wherever possible, the review team has attempted to balance these accounts by drawing on broader 
literature (e.g. peer-reviewed academic publications) and community members’ direct accounts from 
past evaluations and reports, where these were available. However, there is likely still some level of 
sampling bias in the qualitative data relied upon for this study, which should be considered when 
interpreting the qualitative findings.   
It is also difficult to tease out the effects of CYIM specifically given there have been many other 
changes in the CYWR communities since 2007. For example, one of the most significant changes in 
Aurukun was the closing of the Aurukun Tavern in 2008—the same year as the FRC began its work. 
Although there are many qualitative accounts attributing lower alcohol consumption to the FRC and 
CYIM, it is far more likely that this has been caused by a combination of factors, of which the 
FRC/CYIM are only one. In a similar vein, the FRC Commissioner stated (in Interview 1, 2018, p. 3), 
“Well, every one of those [CYWR] communities is a far better place, and it’s not just because of the 
FRC.”  
Finally, the circumstances and history of the CYWR communities also play an undeniable role in 
shaping the context within which the FRC and CYIM operate. These contexts are marked by 
significant social disadvantage and, in many cases, extensive intergenerational trauma. Often, this 
trauma has its roots in the violent histories of colonisation and segregation experienced by those living 
in the CYWR communities, as well as their ancestors. The very makeup of the communities, which 
has been driven and influenced by the history of forced removal and relocation of Aboriginal peoples, 
are an example of the ever-present results of colonisation. Although a ten-year period is significant in 
an individual’s life, it is less significant when considered against this centuries-long history. Thus, it is 
likely that longer timeframes will provide richer evidence of the outcomes and impacts of these 
programmes, especially those outcomes that may only be felt across generations.   
2.2 Quantitative methods 
2.2.1 Quantitative data collection 
2.2.1.1 Offence data 
Publicly available reported offence data was obtained from Queensland Government data online.15  
Monthly reported offence rates per 100,000 persons from January 2001 to March 2018 were obtained 
for the police divisions of Aurukun, Coen, and Hope Vale. Reliable offence data was not available for 
Mossman Gorge.16   
Corresponding data was also obtained for the comparison divisions of Bamaga, Cherbourg, 
Doomadgee, Kowanyama, Lockhart River, Mornington Island, Palm Island, Pormpuraaw, Weipa, 
                                                     
15  These data are available at: https://data.qld.gov.au/dataset/offence-rates-police-divisions-monthly-from-july-2001. 
16 Police divisions do not have 100% spatial correspondence with Indigenous communities, and are at times significantly 
larger than the included community. In the case of Mossman Gorge, the population of the Indigenous community was 
disproportionately smaller than that of the corresponding division, so was excluded from the analyses. 
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Woorabinda, Wujal Wujal, and Yarrabah. These divisions were selected as they corresponded to 
Queensland Indigenous communities.   
Data was disaggregated by the following offence types: 
• assault 
• breach domestic violence protection order 
• drink driving 
• drug offences 
• liquor (excluding drunkenness) offences 
• good order offences 
• offences against property 
• offences against the person 
• public nuisance 
• sexual offences, and 
• traffic and related offences. 
2.2.1.2 Education data 
Publicly available school attendance data was obtained for all schools in Indigenous communities 
from Queensland Government data.17 Data was available at the school level, from 2013 to 2017, 
reported as annual attendance percentages.  
2.2.1.3 Child safety data 
Publicly available data on child safety notification rates was obtained from Queensland Government 
data. Data was collected for all Cape York Indigenous communities, both FRC communities and 
comparison communities. Data was available at the community level, from 2010 to 2016, reported as 
annual notification rates.  
2.2.1.4 FRC data 
De-identified longitudinal data for all FRC clients from Aurukun, Coen, Hope Vale and Mossman 
Gorge were obtained from the FRC. The dataset included information about clients’: community of 
residence, periods of time spent on IM, history of trigger events, and history of service referrals. 
2.2.2 Quantitative data analysis 
Aggregate data was first presented as time-series graphs to assist in visualising changes over time. 
Outcome data was first analysed in a series of pre-post difference-in-difference models. These models 
compare each intervention community to each appropriate comparison group to gain a community-by-
community assessment of the overall impact of the intervention. Difference-in-difference analyses 
were only conducted for offence data. Child safety and education data18 were not analysed using this 
method because data was not available prior to the intervention. 
Monthly offence data was next analysed in a series of interrupted time-series analysis models. Whilst 
difference-in-difference analyses determine whether there was a significant change in the average 
level of an outcome over and above that seen in the absence of the intervention, they do not assess 
whether there is an immediate impact of the intervention, nor whether there is a change in trend that 
may be attributed to the intervention.  
Interrupted time-series analyses assess the trend in outcome before the intervention, assess whether 
there was a significant shift in the outcome immediately following the intervention, and finally assess 
if the trend changed again following any initial shift. Each analysis incorporates a one-month lag 
                                                     
17 These data are reported at school level. Some schools that enrol students from Indigenous communities may have greater 
levels of enrolments of students from beyond those communities. 
18 School attendance data collected before 2008 are not comparable with data collected more recently (SPRC and FaHCSIA, 
2012, p. 224).  
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between the outcomes in adjacent months, in order to account for any immediate temporal 
autocorrelation, whereby outcomes in one month were correlated with outcomes from the previous 
month. Finally, the analysis provides a measure of variability or uncertainty around each of the 
estimates. 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses were conducted on child safety data and education 
data only. This data was not suitable for interrupted time-series analysis, as no data was available for 
years prior to the CYWR intervention. Therefore, these analyses do not assess whether there was a 
change in trend following the intervention, but rather, whether the trends seen in recent years in the 
intervention communities are significantly different to the trends seen in comparison communities. 
The effect estimates from the interrupted time-series analyses and the regression analyses were 
combined using random effects meta-analysis. Meta-analysis is a statistical technique used to combine 
the results of multiple individual analyses, and demonstrate not only the overall effect of an 
intervention seen in those analyses, but also the level of variability or uncertainty around that effect. It 
also allows for moderator analyses—that is, it analyses whether the effect is statistically significantly 
different between groups. 
In order to determine whether the number of CYIM clients in a community is related to offence, 
education, and child safety outcomes, a series of regression models were run. The results of these 
regression analyses were combined using meta-analyses to estimate the overall impact of CYIM on 
offences, and to evaluate differences in effects amongst communities. 
Finally, to assess whether CYIM changed individuals’ behaviours, a series of analyses were 
conducted: a set of descriptive analyses of CYIM and breach notification histories; a multilevel 
logistic regression model that assessed which breach notification types were most likely to lead to 
CYIM; and an event history analysis that assessed the relationship between spells on CYIM and 
future breach notifications. 
For further detail on the quantitative analyses, see Appendix 3. 
2.2.3 Limitations of the quantitative data  
A core limitation of the quantitative analysis of the aggregate data is the inability to isolate the impact 
of CYIM, over and above the impact of the CYWR initiative and FRC more generally, as these 
interventions are intertwined. Consequently, any impacts seen at the aggregate level may not be 
directly attributable to CYIM. However, without access to datasets that extensively link individuals 
across offence, education, child safety, and welfare data, these aggregate analysis must stand as 
proxies.19  
The multilevel regression and event history analyses aim to overcome these limitations by linking 
individuals and their subsequent breaches. The multilevel regression model links repeated episodes of 
breaches and CYIM episodes for individuals over time to evaluate the types of breaches most likely to 
lead to CYIM. The event history analysis model analysed repeated episodes of CYIM, breaches, and 
service referrals over time to allow an evaluation of individual behaviour change. 
Another key limitation with the aggregate data is that the geography of various administrative datasets 
is not always well matched to the geography of Indigenous communities. For example, police 
divisions do not have 100% spatial correspondence with Indigenous communities, and are at times 
significantly larger than the included community. In the case of Mossman Gorge, the population of 
the Indigenous community was disproportionately smaller than that of the corresponding division, and 
so was excluded from analysis for offence outcomes. It is also possible that offences, child safety 
reports, and school attendance rates may be clustered in a small number of families, and therefore the 
                                                     
19 Unfortunately, due to timing and potential privacy issues, datasets that link individuals across multiple data points were not 
available to inform this review. As a further note, health data on relevant issues, such as children’s health or hospitalisation for 
assault, were not publicly available at an appropriate geographic level. 
 8 
 
behaviours of a small number of individuals (who may or may not be FRC clients) may have a large 
impact on the aggregate outcomes. 
Finally, one of the key limitations with all police data lies in the possibilities of reporting and/or 
policing biases. If statistical analyses demonstrate that reported offences go up after a particular 
intervention, there are multiple possible interpretations. The intervention may have encouraged police 
to be more proactive, increased the perception of police legitimacy in the community, or altered the 
community’s sense of self-regulation. Each of these scenarios could lead to increased reported crime. 
Alternately, there may be a community backlash that leads to an actual increase in crime. Caution 
must, therefore, be taken in interpreting change in offence data.   
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3. Implementation of CYIM 
3.1 Implementation process 
The Cape York Institute (2007a, p. 149–150; 2007b, pp. 40–43) described having undertaken 18 
months of extensive consultation and engagement through a variety of means during the development 
of the CYWR design. This occurred across three phases, which involved a mixture of:  
• community-engagement forums,  
• meetings with community leaders and Elders,  
• multiple information sessions covering different aspects of CYWR,  
• community-wide door-knocks,  
• meetings with smaller focus groups of community members,  
• one-on-one meetings with community members, and  
• the ongoing presence of two full-time community engagement officers in each of the 
communities for a 12-month period (Cape York Institute, 2007b, pp. 40–43). 
Endorsement was recorded through the collection of community members’ signatures (Cape York 
Institute, 2007b) and agreement from community leaders. Ultimately, the Aurukun and Hope Vale 
Mayors and representatives of Coen and Mossman Gorge20 agreed, on behalf of their communities, to 
take part in the CYWR trial (Dean, 2013), a key component of which was the introduction of CYIM, 
to be applied through the FRC. 
As part of the initial CYWR implementation, Local Program Offices were also established in each of 
the communities. These housed representatives from each of the CYWR tripartite partners—the 
Commonwealth Government, State Government, Cape York Institute—and a local community 
member. They were intended to carry on the engagement process in the communities, but were 
ultimately dissolved when new governance arrangements were introduced under the National 
Partnership Agreement on Remote Service Delivery (2009–2014).      
Notwithstanding this period of intensive consultation and engagement, there was still some level of 
confusion when the FRC and CYIM were subsequently implemented. At least some community 
members were confused about what the FRC was, how it would operate, and what it would mean for 
them.  
“…At first there was confusion around the purpose of the Commission and whether it would 
be a real authority amongst our community…” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners in 
FRC, 2012e, p. 32)  
“…Many people in Coen did not understand our role and there was fear around attending 
conference…” (Coen Local Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, p. 28) 
Some believed the FRC was an arm of Child Safety, or another court, or that CYIM orders involved 
the FRC stealing clients’ welfare payments (FRC, 2012e; Dav’ange Consulting, 2018; Interview 2, 
2018).  
“…Initially, many in the community believed it was the Commission that brought these 
children to the notice of the Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability 
Services, and this belief created a large amount of bad feeling toward the Commission.” 
(FRC, 2012e, p. 76)  
“…A lot of people were not happy, because they were like, oh, so now they’re going to 
control our money, you know. We’re not going to get our money in our bank accounts, you 
know…” (Aurukun Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 9) 
                                                     
20 Only Aurukun and Hope Vale have local shire councils. Coen is part of the larger Cook Shire Council, while Mossman 
Gorge is part of the Douglas Shire Council. Coen and Mossman Gorge also have local Indigenous organisations that provide 
leadership and advocacy for their communities.  
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“When we first started, I think most of the clients thought we were, they were coming for a 
second court…” (Coen Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 2)  
At least partially because of this confusion, initial client responses were not always positive.  
“Yeah, we got abused, we got sworn at, we got threatened, you know, all those things were 
happening…” (Aurukun Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 2)  
“There was originally a great deal of animosity towards us as commissioners and members of 
the FRC within the community. There was a lot of abuse… People came to the FRC angry…” 
(Local Commissioner in von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 15) 
“[Commissioner Glasgow] has been threatened by people with weapons, people trying to 
punch him and the dirty mouths throwing words at him…” (FRC client in FRC, 2013e, p. 21) 
These responses extended to CYIM and the use of the BasicsCard.  
“A large percentage of clients were initially reluctant to accept the BasicsCard…” (FRC, 
2010e, p. 45) 
Initial reactions such as these may have also been, in part, because of the confronting nature of the 
FRC and CYIM, which was described by one Local Commissioner as holding people ‘accountable’ 
for their actions and behaviours (von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 15). The fact that the FRC 
Local Commissioners also discussed issues that were sometimes very personal was also perceived by 
some clients as being, at least initially, very confronting.  
“…I did not want to discuss private matters with these Local Commissioners.” (FRC client in 
FRC, 2012e, p. 43) 
“..The Commissioners were full on. They told me they had received reports from agencies 
like Child Safety Services and Education Queensland, and they knew the details of the 
reports. I was upset and could not understand why it was their business…” (FRC client in 
FRC, 2013e, p. 68) 
“…people were confronted with their behaviour…” (FRC client in von Sturmer and Le 
Marseny, 2012, p. 13) 
“…we were often abused by community members who felt we did not have the right, or 
authority, to discuss personal issues with them…” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 
2012e, pp. 74-75) 
It is also possible that the FRC provided a new ‘sounding board’ for people’s aggression and anger at 
their own situations (von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 15).  
“People were annoyed at their predicament, not at us. It was their predicament that made them 
angry…” (Local Commissioner in von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 15).    
In addition to sometimes negative reactions by community members, there was also some level of 
opposition from at least one of the local councils soon after the CYWR, the FRC and CYIM were 
implemented.  
Despite the fact that the Hope Vale Shire Council had formally agreed to take part in the initiative by 
signing the ‘Hope Vale Agreement’21 in May 2007, and formally opting into the CYWR trial in 
December 2007, there was subsequently a sense that CYWR, the FRC and CYIM had been imposed, 
rather than agreed to.22 The Hope Vale Shire Council’s Chief Executive Officer (CEO) (in Dean, 
2013, pp. 58–59) stated that: 
                                                     
21 The Hope Vale Agreement was made between the Commonwealth Government (represented by then Minister for 
Indigenous Affairs, Mal Brough) and the Hope Vale Aboriginal Shire Council. Under the Agreement, the Hope Vale 
Council agreed to participate in IM, to be administered by the FRC.   
22 There is also some evidence that, despite initial strong Council support from Aurukun, this also waxed and waned over the 
lifespan of CYWR. For example, this support waned around 2014, when the Aurukun Mayor became outspoken against the 
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“…his perception was that the community believed the trial was imposed on it, 
notwithstanding the Council’s acceptance of it…”  
A Hope Vale Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 4) recently expressed a similar 
sentiment.  
“…it [CYWR] was really dumped on us…”  
It is unclear whether this feeling emerged from the Council itself, or was a reflection of broader 
community sentiment, but the Council moved between proffering its support for CYWR, the FRC and 
CYIM at some points in time, and then becoming a vocal opponent at other times. For instance, one 
Local Commissioner (in von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 16) described how the Hope Vale 
Shire Council, at one point, put out radio broadcasts “…about getting rid of the FRC…”  
In Dean (2013, pp. 58–59), the Hope Vale Shire Council CEO was reported as having said, 
“…there was a lack of consultation by the CYI [Cape York Institute] with the local people. 
He agreed that the reforms proposed were sound but the proposed model was developed 
without adequate local consultation and the community was not wholly trusting of it.”  
This sentiment has also been expressed by at least some of the Hope Vale Local Commissioners (e.g. 
in Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 4; FRC Local Commissioner in von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 
16). However, further detail regarding how the mode or extent of consultation and engagement in 
Hope Vale might have been improved are unclear.    
It is also possible that negative views held by the Hope Vale Council may have been partially due to 
the fact that the FRC was perceived as an alternative power structure (Hope Vale Local Commissioner 
in von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 16), while von Sturmer and Le Marseny (2012, p. 13) also 
suggested that control over funding was a potential issue.  
Regardless of the different factors that played into these views, it is possible that they could have been 
negated, at least to some degree, by additional attention to the need for ensuring a strong and ongoing 
coalition of support for the reforms. As Limerick (2012) recounted, “The inability to sustain a 
partnership with Hope Vale Council… [was] a significant challenge in the trial’s implementation.”    
Ultimately, “There was no backup plan for dealing with a hostile response” (von Sturmer and Le 
Marseny, 2012, p. 13), and it had a considerable impact on how the CYWR, FRC and CYIM were 
perceived (Limerick, 2012). Thus, it likely also impacted how community members engaged with 
these institutions, at least in the early days of the FRC’s operations.    
3.2 Educating and building trust over time 
Because of early indications that many misunderstood the role of the FRC and CYIM, the FRC 
undertook considerable work, especially over its first couple of years of operation, to educate 
community members. This involved inviting vocal opponents to meet with Local Commissioners and 
“…discuss their concerns and fears” (FRC, 2009e, p. 46). It also involved consistent efforts at 
building relationships through conferencing and broader community events.  
“Much of the work to explain the… objectives of the Commission fell to the Local 
Commissioners in each community. The Local Commissioners took up the challenge and 
worked tirelessly throughout the past year to inform and educate all sectors of the community 
about how the Commission works and their role within the Commission…” (FRC, 2010e, p. 
50) 
                                                     
reforms. This may have been, in part, because the reforms were introduced and agreed to under a previous Mayor, who was 
replaced after he suddenly passed away in April 2012. Nevertheless, the current Aurukun Mayor has more recently spoken 
out in strong support of the CYWR.  
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“…we had to spend a lot of time explaining that we were not there to punish them further, but 
we were there to help them to improve their lives.” (Coen Local Commissioners in FRC, 
2014e, p. 30) 
The FRC has reported that, largely through the work of the Local Commissioners (FRC, 2010e), 
community members have improved their understanding of the FRC and CYIM. The fact that, over 
time, more and more community members have had direct contact with the FRC has undoubtedly also 
played a role; they have experienced its functions first-hand. This was also supported by the CYWR 
evaluation, which found that those who had contact with the FRC were more likely to express support 
for it (Colmar Brunton, 2012).  
This has resulted in many changing their perceptions of the FRC.   
“We have instilled in our community that the Commission is a place of assistance rather than 
fear.” (Coen Local Commissioners in FRC, 2009a, p. 14) 
“…as time moved on and they learnt to have trust in us and, and have faith in us and 
eventually they came back to us for more support…” (Coen Local Commissioner in Focus 
Group 1, 2018, p. 2) 
“…it has been good to see more and more people attending conferences with smiles on their 
faces…” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 2010e, p. 14) 
“There is now a better understanding of the good work the Commission is doing in the 
community…” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, p. 74–75) 
This has also extended to CYIM.    
“[Although initial reactions to the BasicsCard were negative]… These clients found over time 
that the BasicsCard provided many benefits to their family…” (FRC, 2010e, p. 45) 
“…I’ve seen that the community have a better understanding of the BasicsCard and what it’s 
there for, and… [saying] we want to be on the BasicsCard, like, voluntary. And, which is a 
good thing [sic.], because they understand that the BasicsCard is good for them and will help 
them…” (Aurukun Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 9) 
Then Member for Cook, Jason O’Brien (in Queensland Parliament, 2011, p. 3382), agreed that: 
“Four or five years ago, the need for social change in those [CYWR] communities was 
completely apparent but the resistance to change was large. There is still some resistance to 
change in those communities, though it is dissipating rapidly. It is dissipating rapidly because 
people in those communities are seeing the benefits of change and seeing what can happen 
when social change occurs.”  
Similarly, FRC Commissioner Glasgow (in Interview 1, 2018, p. 6) stated, 
“…the reality was that people started to see that there was a change and they’d put a bit more 
effort [in] for themselves, and that collective effort improved… and really the community 
started to look a little bit more after itself.”  
In some cases this work is still ongoing (e.g. “…still, we get abused, we get sworn at by our own 
community members…” (Aurukun Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 3)). However, 
there is a broader feeling that once community members became more familiar with the role and 
processes of the FRC, including CYIM, and gained first-hand experience of how they worked, they 
become more supportive and more willing to engage.  
3.3 Summary of findings 
Early experiences indicate a need to carefully consider protocols for any possible future 
implementation of the FRC and/or CYIM (or similar models). Notwithstanding the fact that extensive 
consultation and engagement were undertaken by the tripartite partners (and primarily led by the Cape 
York Institute) before CYWR, the FRC and CYIM were introduced, there was still some level of 
misunderstanding around the role of the FRC and CYIM during and after implementation. There has 
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also been vocal opposition to the CYWR, FRC and CYIM from at least one of the participating Shire 
Councils, though this opposition has waxed and waned over time and the Councils are ultimately now 
supportive of the reforms. This has, however, hindered the process of implementing and ensuring 
continued support for the reforms.    
Any future extension of the CYWR, FRC, CYIM and/or similar models should include careful 
consideration of how coalitions of support for reform can be established and nurtured over time. By 
maintaining strong leadership support for future models, it may be possible to improve overall 
community buy-in, trust, and early as well as sustained take-up.    
There was significant investment in long-term community engagement around the reforms. However, 
greater focus on community-wide education regarding the functions of the FRC, including how CYIM 
would operate, prior to its implementation may have also been helpful in dispelling myths and 
encouraging greater early engagement. It may also be the case that, regardless of how much education 
is undertaken, community members will not fully appreciate the functions, opportunities and impacts 
created by the FRC/CYIM and/or similar models until they experience these first hand.    
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4. The FRC’s approach to delivering CYIM 
The following sections discuss the value of the FRC as the structure through which CYIM is 
delivered, focusing specifically on the following key themes that arose from the qualitative data: the 
importance of cultural authority, local knowledge, and the conference setting. Evidence concerning 
the use of CYIM is then discussed in chapter 5 (Application of CYIM). 
Where the FRC receives an agency notice in relation to a community member, it follows the process 
outlined in Figure 1 belowError! Reference source not found.. Once receiving a notification, the 
FRC has discretion over whether or not to proceed to conference, and what other actions should be 
taken during and after conference. CYIM is only one of multiple courses of action available to the 
FRC.   
  
Figure 1 Flowchart of FRC standard processes 
Source: FRC, 2017e, p. 16.  
 
Under s68 of the FRC Act, the FRC can decide to enter into a ‘family responsibilities agreement’ with 
a client. Under the agreement, the client can be directed to attend support services in accordance with 
a case plan, and/or be subject to a CYIM order. 
Where a person fails to attend a scheduled conference, the FRC must, under s65 of the Act, 
reschedule the conference. If a person fails to attend a rescheduled conference, the FRC holds the 
right to proceed in the person’s absence. This can involve conducting the conference and making ex 
parte decisions about the person, including imposing CYIM.           
4.1 Rebuilding local Indigenous authority 
One of the many devastating effects of colonisation across Australia, including in the four CYWR 
communities, has been the severe disruption and/or undermining of traditional local authority 
structures, which originally maintained and enforced Indigenous social and cultural norms through 
traditional lore. The FRC Local Commissioners were intended in the original CYWR design to be a 
key mechanism through which local authority could be re-established and/or, where it still existed, 
empowered (Cape York Institute, 2007). The Cape York Institute (2007, pp. 22–23, 49) explained,  
“A community-owned process where dysfunctional behaviour is confronted will rebuild 
social norms and Indigenous responsibility… 
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[The FRC] would not only provide the gravitas and stature of a Crown body, but critically, 
would give power to local Indigenous people to take responsibility for the enforcement of the 
obligations and rebuilding of social norms.” 
The FRC Local Commissioners were intended as catalysts for shaping group norms (Reynolds, 
Subasic and Jones, 2012). A Hope Vale Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 27) offered 
further context:  
“…not forgetting the histories of our communities, where we were placed there by 
government. They took feuding clans, and said get on for the sake of Christianity. But there 
has not been anyone responsible for the social aspects of our community and FRC has taken 
on that role, restoring law and order in that way.”   
This empowerment of local Indigenous leaders to apply CYIM is a key feature that distinguishes the 
Cape York model from those implemented elsewhere in Australia (Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC), 2012). There is considerable anecdotal evidence that CYIM has been 
successful in achieving its objective to support and rebuild local authority.  
“We know that the meaningful engagement with our clients and their willingness to take on 
board our guidance is a sign of our acceptance as Commissioners and the returning of 
traditional authority to our community.” (Hope Vale Local Commissioners in FRC, 2011e, p. 
18) 
“…our authority is no longer challenged. Community members proactively seek help from 
us…” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, pp. 74–75) 
“…we are now much more than just a Commission; we are leaders and supporters of our 
community.” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, p. 32) 
The CYWR evaluation findings at least partially supported these views, indicating that community 
members who had endorsed the FRC were also more likely to report there was strong leadership in 
their community (Reynolds, Subasic and Jones, 2012). Limerick (2012, p. 6) concluded that “A 
successful feature of the trial has been the rebuilding of Indigenous authority to tackle antisocial 
behaviour through the local FRC Commissioners...”  
Local Commissioners have also demonstrated increased authority by chairing their own conferences 
without the presence of the FRC Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner (FRC, 2014a, p. 2).23  
“This year we have concentrated our efforts on conducting more conferences without the 
assistance of Commissioner Glasgow. As a result we have found that the community is 
showing greater respect for us as leaders.” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 2014e, p. 
28) 
In 2017–2018, Local Commissioners sat alone for:  
• 98.1% of all conferences in Aurukun, 
• 88.4% of all conferences in Coen, 
• 98.9% of all conferences in Hope Vale, and 
• 26.4% of all conferences in Mossman Gorge24 (Personal communication with the FRC, 21 
September 2018). 
                                                     
23 Local Commissioners were originally required to sit with either the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner. Later, the 
addition of s50A to the Family Responsibilities Commission Act 2008 (Qld) enabled at least three Local Commissioners to 
conference alone, without the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner being present (FRC, 2014a, p. 2). Over time, Local 
Commissioners in each of the four communities increasingly conducted conferences alone (FRC, 2015e, p. 42; 2016e, p. 48).  
24 Mossman Gorge only has three Local Commissioners and, during the 2017–2018 financial year, one Local Commissioner 
took up another significant position based in Cairns. Because the FRC requires a quorum of three Commissioners to sit in 
conference, this has temporarily reduced the ability of the Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners to sit without the 
Commissioner also being present. For example, in the 2016–2017 financial year, Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners sat 
independently 81.2% of the time (Personal communication with the FRC, 21 September 2018).   
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They also regularly provide advocacy and leadership for their communities, including being called 
upon by external parties for advice (FRC, 2009c; FRC, 2010a; FRC, 2017e; IPNRC, 2017, p. 4) and 
taking up other leadership roles (FRC, 2012c, 2017e; Dean, 2013; Focus Group 1, 2018).25 They have 
received praise from other services about their ability to provide positive leadership (e.g. Queensland 
Police Service representative in FRC, 2012e, p. 20; Mossman Gorge Wellbeing Centre staff speaking 
about Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners in FRC, 2016e, p. 20), have been awarded Order of 
Australia Medals for service to their communities (FRC, 2015e), and, at least some community 
members who were originally cautious of the FRC now perceive the Local Commissioners as role 
models.  
“When the Commission first came to our community we all thought it was going to be just 
another person coming into community telling us what to do… We then found out some of 
our aunties and uncles were now Local Commissioners and unlike in the Murri Court, they 
were equal decision makers. We did not think this could be true and believed that they were 
just token names on a committee…  
[Now] I hope one day when I am an older woman with traditional respect, that my courage 
and job skills will make me a Local Commissioner. I want to be a strong and smart woman 
doing the best for my children, family, clan and community.” (FRC client in FRC, 2012e, p. 
80) 
“…you’ve built them [Local Commissioners] up so well that people that are at war with them 
[before the FRC was introduced] have voted them into council.” (Brendan McMahon 
speaking about the election of Aurukun Local Commissioners to the Aurukun Shire Council 
in Interview 3, 2018, p. 8) 
Many others now regularly seek the Local Commissioners out for help and guidance (FRC, 2011e, p. 
19; 2012e, p. 28; 2014e, pp. 30, 34; Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 3).  
“Community members now come to the Commission voluntarily to ask for help and 
support…” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner Cobus in FRC, 2011e, p. 19) 
“…Now we are pulled up on the street or at the shop by concerned community members 
asking if we can do something to help a community member who is going through a tough 
time. We have community members turning up, asking to become clients so they can access 
our assistance.” (Coen Local Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, p. 28) 
Improvements in the perceived authority of Local Commissioners has likely occurred as larger 
proportions of the communities have had contact with the FRC and gained a deeper understanding of 
its role, as well as experiencing benefits from its support. It is also likely that this change is at least 
partially a result of Local Commissioners themselves growing their confidence within the FRC’s 
supportive framework, which includes ongoing professional development, for example through 
annual ‘development weeks’ (FRC, 2012c, 2012e, 2015e, 2016e) and continuous mentoring 
(McMahon in Interview 3, 2018; McMahon, 2012, p. 9).   
“We believe that becoming Local Commissioners has given us the confidence to achieve the 
advances that we have made in our personal lives. We also believe that we have grown in our 
ability to stand strong as Local Commissioners within Mossman Gorge and more importantly 
to stand united.” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, p. 32) 
In this way, “…a primary ‘beneficiary’ of CYWR has been the Commissioners themselves… in a 
significant sense the Commissioners themselves are clients of the system created.” (von Sturmer and 
Le Marseny, 2012, p. 5). Although von Sturmer and Le Marseny (2012) also warned that this had the 
                                                     
25 Many Local Commissioners undertake other leadership roles (though some also undertook these roles prior to becoming 
Local Commissioners), including as Deputy Mayors, Councillors25, Council Advisory Committee members, members 
(including founding members) of Community Justice Groups, Community Police Officers, members of local men’s/women’s 
groups and more (FRC, 2012c, 2017e; Dean, 2013; Focus Group 1, 2018). 
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potential to create a “top-end of town/bottom-end of town” divide, there is little evidence of this in the 
qualitative data. Where jealousy or animosity towards the FRC originally existed, it appears to have 
largely dissipated where clients have increased their contact with the FRC and received benefit from 
its various functions, including CYIM (e.g. case study 21 at Appendix 2). This is also supported by 
the findings of a CYWR community survey undertaken for the CYWR evaluation (Colmar Brunton, 
2012), which found that respondents who had attended the FRC and followed up on conference 
discussions and agreements were more likely to report that their lives were ‘on the way up’ than those 
who had not.  
Collectively, the qualitative evidence indicates that the perception of the Local Commissioners as 
principal authority figures in their communities has grown over time. Some were already undertaking 
leadership roles prior to joining the FRC26, but even those who were already recognised leaders have 
likely further grown their confidence and skills with the FRC (McMahon in Interview 3, 2018; FRC, 
2012e).  
It is difficult to determine the influence that the Local Commissioners’ growing local authority has 
had on their ability to deliver CYIM, but it is likely that this impact has been positive. This 
assumption is based on one of the underpinning theories for the CYWR—Kelman’s theory of 
influence—which argues that social norms are developed across three stages: compliance, 
identification and internalisation (Cape York Institute, 2007; Reynolds, Subasic and Jones, 2012). 
Individuals first comply with norms because they are forced to obey instructions, they then move 
towards identifying with others who role model the social norms (such as the Local Commissioners) 
and comply because of a desire to identify, and finally they internalise the social norms, accepting 
them as part of their own self-identity (Reynolds, Subasic and Jones, 2012, p. 146). Reynolds, Subasic 
and Jones (2012) found that the theory was well supported by the components of the trial, and that the 
concept of internalisation was also well supported by the broader psychology literature.  
The Cape York Institute (2007, p. 52) proposed that the Local Commissioners, as ‘internalisers’ of 
positive social norms, would play “…an important role in changing behaviour in communities from 
simply complying with a law to rebuilding a social norm.” Whether or not they first establish a sense 
of local authority is, therefore, important to whether or not they are able to encourage others to 
comply with, identify with and eventually internalise these norms. Movement along this continuum is 
apparent in some of the case studies discussed above. For example, one FRC client (in FRC, 2013e, p. 
68; also in case study 25 at Appendix 2) stated:  
“…Although I was annoyed at the Commissioners for knowing my business I kept going back 
to them, in the beginning because I had to, but later because I wanted to…” 
This concept is further explored and discussed in the following sections, as well as in chapter 5 
(Application of CYIM).  
4.2 Local knowledge  
The CYIM model is unique in Australia insofar as it enables an individualised, highly-targeted 
approach. This is a contrast to other parts of Australia, where IM has been applied in a less 
discriminating manner (e.g. under the original NTER and now under the Northern Territory’s New 
Income Management scheme) (Bray, 2016). This is only possible because decisions about whether or 
not to apply IM on Cape York are made by Local Commissioners, who hold deep and intimate local 
knowledge about their communities and clients.   
“We have learnt as Local Commissioners that not everyone is meant to fit into one shape. 
Some people have greater challenges, barriers and internal strengths than others. We work 
                                                     
26 For example, Government Coordinator for Aurukun, Brendan McMahon (in Interview 3, 2018) described the Aurukun 
Local Commissioners as people he “…would have gone to anyway [despite their being Local Commissioners] because they 
were not only Elders but they were the people that you want to have on side.”  
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with these clients to find the right pieces to build the tower of strength they need…” (Coen 
Local Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, p. 28) 
Many of the Local Commissioners have built this knowledge over time, having been born and/or 
grown up in their communities (Dean, 2017). They are able to draw on their understanding of local 
conditions, family and kinship relationships, pressures, availability of services and other matters, in 
order to carry out their functions. The FRC’s Commissioner Glasgow (in FRC, 2014e, p. 8) stated,  
“Our Local Commissioners are well acquainted with their community and the ancestry and 
family history of their community members. Decisions are made with an understanding of 
where each client comes from and what has influenced their behaviour.”  
For example, a Hope Vale Local Commissioner (in Focus group 2, 2018, p. 23) described the typical 
conferencing process as follows:  
“When we sit in on conference we get given the paper [referring to each client’s file], five to 
ten minutes before the person comes in so you read it and have a discussion amongst 
ourselves, because coming from that community you know that family and the family 
background and what exactly happened last night or over the weekend to put it all together, so 
the commissioners themselves talk about it and make a decision. Call the person in and have 
the discussion with them, find out what their side of the story is…” 
A similar process was described by the Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners (in FRC, 2015e, p. 39). 
When asked by a Commonwealth Government representative about whether some clients might 
“…look good on paper” but may not be doing well in reality, one Mossman Gorge Local 
Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 8) remarked, “I think that’s the beauty of the FRC, we 
know what’s going on at the ground level, you know?”  
Having this ‘ground-level’ knowledge about their communities also means that Local Commissioners 
can have frank and ‘tough’ discussions with clients (Hoolihan in Queensland Parliament, 2011, p. 
3381; McMahon in Interview 3, 2018, p. 18).  
“It is very difficult for someone to lie about their behaviour because that information very 
rapidly travels back to the Elders. The fly-in-fly-out services don’t have that local knowledge 
and insight.” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in Dav’ange Consulting, 2018, p. 41) 
“And the people that come in, man or woman, they can’t bullshit us. Because we know every 
one of them. We know our people.” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in Focus Group 2, 
2018, p. 23) 
 “…We were hard on some clients, and when they told lie stories or made excuses, we told 
them they had to stop making excuses for bad behaviour…” (Aurukun Local Commissioners 
in FRC, 2013e, p. 18) 
This ability is frequently cited as a key strength of the CYIM model (e.g. FRC, 2009e, 2010e, 2011e, 
2014e; Bray, 2016) and has been described by the FRC itself (2009e, p. 32) as being “…pivotal to 
reaching successful outcomes at the conference.” A Hope Vale Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 
2, 2018, p. 23) articulated the importance of this deep local knowledge to the ability of the FRC to 
apply CYIM in a carefully discriminating manner.  
“You need to know it, you need to know the family connections, you need to know the 
situation, if there is a domestic violence situation and try [to] understand exactly why you 
have this report before you. It’s just knowledge from right across the board. That’s why 
something like this, this IM can’t be done by government or anybody else, it has to be done 
by people from that community, Elders from that community. We have to be responsible for 
our own, we have to deal with our own.”  
An FRC Local Coordinator (in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 17) also spoke about the role that the FRC 
plays in delivering CYIM and what might occur if it did not play this role.  
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“…The Commissioners work on a case-by-case basis… Take them away, everyone’s just on a 
card, and they’ll probably never move.” 
The knowledge that Local Commissioners are able to draw upon when deciding whether or not to 
apply IM is extensive (McMahon in Interview 3, 2018). This distinguishes the FRC’s ability to deliver 
IM in a nuanced manner, which is not currently the case in other locations throughout Australia (Bray, 
2016).  
4.3 Cultural sensitivity 
Because Local Commissioners are Indigenous and have deep connections with the communities in 
which they work, they are well placed to provide a service that is culturally sensitive and appropriate.   
“We apply our culture in all our decision making. We hear the voices of our Elders guiding us 
and when we mix it together with Commissioner Glasgow’s leadership, we are strong, united 
and compassionate.” (Coen Local Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, p. 29) 
The fact that Local Commissioners are intentionally drawn from various clan groups and also 
represent a mixture of genders means that responses can be shaped depending on cultural conventions. 
For example, male Local Commissioners are called upon to lead discussions on men’s business while 
female Local Commissioners lead discussions on women’s business (Dav’ange Consulting, 2018, p. 
42).  
Local Commissioners also converse with clients in their local ancestral languages (primarily Wik-
Mungkan in Aurukun, Umpithamu in Coen, Guugu Ymidhirr in Hope Vale and Kuku Yalanji in 
Mossman) (Dean, 2013, p. 51). This is pragmatic, given Standard Australian English is spoken as a 
second language by many community members. However, it has also been described as being 
symbolically important; as von Sturmer and Le Marseny (2012, p. 6) reported, “Wik is the language 
of equality: as if to say, we are all equal before Wik. English is the language of hierarchies and 
externally-derived statuses.” A statement from one Hope Vale Local Commissioner (in FRC, 2011e, 
p. 42) further supports this:  
“In conference, speaking in language gives more authority and emphasis to the words, it is the 
tone, the history and the respect for the language and those long passed that spoke it.”  
It appears that the FRC setting is able to achieve a level of cultural sensitivity that may not otherwise 
be possible without the presence of the Local Commissioners. This level of cultural capability does 
not appear to be present in the delivery of IM elsewhere in Australia (Bray, 2016).   
4.4 The conference setting 
The forum within which CYIM is typically applied is the FRC conference (although CYIM may also 
be applied ex parte where clients consistently fail to appear for conferences, primarily as a tool to 
encourage engagement, as discussed in section 5.1 Encouraging client engagement). The available 
qualitative data indicate that the conference environment is important in setting the scene for CYIM. 
In particular, it appears to improve clients’ access to natural justice and encourages them to take up 
highly-targeted support, both of which can support the intentions of CYIM.  
4.4.1 The value of being listened to 
The FRC conference provides a forum where clients can sit with Elders and discuss the reasons 
behind their attendance. There appears to be value in clients feeling like they are being listened to by 
the Local Commissioners during the conferencing process.  
“…I am glad the Commission listened to me. Not long ago I met with the Commissioners 
again, just for a chat so they could hear what I am doing. I am proud of where I am now you 
know. It was nice that they listened to me…” (FRC client in FRC, 2009e, p. 40) 
“Every time I see the FRC, I discuss the problems I face in getting my child to school. I think 
that the Commissioners listen to me…” (FRC client in KPMG, 2010, p. 77) 
“…I think the FRC listened to me and helped me.” (FRC client in KPMG, 2010, p. 81) 
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“…The Commissioners listened closely to what I said, asked me questions then gave me 
ideas…” (FRC client in FRC, 2011e, p. 62) 
Some client accounts also indicate that the ability to talk and be listened to during FRC conferences 
may hold therapeutic value. For example, one client spoke about their grief over the sudden passing of 
a close relative:   
“…I was so upset that nothing made sense, the days stopped having names and the nights 
were so lonely. Only the grog would fill the hole. I could see the grandchildren falling away, 
not going to school, hungry and dirty, but I could not move.  
One of the Commissioners came to see me at home and asked me to come to the next 
conference… I had not spoken about the passing to anyone, but looking at the Commissioners 
I knew it was time. I am sure I stayed much longer than my allocated time, but nobody 
hurried me, they just listened. We all cried just a little and they felt my pain… I agreed to go 
back to the Wellbeing Centre and asked for the BasicsCard…” (FRC client in FRC, 2013e, p. 
68) 
Local Commissioners also regularly describe focusing on their clients’ strengths and achievements as 
a key motivating factor during conferencing.  
“I like to encourage people and I make sure I tell them, ‘No-one can tell you that you can’t do 
it…” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioner Shuan in FRC, 2012e, p. 59) 
“[clients]… now realise we are also here to give them a pat on the back for their achievements 
and the progress they have made.” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 2010e, p. 14) 
“We have seen the worst of people. We have seen violence, crime, addiction, neglect and 
abuse, yet we remain hopeful. We remain faithful to our community, and open to seeing the 
best in people, regardless of what they have done or are doing.” (Aurukun Local 
Commissioners in FRC, 2014e, p. 28) 
This appears to contribute to the perceived legitimacy of the conferencing process.  
“We have gone back to the Local Commissioners a few more times and although they have to 
address the issues, they always praise me and tell me I am a good father for giving up the 
drinking. We leave there with a bit more confidence each time, determined only to return to 
let the Local Commissioners know how well we are doing—no more issues or problems for 
our family.” (FRC client in FRC, 2012e, p. 43) 
It may be the case that, where clients feel that they have been able to speak freely during conference, 
be listened to, and praised for their strengths, they are more likely to trust and “…abide by the FRC’s 
decisions” (Reynolds, Subasic and Jones, 2015, p. 164). This aligns with a large body of literature 
concerning the importance of procedural justice to the subsequent perceptions and actions of 
individuals who have contact with agents of the criminal justice system (e.g. Barkworth and Murphy, 
2014; Braithwaite and Makkai, 1994; Murphy, Hinds and Fleming, 2008; Jackson and Bradford, 
2010). For instance, Barkworth and Murphy (2014, p. 254) stated, “…when people are treated with 
trust, respect, neutrality, and are given an opportunity to express their views—all aspects of 
procedural justice—they are more likely to comply with directives, rules and laws, and are more 
likely to voluntarily cooperate with authorities.” Similarly, one FRC client (in FRC, 2013e, p. 21) 
remarked:   
“I know sometimes he [Commissioner Glasgow] was disappointed in me, like the day I turned 
up really drunk to a conference, but he always showed his concern and listened… I thank 
Commissioner Glasgow and the Local Commissioners because they have stuck by me, and 
now I will stick by them and make sure my promises are kept.”  
The FRC conferencing process also enables Local Commissioners to have ‘hard conversations’ with 
clients and set clear expectations, sometimes using their cultural authority to apply a re-integrative 
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shaming response (Dav’ange Consulting, 2018). For example, one FRC client (in FRC, 2012e, p. 43) 
recounted their contact with the FRC as follows:   
“…Grabbing the baby, we walked to the Commission building. Once we were inside I began 
telling them what I thought. Immediately they said to be quiet, sit down and listen, or go away 
and come back later when I was prepared to talk calmly. The yelling was not going to 
intimidate them. I decided to sit and listen.  
The Local Commissioners asked my partner if I had hit her in the stomach while she was 
nursing the baby. She looked at me to answer the question, but they wanted her to answer 
instead. I was shamed when she said yes, and then she said I did it other times as well. Her 
mother came to our defence and said we had a good relationship and it did not happen often. 
The Local Commissioners said they knew what went on; they knew I lost my temper and that 
I was a hothead. They looked me in the eye and said I didn’t have the right to hit her. Then 
they told my partner she did not deserve to have it happen to her, no matter what I said.  
There was some silence in the room whilst the words settled. They asked me what I liked 
about being a father, what I thought my job as a father was and what type of father I might be 
when my child is 10 years old. I had never thought about this. It was difficult. They then 
asked me if I would want my child to be beaten like I hit my partner when she was grown up 
and in a relationship. I asked what I could do to make myself a better father and partner. Since 
that day I have tried to make myself better…” (FRC client in FRC, 2012e, p. 43)  
Similarly, the Aurukun Government Coordinator (McMahon in Interview 3, 2018) stated,  
“One of the biggest things I noticed was that people mightn’t like them, but they see them as 
telling the truth and fair, and that is the thing that is most important in the community.  So 
that's a really important thing.”  
Because of the Local Commissioners’ ability to have difficult conversations, the FRC has been 
described as being potentially more effective than formal, adversarial modes of justice (Focus Group 
2, 2018; Dav’ange, 2018). For example:  
 “…they know facing our elders in the community has more impact on the community 
behaviour than, for the MAG [Magistrates Court] notice like, they go to the courts, the judge 
comes in, hands them down a, gives them a slap on the wrist or whatever. But if they face the 
community Elders that has more impact on them, for them to change their behaviours, than 
what would have… Means they have to follow up on their responsibilities.” (Hope Vale Local 
Commissioner in Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 24)   
This further highlights the importance of the Local Commissioners’ sense of local authority in 
carrying out these duties (as discussed in section 4.1 Rebuilding local Indigenous authority); it is 
within this context that CYIM is applied. There are many powerful stories of clients experiencing 
pivotal moments of realisation during conference sessions and making dramatic and positive changes 
in their lives (for example, see case studies 3, 4, 5, 9, 11, 18, 20, 21 and 24 in Appendix 2). There are 
also others, for whom conferencing appears to have less of an impact (e.g. case study 14), which is 
further discussed in section 7.2.4 ‘Hard to reach’ clients. However, overall, it appears that the FRC 
conference context plays an important role as a standalone component of the CYWR, as well as in 
setting the context for CYIM.   
4.4.2 Linking clients with services 
The Cape York Institute (2017, p. 7) recently described the FRC as a ‘fulcrum’, which connects the 
“…Australian Government’s welfare system, and the State’s and NGOs’ service delivery/support 
system.” This primarily occurs through the FRC’s conferencing function, whereby clients can be 
referred to local services to access support for certain needs (e.g. local health clinics, parenting 
programs, financial-literacy support). The wraparound support that services provide has been viewed 
by some FRC Commissioners as being critical to the model’s success.  
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“The programme like this, it’s gotta [sic.] be surrounded by people, agencies that we can refer 
them to. The wellbeing men’s group, the budgeting, parenting, pride of place. They play a 
role, outside of what we do…” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 
13) 
“…it’s really important to have back-up services…” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in 
Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 16) 
Often, clients that come to the attention of the FRC experience complex circumstances of 
disadvantage that have combined to result in the receipt of a trigger notification. These may include 
(but are not limited to) experiences of abuse and violence leading to significant trauma, substance and 
gambling addictions, significant health concerns, interactions with the criminal justice system 
(including bouts of imprisonment), and poor living conditions, including living in overcrowded homes 
and/or experiencing homelessness (von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012; Ford, 2012; FRC, 2009b, 
2011b, 2011c, 2012e, 2016e, 2017e). Arguably, CYIM alone is a poor response to addressing what 
are often complex needs. The FRC’s ability to link clients to a range of other support services is, 
therefore, an important aspect of its broader role.  
Although there is evidence that the service framework could be further enhanced (as discussed in 
section 7.2.5 Service delivery), there is also anecdotal evidence that some clients receive great benefit 
from participating in support services under an FRC case plan (e.g. see case studies 1, 6, 7, 11, 18, 23 
and 24 at Appendix 2). Thus, this aspect of the FRC’s role enables it to further support the objectives 
of CYIM in a way that does not occur in other IM programmes across Australia.  
4.5 Summary of findings 
There is strong evidence that Local Commissioners have grown their confidence over time to become 
respected authority figures for their communities. It is likely that the supporting structure of the FRC 
has played a key role in empowering Local Commissioners to take on greater authority and leadership 
roles (notwithstanding the fact that some were already recognised as leaders and Elders). Although it 
is difficult to tease out the impact that this has had on the FRC’s ability to deliver CYIM, it is likely 
that this impact has been positive.  
Regardless, the Local Commissioners play a critical role in delivering IM on Cape York. Their deep 
and long-lasting connections with their communities, knowledge of local families, kinship networks 
and circumstances, enables them to apply CYIM in a way that takes into account each client’s unique 
situation. This allows a far more individualised application of IM than that which exists elsewhere.    
The fact that Local Commissioners have deep and intimate connections with the communities in 
which they work also enables them to provide a service that is more culturally appropriate than may 
otherwise be the case. This likely plays an important role in decolonising the delivery of support and 
services, including CYIM, to community members, suggesting that there is a greater likelihood that 
CYIM will be delivered in a culturally sensitive and appropriate manner when compared with other 
IM models in Australia.  
As the key forum within which CYIM is typically applied, the FRC conference appears to be 
important in improving clients’ access to natural justice. There appears to be significant value in FRC 
clients feeling that they have been able to share their views and be listened to during conferencing. In 
turn, access to procedural and natural justice likely encourages greater trust and confidence in the 
FRC, which at least in some cases translates to greater likelihood that clients will adhere to the social 
norms role modelled and enforced by the FRC. This provides an important context for the application 
of CYIM, which may serve to support its behavioural objectives.   
Finally, many FRC clients experience complex circumstances of disadvantage. IM alone would likely 
be a poor response to addressing these diverse needs. Therefore, the FRC’s ability to link clients with 
a range of additional support services undoubtedly plays an important role in addressing the 
circumstances of disadvantage that bring clients to its attention in the first place. This also appears to 
play an important role in setting the context for CYIM.  
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5. Application of CYIM 
CYIM is only one tool in the FRC’s broader toolkit of options. Ultimately, only a relatively small 
proportion of FRC clients have ever been subject to a CYIM order. Between January 2015 and June 
2017, the total percentage of clients on IM orders at any one time remained below 10% of the total 
client population (FRC, 2017e, p. 52). At 30 June 2018, only 7.7% of the FRC’s client cohort was on 
a CYIM order (Personal communication with FRC, September 2018).  
The individual data provided by the FRC indicates that in the ten years from July 2008 to July 2018, 
fewer than half of all FRC clients had been placed on CYIM at some time (n=794, 43.1%), and of 
these, over half (52.8%) had only one spell of CYIM, and over a quarter (27%) had only two spells. 
The remaining 20.3% had three or more spells of CYIM in their histories. The majority of clients who 
had an IM order (68.5%) had been placed on a maximum of 75% quarantining during their history, a 
quarter (25.6%) had been on a 90% maximum, while only 5.9% of IM clients had been on a 60% 
maximum during their history. On average, FRC clients who had been placed on an income 
management order spent an average of 28.5% of their FRC history on CYIM (standard deviation = 
19.95%; minimum = 0.85%; maximum = 100%).  
This indicates that CYIM is utilised in a far more targeted way than schemes elsewhere in Australia 
(Bray, 2016). In particular, it is predominantly used as an option of ‘last resort’ where the FRC’s other 
functions (e.g. issuing of a notice to appear, conferencing, and referral to support services) do not 
result in a client engaging with the FRC, or demonstrating changes in their lives that align with the 
CYWR social norms (Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 1).  
Based on the qualitative data, it appears that when the FRC does impose IM, it is typically used in the 
following ways:  
i. Encouraging client engagement with the FRC—As a means of encouraging clients to engage 
with the FRC where they have not otherwise done so (e.g. where a decision to impose a 
CYIM order is made ex parte because a client has repeatedly not appeared at set conferencing 
dates) 
 
ii. Addressing  non-normative behaviours and decisions—As a means of penalising clients who 
have not complied with agreements or case plans, for instance by continuing to receive 
notifications for breaches, or for not engaging with support services in accordance with an 
agreed case plan 
 
iii. Incentivising normative behaviours and decisions—Where clients are already on CYIM, 
agreeing to incrementally reduce proportions of quarantined income depending on the 
achievement of agreed milestones (e.g. where reaching a school attendance milestone target 
results in a decrease of CYIM from 90% to 75%)  
 
iv. Supporting clients’ own desires to better manage and/or protect their money—Where clients 
ask to be placed on a CYIM order to assist them to manage and save their money; this may 
either be recorded as a voluntary order, or still be recorded as a conditional IM order where 
clients specifically ask the FRC to apply a compulsory order (e.g. to avoid opportunities for 
family humbugging, as discussed in section 6.4 Money for basic needs). 
5.1 Encouraging client engagement 
CYIM is regularly cited as a useful tool to ‘get people through the door’ and attending an FRC 
conference, particularly where the simple issuing of a notice to appear does not work. This is 
generally perceived as a gateway to further engagement with the FRC, as well as wraparound support 
services.  
Under section 66 of the Family Responsibilities Act 2008 (Qld), IM is only able to be applied ex parte 
after clients have missed two prior conferences. It is, therefore, often only used for this purpose as a 
‘last resort’.   
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“Income management to us is the last resort because, when we bring a parent in, when we 
start giving out notices to families to come to the tables, they don’t come the first time, they 
don’t come the second time, but the third time, and we put ‘em on income management. And 
that is the trigger to make them come…” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in Focus Group 2, 
2018, p. 1)  
“We use it [IM] as a tool to bring, to get more clients coming to conference…” (Coen Local 
Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 10) 
“Income Management has been the teeth to get changes happening. That’s been the hook to 
get everyone in the door and start discussing their issues, and start changing their lifestyles.” 
(Hope Vale Local Commissioner in Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 9) 
 “… [Clients] who don’t want to come into conference… we give them a chance on the next 
conference, we bring them back in, and if they don’t, well they don’t have a third chance. And 
the third time, if they don’t come in, we put them on BasicsCard, straight off the mark, we put 
90 per cent on…” (Aurukun Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 8) 
There are indications that using CYIM in this way does assist in encouraging clients to attend.  
“She would not attend, she would not talk to us and, finally we placed the Income 
Management order on her… she turned up at the next conference” (Local Commissioner in 
FRC, 2013e, p. 35) 
“We have witnessed over the past year that some of our mob who were placed on 90 per cent 
income management along with a case plan tend to slowly come around and eventually attend 
conference.” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners in FRC, 2015e, p. 39) 
“It’s also helped, well one example, we had one guy, probably twenty years old. He’d had a 
second domestic violence arrest. We’d served him three times, he didn’t want to come, put 
him on Basics Card, and that got him to come and see me…” (Hope Vale Local 
Commissioner in Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 13)  
There are also undoubtedly other influences on whether clients ultimately attend. For instance, one 
case study indicates that some clients refuse to attend even when placed on IM for extended periods.   
“…For many years this father had neglected his family. He had a long history of alcohol 
abuse and violence. He had been the subject of numerous Magistrates Court notifications and 
Education Queensland notifications to the Commission over a period of only 13 months, and 
had been in and out of custody over the last couple of years…  
He had refused for two years to attend a Commission conference [and was placed on IM 
during that time]… subsequently in February 2011 he came for the first time and asked for 
help to become the parent he wanted to be for his children...” (FRC, 2011e, p. 85) 
In the above case, it is unclear what ultimately encouraged the client to attend the FRC—whether it 
was the extended period of IM, or some other factor. Nevertheless, the use of IM as a tool to 
encourage engagement does appear to work in at least some cases.  
5.2 Penalising and incentivising behaviours and decisions 
There has been some contestation around the ideological underpinnings of CYWR, including 
questions around whether the social norms agreed under the intervention provide evidence of 
underlying neo-colonial objectives (e.g. Campbell, 2015). This debate is briefly summarised in 
section 7.1 Ideological challenges. However, for the purpose of this section, the CYWR social norms 
(reflected in the FRC’s social obligation triggers) are treated as desirable and normative.   
The way that the FRC operates means that it is, at least to some degree, punitive (Campbell, 2015; 
Bielefeld, 2016; von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 19). For instance, community members 
typically arrive at the FRC as a result of breaching the social obligation triggers (i.e. not sending 
children to school, being notified to child safety, not fulfilling housing tenancy obligations, and/or 
committing an offence). Once they arrive at the FRC, the conference setting can be used both to 
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reprimand as well as to celebrate achievements and strengths (as discussed in section 4.4 The 
conference setting). Similarly, CYIM is also used in both ways by the FRC—to coerce, but also as an 
incentive.  
“Well, we use [90% IM] as a stick and also a reward, so if we refer clients, we refer to the 
Wellbeing Centre and put them on say, 60 per cent, and they’ll come back and say I went 
there, and then we’ll have a look at their records and they haven’t been there, and we’ll say 
you can stay at 60 we can go up to 90 until you attend, and then drop back. So, we use it both 
ways…” (Coen Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 7) 
“So, [the Local] Commissioners, you know, perhaps explained when someone really does try 
to get their kids to school, you might drop them back to  from 90 per cent to 75 per cent, give 
them a chance to do that, so you have that flexibility.” (Commissioner Glasgow in Focus 
Group 1, 2018, p. 8) 
“Income management has also been utilised as an incentive rather than a disincentive in 
regard to school attendance. At conference clients who are the subject of income management 
orders are shown a graph of their child’s attendance in order to come off income management 
or have it reduced. The Commissioners report that there has been a favourable response to 
this strategy.” (FRC, 2015c, p. 13) 
 “…Local Commissioners often set school attendance goals or expectations for clients to 
attend service providers as a way of providing opportunities for clients to have CIM orders 
reduced or revoked if they are able to demonstrate the behaviour change expected by 
Commissioners.” (FRC, 2016e, p. 53) 
“…it gives them incentive, and as your kid goes more you might reduce that person off and 
eventually they don’t need to be restricted. So I think that system was a good idea…” 
(McMahon in Interview 3, 2018, p. 17) 
The above accounts indicate that it is not just a case of simply being put on, or coming off IM, but 
also the option and flexibility of being able to quarantine different proportions of each clients’ income 
that holds value. It enables Local Commissioners to apply pressure in different ways, at different 
times. This supports previous findings by KPMG (2010).   
IM elsewhere in Australia does not allow for this and, arguably, this would not be possible beyond the 
mechanism of the FRC, where the Commissioners can draw on local knowledge to better understand 
each client’s unique circumstances (as discussed in section 4.2 Local knowledge). Ultimately, Local 
Commissioners are able to balance the FRC’s coercive tools (e.g. requirement to appear, case plans, 
IM) with its in-built incentives (e.g. coming off case plans, reducing IM amounts), which provides for 
a more nuanced and individualised response to each client’s needs. (Whether or not IM has, overall, 
been successful in achieving its intended outcomes is further explored in chapter 6 Outcomes of 
CYIM.) 
5.3 Scaffolding clients’ desires to better manage and/or protect their money 
The FRC have the option of applying compulsory IM (through a conditional IM order), or entering 
into a voluntary IM agreement with community members. Voluntary IM agreements are only applied 
when members of the CYWR communities approach the FRC and request that they be placed on 
IM.27 Clients tend to make this request because of a desire to better manage their money, and/or 
protect it from practices such as humbugging.  
                                                     
27 Some clients also request that the FRC place them on a compulsory IM order, despite volunteering to enter into the 
scheme. The reasons for this are further discussed in section 6.4.2 Qualitative evidence concerning the impact of CYIM 
on ‘basic needs’. 
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“…Those clients who do request VIM [voluntary IM] advise it assists in the management of 
household budgets and provides a tool for savings for special occasions such as Christmas…” 
(FRC, 2011c, p. 18) 
“Those clients that request a VIM [voluntary IM] agreement use income management as a 
savings and budget tool, often for a specified period and to deter family members from 
accessing their income.” (FRC, 2013a, p. 9) 
This demonstrates an additional application of IM on Cape York; to scaffold clients’ desires to better 
manage and protect their money.     
5.4 Summary of findings 
CYIM can be used as a tool to support clients to engage with the FRC and other support services. 
There is evidence that, at least in some cases, it does work to encourage engagement. However, the 
combination of approaches and tools available to the FRC, of which CYIM is only one, also appears 
to be crucially important in enabling Local Commissioners to design the right mixture of ‘push’ and 
‘pull’ factors that meet the needs of each client’s individual circumstances (KPMG, 2010). 
This includes the ability to use IM to coerce, but also as an incentive. This is only possible because 
Local Commissioners have different options available to them—e.g. the option to quarantine different 
proportions of an individual’s income, as well as the option of deciding whether to apply or remove 
CYIM as opposed to other intervention options, like enforcing case plans. This level of flexibility is 
not available in other Australian IM schemes and re-emphasises the importance of the context within 
which CYIM is delivered.   
CYWR community members also have the option of requesting IM be applied in order to help them 
manage their income and/or protect it from humbugging. The FRC is, therefore, also able to apply IM 
as a means of supporting these clients’ goals. 
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6. Outcomes of CYIM 
There is a general feeling, both from the FRC Commissioners and from CYWR community members, 
that that their communities have improved since the introduction of the FRC and CYIM. For instance, 
in a CYWR community survey undertaken for the previous CYWR evaluation, Colmar Brunton 
(2012, p. 34) reported that 78% of community respondents said that the BasicsCard made their life 
better. 
This extends to a number of areas, including a reduction in violence, consumption of alcohol/drugs, 
gambling, child-safety interventions and an increase in school engagement and attendance. One of the 
specific outcomes of CYIM in particular appears to be its ability to support clients to better manage 
and budget their income, as well as overcome humbugging, which enables them to cover basic needs. 
These include instances where families have been able to afford basic furniture, household items, 
food, clothing and school supplies, where they were unable to do so prior to moving onto CYIM. 
These anecdotal outcomes do, however, need to be interpreted with a sense of caution. There is a risk 
that discourses around outcomes from the FRC and CYIM create a kind of ‘mantra speak’, where 
individuals repeat the dominant discourse even where it does not necessarily apply (von Sturmer and 
Le Marseny, 2012). Therefore, the process of objectively verifying these claims, wherever appropriate 
and possible, is important.  
To this end, anecdotal evidence regarding outcomes in the following sections is compared, wherever 
possible, with evidence garnered from quantitative analyses of administrative data (e.g. police report 
data) and client data held by the FRC. These data provide a further element of objectivity that is not 
available in most of the anecdotal accounts. However, they also carry limitations, which are described 
in section 2.2.3 (Limitations of the quantitative data) and which are also referred to in the following 
sections. Thus, although triangulating the data enabled a more fulsome overview of the outcomes 
achieved under CYIM, the findings described in this section are still limited and should be interpreted 
with caution.  
Finally, although specific outcomes are discussed separately in the following sections, these factors 
often interact and influence one another. For example, school attendance is regularly described as 
being directly impacted by the level of alcohol, drug use and associated ‘partying’ in the communities 
(e.g. Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 14; FRC, 2011d, p. 21). One Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 
2018, p. 23) described it as a, “…spider web story, you know. Just like a spider web, you pull really 
the whole thing and it’s a tangled web…” Nevertheless, each outcome area is dealt with separately in 
this report for the sake of clarity.    
6.1 Alcohol 
Alcohol is widely recognised as a key contributor to high levels of violence, child-safety intervention 
and health issues in Australia (Standing Committee on Indigenous Affairs, 2015). On Cape York, 
there is considerable evidence that alcohol has played a critical role in the breakdown of community 
and family functioning.  
A specialist physician gave evidence to the Commonwealth Inquiry into the harmful use of alcohol in 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities (‘the Alcohol Inquiry’) that, since the introduction 
of canteens in the 1970s, alcohol on Cape York had led to the loss of “…two or three generations of 
Indigenous folk” (Standing Committee on Indigenous Affairs, 2015, p. 53). This aligns with evidence 
captured over more than three decades by anthropologists, sociologists and others on Cape York and 
other areas of Far North Queensland (e.g. Sutton, 2009; Martin, 1993; McKnight, 2002). In Aurukun, 
the breakdown of social order and increase of alcohol-related violence after the introduction of a wet 
canteen in 1985 (against the wishes of many community members) was also documented by 
journalists (Carney, 2011). 
The following sections unpack the intentions of the CYWR in addressing alcohol abuse. Other 
policies and programmes that seek to also reduce alcohol consumption in the CYWR communities are 
then discussed in order to provide further context for the remaining sections, which discuss evidence 
concerning the impact of CYIM on alcohol in the CYWR communities.  
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6.1.1 Focus on alcohol under CYWR 
Alcohol played a key role in prompting the initial design for the CYWR. In its CYWR design report, 
the Cape York Institute (2007, p. 18) recognised alcohol abuse as one of seven what it called 
‘dysfunctions’ that had resulted from and also contributed to the perceived breakdown in social 
norms. It indicated that the per capita consumption of alcohol on Cape York was, at that point, 
between four and 4.5 times the Australian average and that 83–84% of Cape York men and women 
reported that they drank alcohol at harmful levels (as defined by the National Health and Medical 
Research Council) (Cape York Institute, 2007, p. 19).  
The Cape York Institute (2007, p. 20) attributed widespread alcohol use to a combination of factors, 
including the greater availability of alcohol, loss of local employment, and widespread availability of 
cash through welfare transfers. It argued, “…introducing idle time, free money and the right to drink 
had the unintended consequence that the preconditions for alcohol abuse epidemics were created” 
(Cape York Institute, 2007, p. 20).28 In response, it proposed that:  
“Intervention via a conditional income management sanction will effectively prevent the flow 
of welfare income to substance abuse and other behaviours that impact upon the welfare of 
children and dependents in the Welfare Reform communities.  
The conditional income management sanction will help to provide a family with a break from 
dysfunctional behaviour, supporting the success of other support services such as drug and 
alcohol counselling…” (Cape York Institute, 2007, p. 67) 
CYIM was, therefore, fundamentally perceived as a means of reducing discretionary spending on 
alcohol (and other substances) to provide a window of opportunity for clients to receive counselling 
and support, and otherwise recover from alcohol dependency. CYIM was essentially conceived of as 
one ‘lever’ that could encourage individuals to abstain in the short term and seek help; it was intended 
that other services would then step in and assist in reducing long-term dependency.    
6.1.2 Other policies and programmes 
It is difficult to draw conclusions about the specific impact of CYIM on alcohol consumption and 
associated social norms in the CYWR communities because of the extent of overlap between different 
policies and measures implemented at different times. For example, two of the CYWR 
communities—Aurukun and Hope Vale—have Alcohol Management Plans (AMPs)29, which have 
resulted in changes to alcohol restrictions.  
In Aurukun, an AMP enforcing a zero alcohol carriage limit was originally introduced in December 
2002 (Clough and Bird, 2015). Subsequently, the local tavern was closed in 2008—the same year as 
the FRC began its operations. In this respect, early anecdotal accounts from Aurukun regularly 
attribute lower alcohol consumption to the closure of the tavern. For example:   
                                                     
28 This is also supported by some of the broader anthropological literature. For example, Martin (1993) argued that, in 
Aurukun, reciprocity and demand-sharing arrangements within the Wik familial and kinship network traditionally regulated 
the goods and services acquired by each individual. However, the introduction of cash removed the need to rely on 
customary relationships for subsistence; in turn, “Many young men in particular used the bulk of their CDEP [Community 
Development Employment Program] incomes for gambling, alcohol (both canteen beer and outside grog) and travel” 
(Martin, 1993, p. 117). Similarly, Sutton (2009, pp. 54–55) stated that “Rising real disposable incomes in Indigenous 
Australia, while reflecting a reduction of economic disadvantage, have played a significant role in the intensification of 
alcohol-related problems and those of other drugs, ganja (cannabis) in particular.”  
29 In 2001, the Cape York Justice Study compiled evidence of widespread, harmful use of alcohol across Cape York’s 
Indigenous communities and subsequently recommended the introduction of alcohol management plans (AMPs), which 
were implemented incrementally from 2002 onwards (Clough, 2017). However, political support for the plans has waxed 
and waned over time (e.g. McKenna, 2014).    
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“…parents are at home looking after them [children] because the Tavern is closed… Because 
money is not being spent on alcohol the children are being better cared for and clothing and 
food is being provided for them.” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 2009e, p. 13) 
“…It is better with no canteen it stopped me drinking and my defacto has stopped 
drinking…” (FRC client in FRC, 2009e, p. 42) 
An AMP was also introduced at Hope Vale in April 2004 and later updated in January 2009. It does 
not impose a zero carriage limit, like the AMP in Aurukun. Instead, it allows the carriage of 11.25L of 
light- or mid-strength beer, or one bottle of non-fortified wine.  
Although there are no AMPs in Mossman Gorge and Coen, Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners 
alongside other community leaders have worked to establish voluntary accords, though it appears that 
a trial undertaken in April 2010 was not extended (FRC, 2011e, p. 20; 2012b, p. 17; 2016d, p. 13). 
Nevertheless, the Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners (in FRC, 2011e, p. 20) reported that, during 
the 2010 trial,  
“…the community was much tidier without those ‘silver pillows’ [cask wine bladders] and 
their cardboard containers littering the streets… there were [also] less assaults and domestic 
problems.”   
In addition to community-wide alcohol restrictions, the FRC Local Commissioners have also been 
instrumental in encouraging community members to establish dry houses (FRC, 2009c, 2009e, 2010b, 
2010d, 2010e). By 2010, the Local Commissioners had been involved in encouraging the 
establishment of at least 24 dry houses across three of the four CYWR communities (FRC, 2010e). 
There is evidence that these have also had a positive impact for some community members (also see 
case study 3 at Appendix 2).  
“I see changes in families that choose to have a Dry Place so that their children are no longer 
exposed to alcohol and parties and the violence that follows. I see families are spending more 
on food, clothing and bills and the dress code has got better in Coen. The children are more 
prepared for attending school, their consistent attendance has made big improvements to the 
standards of education they are achieving. Parents are more positive and taking more 
responsibility for their families. Not so many late nights with grog means that families can do 
more together on weekends, get out on country.” (Coen Local Commissioner Port in FRC, 
2009e, p. 36)  
“There has been a significant reduction in the amount of alcohol-related incidents such as 
public nuisance and domestic violence, with many people declaring their houses ‘Dry 
Houses’.” (FRC client in von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 14) 
“The implementation of Dry Houses has assisted community members to respect the choices 
of others to have a home without alcohol…” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners in FRC, 
2012e, p. 79) 
These, and other, policies around the consumption of alcohol make it difficult to isolate the specific 
effects of the FRC and CYIM. However, there is still some indication that the CYWR, FRC and/or 
CYIM have played a positive role.  
6.1.3 Qualitative evidence concerning the impact of CYIM on alcohol 
There is a general feeling across the communities that alcohol usage has decreased since CYWR, the 
FRC and CYIM were introduced (FRC, 2009e, 2010e, 2011c, 2011e, van Vondren, 2010; Carney, 
2011). This is most often attributed to a mixture of factors, including the AMPs and closure of the 
tavern in Aurukun (Carney, 2011; van Vondren, 2010; FRC, 2009c, 2009e; Limerick, 2012), the 
establishment of dry houses (von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012; FRC, 2009b, 2009e, 2010b, 2011e, 
2012e), and FRC clients’ attendance at alcohol counselling (e.g. FRC, 2009a, 2012e). However, there 
is also some evidence that the FRC and CYIM have had an impact on drinking. 
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Some FRC clients have indicated that they have either given up or reduced alcohol since coming into 
contact with the FRC. However, it is unclear whether this is a result of CYIM itself, the process of 
conferencing, attendance at support services, or some other factor. In at least some cases, it may be a 
combination of all of these factors. 
One client (case study 7 at Appendix 2)—an older man—had come to the FRC’s attention due to a 
Magistrates Court conviction for a breach of the Liquor Act 1992 (FRC 2010e, p. 47). The man was 
conferenced and placed on a case plan, whereby he was encouraged to complete a substance-abuse 
program. He was also placed on IM. He re-attended the FRC several months later, at which time he 
reported having made considerable progress.  
“…Since his first time before the Commission, the man had been thinking about his drinking, 
why he kept drinking and the damage he was causing to himself, his family and his 
community, and he had decided to stop.  
He had not had a drink for the past five months and although he was finding it hard at times 
he was determined to stay on track… FIM [Financial Income Management—a past 
programme that supported CYIM clients to manage their budgets] was helping him look after 
the extra money he had now that he was no longer spending it on grog… He is healthier, 
happier and calmer since he gave up drinking.” (FRC, 2010e, p. 47)    
Another client also indicated that they had stopped drinking since attending an FRC conference, being 
referred to a support service, and being put on IM.  
“Since that day [referring to the day he attended an FRC conference] I have tried to make 
myself better. I attended the Alcohol, Tobacco and Other Drugs Service (ATODs) programme 
and still go when I need to. I went to the Wellbeing Centre to do some anger control programs 
and to understand why I get frustrated and angry. Most of all I have stopped drinking grog.  
This was and remains the hardest thing I have ever done. My friends and family don’t 
understand, but my partner and child are much happier. We hardly fight at all because I am 
more in control and there are no more money troubles caused by the grog…” (FRC client in 
2012e, p. 43; also see case study 19 at Appendix 2)  
For yet another client, attendance at the ATODS programme, after being referred by the FRC, 
appeared to be a key catalyst for change.  
“…I used to drink and smoke excessively as a way of dealing with problems in my life. I 
thought the alcohol was helping me but I could feel my life going out of control… [This client 
subsequently attended the FRC, was placed on IM and referred to support services.]  
I am very proud that I have successfully completed the Alcohol, Tobacco and Other Drug 
Services (ATODS) programme and have learnt other strategies to deal with stress like talking 
about the problems, finding other ways to relax and not worrying about things that I have no 
control over…” (FRC client in FRC, 2009a, p. 34; also see case study 1 at Appendix 2)  
For these clients, it appears that a mixture of conferencing, referral to support programmes and IM 
have played a joint role in influencing their behaviour change. Whether or not the clients would have 
refrained from drinking without the additional imposition of IM, or only through the imposition of IM, 
is unclear. However, other clients do highlight the specific impact of IM.  
“The BasicsCard made an immediate difference because food became my main expense not 
grog. The grandchildren quickly saw the results and hugged and kissed me because I was with 
them now, not away in alcohol dreams…” (FRC client in FRC, 2013e, p. 68) 
Another FRC client who had been placed on IM stated that, “…there were no more money troubles 
caused by the grog” (FRC, 2012e, p. 43). Similarly, a Hope Vale Local Commissioner (in Focus 
Group 2, 2018, p. 11) remarked that IM had “definitely” helped to reduce drinking,  
“Because the money is not there in the Westpac or in the Commonwealth [bank account]. 
That money is in their BasicsCard and they can’t use the BasicsCard for cigarettes, and for 
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alcohol. And living in a defacto [relationship], it’s helping those guys, I can tell you—very 
much so.”  
McMahon (in Interview 3, 2018, p. 6) also stated,  
“…I’ve seen the amount of alcohol be reduced not only by good police work which they’ve 
done over the years but the fact is part of it is restricting the amount of money [cash] there [in 
Aurukun]… [so it can’t be spent on alcohol]”  
The FRC believes that CYIM has played a direct role in curbing alcohol abuse for clients because it 
reduces the amount of money available for the purchase of alcohol.  
“The BasicsCard has assisted in reducing the flow of alcohol and the ability for family 
members to humbug for money to buy alcohol” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners in 
FRC, 2012e, p. 79) 
“…money is not being spent on alcohol…” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 2009e, 
p. 13) 
“… [there are] certain families, or some certain family, that might go off the BasicsCard. 
They—they drink worse…” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, 
p. 22) 
This supports the Cape York Institute’s (2007) original design intention for CYIM—that it would 
provide a window of opportunity for money to be redirected elsewhere, away from alcohol, and for 
other supports to be taken up. As one Coen Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 17) 
explained, 
 “Eventually they sober up, then give us the opportunity to get in...”   
For other clients, contact with the FRC and potentially also CYIM has encouraged them to change the 
way they drink, rather than necessarily giving up alcohol.  
“…If I was going to have a weekend with the grog, we made sure the grandchildren were 
with relatives and out of the way. I made sure I was out of community.” (FRC client in FRC, 
2013e, p. 68) 
“I decided to make some rules of my own and now don’t allow anyone to drink at my 
house… I can go and have a drink somewhere else away from the kids. It is safer for them…” 
(FRC client in FRC, 2009e, p. 40) 
“…her parenting is good most of the time now that the grog and gunja is away from the 
children…” (FRC, 2013e, p. 35) 
These accounts indicate positive effects of CYIM for some individuals. However, whether this also 
led to longer-term reductions in alcohol usage for the above clients is unknown. Access to information 
about long-term outcomes for these clients may indicate lasting impacts of the FRC and CYIM, but 
may also provide some insight into the efficacy of alcohol counselling services to which the FRC 
refers its clients (as further discussed in section 7.2.5 Service delivery). 
Despite the apparent positive effects of CYIM for some clients, there are also others for whom contact 
with the FRC and CYIM has not impacted their drinking (e.g. case study 13 at Appendix 2). These 
cases are further discussed in section 7.2.4 ‘Hard to reach’ clients. Whether or not individual-level 
successes have translated into broader community change is also difficult to determine; the mechanics 
of change are not well understood and the impacts of various factors (as described earlier) makes it 
difficult to isolate the different effects of multiple interventions. What is clear is that, even though 
there is a general feeling that alcohol usage has lessened, it nevertheless remains a key issue that the 
CYWR communities continue to grapple with, as is the case in many other remote Indigenous 
communities. 
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Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners report that alcohol continues to be a key problem for their 
community, largely due to their inability to stem the flow from the nearby Mossman Township (also 
see section 7.2.3 Out of jurisdiction).  
“Alcohol remains a serious problem that destroys the lives of many of our loved ones. 
Alcohol contributes to the noise levels in our community with loud music playing at parties 
fuelled by alcohol…” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners in FRC, 2016e, p. 40) 
“…you know, we slowly get less alcohol in the community, less violence, less drugs and 
them, but the clients we’ve had over the years [who now live in the Mossman Township] are 
coming back in the end, bringing them back. Even though they were on their own little 
jurisdiction as welfare reform. They don’t care…” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioner in 
Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 23) 
Sly grogging is also still reported as a problem in Aurukun. For example:  
“Despite Aurukun being an alcohol free community, the booze still comes in midnight car 
runs from Weipa…” (Carney, 2011) 
“…sly grogging [in Aurukun] causes aggressive behaviours and translates into all night 
parties.” (FRC, 2014e, p. 59) 
“…rivers of grog [are] smuggled into the Cape York community… Depending on the season, 
a bottle of rum can sell for $280 on the streets of Aurukun…” (Elks, 2016) 
6.1.4 Trends in reported liquor offences 
The quantitative data indicate some evidence of community-wide changes in alcohol-related offences 
since the introduction of CYWR. However, reported offences may also provide evidence of greater 
willingness to report, rather than actual changes in alcohol use. This may be particularly apparent 
where social norms around the consumption of alcohol are changing; individuals who may not have 
reported alcohol-related offences in the past may be more likely to do so since CYWR and the FRC 
were established. Conversely, it is also possible that some offences continue to go unreported.  
Furthermore, reported liquor offences only provide one indicator of the level of availability and 
consumption of alcohol in the communities. Additional data points may provide a more valid 
indication of the real extent of alcohol usage, as well as differentiating usage that might be considered 
harmful versus other types. These limitations should be considered when interpreting the following 
findings. Liquor offences (excluding drunkenness) include offences such as infringements under the 
Liquor Act 1992 (Qld) and supply of alcohol to minors, but do not include intoxication. 
Trends in reported liquor offences (excluding drunkenness) were analysed for the police divisions of 
Aurukun, Coen, and Hope Vale, relative to the comparison areas of Bamaga, Cherbourg, Doomadgee, 
Kowanyama, Lockhart River, Mornington Island, Palm Island, Pormpuraaw, Weipa, Woorabinda, 
Wujal Wujal, and Yarrabah. Data for Mossman Gorge are not available, because offence data is only 
available at an aggregate level for the entire Mossman area, which includes the Mossman Township.  
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Figure 2 Trend in reported liquor offences (excluding drunkenness) rate, Aurukun, Coen, Hope Vale 
Following the implementation of the FRC, Aurukun, Coen and Hope Vale each had a significant and 
sustained reduction in the rate of liquor offences (excluding drunkenness), reversing a previous 
upward trend. However, this pre-intervention increase, followed by a post-intervention decrease in 
liquor offences also occurred in ten of the twelve comparison areas. Both the pooled CYWR 
intervention area and the pooled comparison area saw a significant immediate increase in offences 
followed by a significant decrease in the trend.  
As these effects are common to both the intervention and comparison areas, they cannot be directly 
attributed to the CYWR intervention. The meta-analysis of the interrupted time-series analyses 
indicated that only Hope Vale had a decrease in trend following CYWR that was significantly greater 
than that seen in the pooled comparison area. Overall, the results indicate that there was no significant 
difference between the changes seen in Aurukun or Coen, and the changes seen in the comparison 
areas overall.  
The regression analysis of the relationship of CYIM to liquor offences (excluding drunkenness) did 
indicate that there was a statistically significant relationship between an increase in the number of 
clients on CYIM in Aurukun, Coen and Hope Vale, and a decrease in the rate of liquor offences in 
these areas. However, given that there was a corresponding decrease in liquor offences in all non-
CYWR communities, this relationship must be interpreted with caution. 
6.1.5 Trends in reported drink-driving offences 
Reports of drink driving may also provide some indication of the level of alcohol use in the CYWR 
communities, though they also carry similar limitations to reported liquor offence data (see section 
6.1.4 Trends in reported liquor offences).  
Trends are reported for Aurukun, Coen and Hope Vale (see Figure 3 below). However, data was not 
reported for Mossman Gorge because it was only available at an aggregate level (including Mossman 
Township). 
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Figure 3 Trend in reported drink-driving rates, Aurukun, Coen and Hope Vale  
Each of the three police divisions of Aurukun, Coen and Hope Vale appeared to show an immediate 
increase in drink driving following the implementation of the FRC. However, in the meta-analyses of 
the interrupted time-series analyses for drink driving offences, only Hope Vale showed a significant 
immediate increase in offences, although not beyond that seen in the pooled comparison area. 
Furthermore, this was followed by a significant decrease in the trend in offences (although again, not 
beyond that seen in the pooled comparison area).  
Overall, the meta-analyses of the interrupted time-series analyses for drink driving offences indicate 
that there was no significant difference between the pooled CYWR intervention areas and the pooled 
comparison areas in initial level of offending, pre-intervention trend, immediate post-intervention 
change, or post-intervention change to trend. 
The results of the regression analysis showed that only Hope Vale had a statistically significant 
relationship between the number of CYIM clients in the community and the rate of drink driving 
offences. There was no overall significant relationship between CYIM and drink driving offences in 
the pooled communities, and there was significant variability amongst the effect in the three 
communities.  
6.1.6 Summary of findings 
Taken on the whole, the qualitative data suggest some level of impact of the CYWR and, potentially 
also the FRC and CYIM, on alcohol use. The qualitative data contain some accounts where 
individuals have made long-term changes to their drinking behaviours, either by giving up drinking, 
or choosing to drink in a way that has less of an impact on other family members, particularly 
children. In some cases, this appeared to be caused by a mixture of factors (e.g. FRC conferencing, 
referral to/attendance at alcohol counselling, and CYIM). In others, CYIM appeared to have a key 
influence.  
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CYIM has enabled some FRC clients to redirect money that would have otherwise been spent on 
alcohol towards other basic needs. The FRC Local Commissioners also overwhelmingly endorse 
CYIM as a helpful tool in halting expenditure on alcohol. This finding aligns with the original 
intention of CYIM, which was to open up a short-term window of opportunity where clients could 
abstain from drinking, redirect spending towards basic needs, and seek counselling support (Cape 
York Institute, 2007). In this respect, the available qualitative evidence indicates that CYIM appears 
to have achieved this objective, at least for some clients. There are also, however, some clients for 
whom the model has been less successful.  
The quantitative data are mixed. Some analyses provide support for the contention that the CYWR, 
FRC and/or CYIM have resulted in positive community-wide changes to alcohol-related offending, 
while others do not.  
The meta-analyses of interrupted time series data indicate that reported liquor offences in Hope Vale 
have significantly decreased when compared with trends in the combined comparison communities 
since the CYWR, FRC and CYIM were implemented. This suggests that the intervention has had a 
positive effect on this community. Further, when liquor offences were analysed in relation to the 
number of IM clients in a community over time, the data demonstrated that IM is associated with a 
reduction in liquor offending. Given the mixed findings, this result should be interpreted with caution, 
as it may be due to a relationship between the number of CYIM clients and other broader social 
changes that have impacted all indigenous communities. 
Alternatively, drink-driving offences initially increased and then gradually reduced again in Aurukun, 
Coen, and Hope Vale. However, these effects were common to the comparison areas, so these 
analyses do not support the CYWR intervention having caused these changes. However, both of these 
measures (i.e. liquor and drink-driving offences) are susceptible to changes in reporting behaviours 
(e.g. greater propensity to report as a result of changing social norms) and policing approaches (e.g. 
more intensive policing of alcohol-related crime). Thus, these results should be interpreted with 
caution.  
6.2 Drugs 
Although alcohol continues to be a cause of primary concern in Cape York and other parts of Far 
North Queensland (Northern Queensland Primary Health Network, 2017), the use of other substances, 
particularly cannabis, has reportedly increased (Bohanna and Clough, 2012; Clough, 2012).30 In some 
Cape York Indigenous communities, cannabis use amongst 14–50 year olds has been found to be far 
higher than the national average (Bohanna and Clough, 2012). There is also evidence of an emerging 
problem with the use of methyl amphetamine (‘ice’), though the extent of use is unclear (Entsch, 
2015; National Ice Taskforce, 2015).  
It has been argued that high rates of drug use in Far North Queensland, including Cape York, have 
contributed to high rates of violence, including family violence (Northern Queensland Primary Health 
Network, 2017; Pearson, 2005). Drug use may also contribute to high incidents of psychosis on Cape 
York, as well as other chronic health problems (Hunter et al., 2012).     
6.2.1 Focus on drugs under CYWR 
Drug abuse was one of the key ‘dysfunctions’ identified under the CYWR that had broken down 
social norms on Cape York (Cape York Institute, 2007, p. 18). It was proposed that drug offences 
should be included as a trigger to the FRC; they were subsequently captured in the Magistrates Court 
(and later, District and Supreme Courts) triggers. 
 
 
                                                     
30 Some have argued that this may have been an unintended consequence of the AMPs (for example, see Robertson, Fitts and 
Clough, 2017; Clough, 2012). 
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Similarly to alcohol, the Cape York Institute (2007, p.67) proposed that CYIM would provide a 
window of opportunity during which expenditure could be redirected away from drugs and towards 
basic needs, while “…other support services such as drug and alcohol counselling” could generate 
longer-term change. 
6.2.2 Qualitative evidence concerning the impact of CYIM on drugs 
Drug use, particularly use of cannabis, is regularly cited as being a common issue across the CYWR 
communities (e.g. McMahon in van Vondren, 2010; FRC, 2014e, p. 58; Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 
22).31 There is some anecdotal evidence that the FRC and CYIM have impacted drug use, though it is 
generally still perceived to be a major problem. 
During a focus group held in May 2018, Coen, Aurukun and Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners 
were asked whether drug users and families of drug users were better or worse off since CYIM was 
introduced. The exercise carried limitations.32 However, the Local Commissioners’ responses, 
illustrated in Table 1, still offer some insight (Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 19).  
Table 1 Aurukun, Coen and Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners’ reflections on CYIM and drug 
users/users’ families 
Key: Aurukun  Coen  Mossman Gorge  
 
 
Unsure 
Much worse off 
than before IM 
A little worse off 
than before IM 
Same as 
before IM 
A little better off 
than before IM 
Much better 
off than 
before IM 
Drug users       
Families of 
drug users 
      
 
Aurukun and Coen Local Commissioners indicated at least some improvement for drug users and 
their families since CYIM had been introduced, but Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners’ responses 
were less positive. This was due to a perception that cannabis use had increased in the community 
over the previous ten years. However, responses were not meant to indicate a causal link between 
CYIM and this trend. Instead, one Local Commissioner indicated that being close to the Mossman 
Township was the key issue, as well as drug use by people who do not fall within the FRC’s 
jurisdiction and who are therefore unaffected by CYIM (also see section 7.2.3 Out of jurisdiction).   
“…if you’re talking about the green drugs… that’s a problem because we’re downtown, you 
know… it seems to be more obvious now. Yeah, I don’t know what’s happening… [And the 
BasicsCard isn’t curbing it because] we’ve got other people, like full-time workers, and other 
people that don’t have jurisdiction… I don’t know about the other Commissioners, but I… 
think its worse.” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 20) 
                                                     
31 Although the FRC identified ‘sniffing’ or ‘chroming’ as a problem particularly amongst younger people in 2012 (p. 17), it 
has not been raised as a concern in more recent accounts. The rollout of low-aromatic Opal fuels since then may have 
reduced the prevalence of this behaviour (Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), 2015). 
32 For example, Local Commissioners were not explicitly asked to respond according to changes that they thought had been 
caused by IM (instead, being asked to comment on broader changes that had occurred since IM came into effect). Further, 
the exercise was led by personnel from the Department of Social Services, which may have resulted in at least some level of 
acquiescent response bias. There were also some instances where language and cultural barriers may have played a role in 
limiting the validity of responses.  
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It may also be the case that the Local Commissioners were describing symptoms of a general increase 
in cannabis use on Cape York, such as that reported in the broader literature (particularly Bohanna 
and Clough, 2012; Clough, 2012).     
Other anecdotal evidence from the Local Commissioners did indicate some level of positive change as 
a direct result of the BasicsCard. As McMahon (in Interview 3, 2018) pointed out, drugs are 
“…bought with cash, so you’ve got to have… [cash]” to be able to purchase drugs. For example, an 
Aurukun Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 27) remarked that, without the BasicsCard, 
use of “gunja” would increase. With regard to one client who entered into a voluntary IM agreement, 
another Aurukun Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 3) stated,  
“He was spending his money on gambling and buying drugs, and then—which, when he 
asked to go on BasicsCard it had stopped.”  
Another Aurukun Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 15) stated,  
“In Aurukun, the BasicsCard, our community, I mean it’s good. It’s really good… there’s less 
drugs…”  
Although Aurukun Local Commissioners cited this as a positive outcome, there is little evidence of 
similar views in the other communities. (This is also supported by analyses of reported drug offences 
in section 6.2.3, which showed a significant decrease in Aurukun but not in other areas.) 
Nevertheless, despite any apparent decreases in usage that may be associated with CYIM, it appears 
that drug use—particularly the use of cannabis—continues to be a key issue across all of the 
communities.  
The FRC (2014e, p. 58) stated, “Marijuana use is endemic…” amongst youth and older age 
cohorts.  
A Mossman Gorge Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 22) remarked that there 
was a group of community members who regularly used marijuana: “Yeah. In their twenties, 
you know? There’s a group that indulge in it, you know?” 
The current Government Coordinator for Aurukun stated, when he was the Officer-in-Charge of 
Aurukun police station (in van Vondren, 2010) that “…the drug problem is, and it tends to be more 
drug problems with marijuana, but it is an issue that we have to concentrate on as well.” An Aurukun 
Local Commissioner (in van Vondren, 2010) supported this view, stating, “There are lots of people 
with mental problems because they’re taking too many drugs…”  
6.2.3 Trends in reported drug offences 
Reported drug offences are one proxy indicator of the level of substance abuse occurring in the 
communities, though the data are affected by changes in policing methods and community members’ 
willingness to report. Trends are reported for Aurukun, Coen, and Hope Vale (see Figure 4), but could 
not be reported for Mossman Gorge.  
  
 38 
 
  
 
Figure 4 Trends in reported drug offence rate for Aurukun, Coen, and Hope Vale 
The difference-in-difference analysis for Aurukun indicated that there was a significant decrease in 
the average rate of drug offences after the CYWR intervention, relative to the comparison area. The 
meta-analyses of the interrupted time-series analyses support this conclusion, and identify that this 
decrease was due to an immediate and sustained decrease in drug offences, but that there was no 
significant change in the post-intervention trend relative to the change seen in the comparison area.  
Prior to the intervention, there was a significant increasing trend in the drug offence rate in both 
Aurukun and the comparison area. Immediately following the intervention, drug-offence rates 
increased significantly in the comparison areas, but significantly decreased in Aurukun relative to the 
comparison area. Overall, these results lead to the conclusion that drug offences decreased in Aurukun 
as the result of the intervention.  
Conversely, in Coen, the difference-in-difference analyses found no significant difference between 
Coen and any of the individual comparison divisions. Whilst the pre-post difference in Coen is not 
significantly different to that in any of the comparison divisions, the more nuanced interrupted time-
series analysis shows an increase in the trend in drug offences, significantly beyond the pooled 
comparison (and beyond all but three of the individual comparison areas). Overall, these results lead 
to the conclusion that drug offences increased in Coen following the introduction of the intervention.  
Finally, the interrupted time-series analysis demonstrates that there was no significant post-
intervention change in the rate of drug offences in Hope Vale, relative to the levels and trends of the 
monthly outcome in the comparison area. 
Overall, the meta-analyses of the interrupted time-series analyses for drug offences indicate that there 
was a high degree of variability regarding the impact of the intervention on drug offences in the 
intervention divisions, with Aurukun showing a positive impact of the intervention, and Coen 
showing a negative impact. 
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The results of the regression analysis showed none of the communities showed a statistically 
significant relationship between the number of CYIM clients in the community and the rate of drug 
offences in the corresponding police division. There was no overall significant relationship between 
CYIM and drug offences in the pooled intervention areas, and no significant variability between 
communities. 
6.2.4 Summary of findings 
There are some indications that the FRC and CYIM have impacted drug use in the CYWR 
communities, particularly by limiting the availability of cash. For some FRC clients, this has meant 
that they have redirected their spending elsewhere. However, anecdotal accounts indicate that drug 
use, particularly the use of cannabis, is still a key issue of concern across the communities.  
The quantitative analysis of reported drug offences indicated mixed results. For Hope Vale, no 
significant impact was uncovered, and for Coen, the rate of reported drug offences significantly 
increased relative to the comparison areas. However, the rate of reported drug offences in Aurukun 
significantly decreased, relative to the comparison areas. This was also supported by the qualitative 
data, which indicated that reports of reduced drug availability and usage were apparent in Aurukun, 
but not necessarily in the other communities. 
6.3 Violence and crime 
Indigenous Queenslanders continue to experience disproportionate levels of violence and crime 
(Fitzgerald, 2001; Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence, 2015; Crime and Misconduct 
Commission, 2009). This includes high rates of severe violence in many Cape York communities 
(Martin, 1993; Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence, 2015).  
In 2015–2016, the rate of reported offences against the person33 was, when compared with the 
Queensland average rate of 6.5 per 1,000 persons, more than 19 times higher in Aurukun (at 127.8 per 
1,000), more than seven times higher in Coen (at 51.9 per 1,000), more than five times higher in Hope 
Vale (at 36.4 per 1,000) and  more than 17 times higher in Mossman Gorge (at 112.2 per 1,000) 
(Department of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Partnerships (DATSIP), 2016).  
Indigenous Queenslanders, including women on Cape York, also experience disproportionate rates of 
domestic violence (Medland, 2007; Sutton, 2009). For example, Queensland’s Indigenous female 
population is 35 times more likely than the general female population to be hospitalised as a result of 
domestic violence (Special Taskforce on Domestic and Family Violence, 2015, p. 50). Overall, the 
crime rate in Far North Queensland (encompassing Cape York) continues to be the highest in the 
State (Queensland Police Service, 2017).   
6.3.1 Focus on violence and crime under CYWR 
The Cape York Institute (2007, p. 17) argued that violence had become a social norm on Cape York. 
It pointed to past studies, such as The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Women’s Task Force on 
Violence report (1999) and Cape York Justice Study (Fitzgerald, 2001), which documented the nature 
and extent of violence in Queensland’s Indigenous population, including across remote Cape York 
communities. It also reported that medical evacuations from Coen were regularly a result of injuries 
sustained during domestic violence incidents, though similar observations for the other communities 
were not reported (Cape York Institute, 2007, p. 136). 
Violence was perceived as being inextricably linked to the abuse of alcohol and other substances34 
(Pearson, 2005, 2009). It was also proposed that at least some violence occurred due to aggressive 
                                                     
33 This category includes, for example, assaults, robbery, homicide and sexual offences.  
34 For example, Pearson (2005, p. 10) stated, “Grog abuse is the main cause of all types of Aboriginal violence and violence-
related injury. There has been a debate about the relevance of characteristics of traditional and semi-traditional Indigenous 
culture to understanding contemporary violence. But we need to avoid attributing violence to culture rather than to grog. 
Whatever inherent propensities to use physical means of resolving disputes there might be in traditional culture, the fact is 
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requests for money or alcohol, also called humbugging (Pearson, 2001, 2005; Cape York Institute, 
2007).35 For example, Pearson (2005, p. 10) stated,  
“What was a cultural obligation to share food with countrymen is turned into a cultural 
obligation to share grog. Whilst the relationships between drinkers are reciprocal, the 
relationship between drinkers and non-drinkers is not reciprocal. The drinkers take; the non-
drinkers (are forced to) give…”   
More broadly, crime was also perceived as being a symptom of the breakdown of social norms in the 
CYWR communities. In one community in particular, it was argued that crime and imprisonment 
(including for violent and other crimes) had, for at least some young men, become a new social norm 
and ‘rite of passage’.  
“…some young men have come to see a prison term not as rightful punishment for shameful 
and criminal conduct, but rather as a way in which to become ‘hard’ and ‘tough’ and to gain 
respect…” (Cape York Institute, 2007, p. 315) 
Because of extreme poverty experienced in their home communities, some ostensibly perceived 
prison as a welcome relief.  
“The routine, discipline and nutritious food provided in prison are also regarded as beneficial. 
Prison will provide many of these offenders with a room of their own for the first time, and all 
are permitted a television.” (Cape York Institute, 2007, p. 315)36 
In order to address social norms concerning violence and crime, it was conceived that offenders could 
be directed to the FRC through the inclusion of a Magistrates Court (and later also District and 
Supreme Court)37 trigger notification (Cape York Institute, 2007). To enable the FRC to also address 
domestic violence cases, an additional trigger was later added to cover the provision of domestic 
violence orders (DVOs). The FRC began receiving notifications for DVOs in February 2016.       
6.3.2 Other policies and programmes 
In addition to the CYWR, FRC and CYIM, there are other policies and programmes in the CYWR 
communities that have the potential to impact general crime and community safety. For example, a 
restorative justice mediation programme38 was introduced in Aurukun in late 2013 (FRC, 2016d, 
2016e; Focus Group 1, 2018), and is ongoing.     
Changes in policing resources and strategies also likely have a heavy impact on whether crime is 
detected, reported, and whether/how reports are followed up. In some instances there have been 
dramatic point-in-time increases in policing resources in the communities. For example, in Aurukun 
the number of police was reportedly increased in January–March 2012 (FRC, 2012b, p. 17) and then 
again in 2015 and 2016–2017 after community fighting increased and Aurukun teenagers attacked the 
local school principal (FRC, 2016d; Uhr, 2015; Elks, 2016).  
At some point in 2016, closed-circuit television (CCTV) was also installed throughout Aurukun, 
which may have also resulted in an increased ability to identify offences as they occur. Greater 
                                                     
that substance abuse results in violence, the nature and magnitude of which is of a vastly different proportion to that in 
traditional culture.” 
35 As opposed to the traditionally productive and generous social practice of demand-sharing (Altman, 2011; Peterson, 
1993), ‘humbugging’ is particularly aggressive and unremitting, and is not always predicated on the need for reciprocity or 
exchange (Altman, 2011; Gerard, 1989). The issue of humbugging is also further discussed in section 6.4 Money for basic 
needs. 
36 The Cape York Institute (2007, p. 315) also pointed to other supporting literature, like Ogilvie and Van Zyl (2001). 
37 The Act was amended to enable the FRC to receive these additional notifications from higher courts in October 2014.  
38 This was based on the Mornington Island Restorative Justice Project. One of the Aurukun Local Commissioners continues 
to be employed under the programme to conduct ongoing restorative justice mediations.   
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surveillance may have also had an impact on the number of offences being brought to the attention of 
police.  
6.3.3 Qualitative evidence concerning the impact of CYIM on violence and crime 
There is some anecdotal evidence that the CYWR communities have become ‘quieter’ and have 
experienced less general crime (or less severe crime) than before the CYWR, FRC and CYIM were 
introduced.  
“The community has become quieter and it would appear to us that Magistrates Court matters 
are reducing…” (Coen Local Commissioners in FRC, 2011e, p. 16) 
“…the severity of crimes committed in our community is decreasing…” (Hope Vale Local 
Commissioner in FRC, 2014e, p. 32) 
One Aurukun Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 25) also attributed this at least 
partially to a perceived reduction in youth crime, but a reduction that had apparently occurred more 
recently.  
“Crime has decreased, like two, three years ago we had young kids just damaging property… 
but that could be because, you know, they’re frustrated because there is nothing at home for 
them, there’s no food at home for them, you know… But now, we’ve, I’ve seen a change. 
There’s less, you know, less vandalism happening, less break and enters…” (Aurukun Local 
Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 25) 
Senior Government Coordinator for Aurukun (and former police officer), McMahon (in Focus Group 
1, 2018, p. 25), agreed:  
“We haven’t had a car stolen for 18 months, which they used to be every week. But we, look 
there’s not many break and enters anymore either, they’re pretty rare… It’s still happening 
but there’s not a lot.”  
Although the participants were responding to a question about the impact of the FRC and CYIM, their 
comments appeared to refer to a more recent trend. It is possible that this was caused by the 
community’s response to incidents of violence and crime in 2015–2016 (as described in section 6.3.2 
Other policies and programmes), which involved increased police numbers and McMahon taking on a 
role to improve coordination of existing community services (FRC, 2016d; Uhr, 2015; Elks, 2016). 
The FRC contributed to this response, but the overall strategy was broader, involving different 
programmes and service providers. Later, however, McMahon (in Interview 3, 2018) indicated that a 
general downward trend had begun earlier and that the FRC had played a primary role.   
“Aurukun is a very safe place now. They’ll say oh but that happened two years ago [when 
police numbers were increased in relation to publicised incidents of violence]… Well prior to 
that I was in Aurukun living there. That was my home. I didn’t have any house anywhere 
else. So it didn’t start two years ago. Two years ago is when we got everyone on the same 
page [in my role as Senior Government Coordinator], all of the agencies, but they would 
have—I could have never got them on the same page if I didn’t have what the FRC had 
already built for me to take up…” (Brendan McMahon in Interview 3, 2018, p. 12)  
Anecdotal accounts that crime has generally decreased are also supported by findings from the 
CYWR evaluation. The Social Policy Research Centre (SPRC, 2012, p. 252) found that, at that time, 
there was evidence that an upward trend in the overall offence rate had been reversed in the CYWR 
communities, which was not the case in comparison communities. The evaluation also found that 
there was a statistically significant reduction in the rate of hospitalisations for assault during the 
CYWR period (as opposed to before CYWR), but that this was not significantly different from a 
similar trend seen in other comparison communities (SPRC, 2012).  
The qualitative data also reflect a general feeling that violence, including domestic violence, has 
reduced since the introduction of the CYWR. Whether these accounts reflect the broader trend 
identified by the SPRC (2012), or the perceived downward trend was at least in part a result of 
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CYWR the FRC and CYIM is unclear overall. For example, some Local Commissioners related this 
to the perceived reduction of alcohol usage (e.g. FRC, 2011e, 2012e; Dav’ange Consulting, 2018; also 
see section 6.1 Alcohol). For example:   
“Domestic violence has in the past plagued our community. Many alcohol-fuelled fights 
occurred in public spaces in full view of children. Fights would frequently end in 
imprisonment and hospital visits. Since the Commission commenced in 2008 fights still do 
occur, however, we believe they are less frequent and less violent…” (Mossman Gorge Local 
Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, p. 79) 
Whether this reduction in alcohol, which may also have lessened the amount of violence (e.g. FRC, 
2009e, p. 36; also see case study 5 at Appendix 2), was a direct result of the FRC and CYIM is also 
unclear, though there appears to be some evidence that CYIM has reduced alcohol usage in the 
communities, as discussed in section 6.1 Alcohol. FRC and CYIM have also played a role in reducing 
violence. For example, some clients appear to be deeply affected by attendance at FRC conferences, 
where Local Commissioners use their authority to challenge norms around violence (e.g. FRC client 
in FRC, 2012e, p. 43).  
The take-up of additional support through FRC case-plan referrals also appears to improve outcomes 
for some clients. This was reflected in another client’s story, whose partner’s participation in a family 
violence intervention, to which he was referred by the FRC, appeared to make a significant impact. 
With regard to the client, Local Commissioners (in FRC, 2010e, p. 67) reported:  
“…The [client’s] partner is in and out of jail regularly, usually for violence and aggressive 
behaviour and sometimes also for possession of illegal drugs and alcohol. The previous 
conference she [the FRC client] was to attend [but] was delayed until she returned from the 
local women’s shelter after an incident with her partner… [The client has attended multiple 
conferences and also been placed on a case plan] 
For the first time in a long time she arrives at conference with a smile, her partner is back in 
the family home after being released from jail and things are going well. It has been three 
weeks since the partner attended the three-day ‘Ending Family Violence’ course… The 
partner had been conferenced [sic.] by the Commission and referred to the programme as 
soon as he returned to the community after being released from jail. As a result of the course, 
he tells his partner he has some understanding why he has previously been violent and what 
he has been doing to the family. The partner has now made a commitment to help rebuild the 
family…”  
Another FRC client also spoke about the importance of reflecting on his role as a father as a key 
motivator to attend a conference and take up further support. This aligns with recent research about 
the factors that motivate family-violence perpetrators to seek help and work towards behavioural 
change (e.g. Meyer, 2018). Attendance at the FRC then appeared to provide him with the necessary 
support to make significant changes in his life.  
“…For many years I was not a good father, partner or role model to my children. I would get 
very angry and just want to hit something. Sometimes it was my partner, sometimes it was the 
wall and sometimes I picked fights with other blokes knowing I could never win… When I 
felt the new baby in her belly I thought I have to change…  
I talked to the [FRC] Commissioners at the next conference I attended. They said if I want to 
change I need to work hard and a good start would be the Ending Family Violence program… 
[The client completed the programme.] I am a better man, a better partner and a better father 
now. I think first and act later, not the other way around. I still get mad and yell sometimes, 
but most of the time I calm down and think of what I can do to make things better not worse.  
My new baby will come home to a happy home now and my little girls will not be worried to 
laugh out loud and play noisy games because I will be laughing and playing with them, not 
yelling at them to stop.” (FRC client in FRC, 2013e, p. 57)  
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Take up of the Ending Family Violence39 programme appears to have produced some successful 
outcomes for these and other clients (e.g. see case studies 6, 11 and 23 at Appendix 2). Local 
Commissioners also play a key role and may, in some cases, “…become the buffer to stop the 
arguments between the relationships… [at home]” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in Focus Group 
2, 2018, p. 2). For example, one community member (in von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 11) 
remarked that the FRC can “…control the fights from both sides.” A Local Commissioner (in von 
Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 15) also recognised the importance of the FRC conference setting 
as a ‘sounding board’, where clients could safely express their feelings, including their anger.  
“Before the FRC started there was nowhere for people in the community to let their feelings 
out in a safe environment. In public meetings they would just blow up as they let their 
feelings out, fights and assaults were common…”  
In this respect, von Sturmer and Le Marseny (2012, p. 6) reflected upon the changing situation as 
follows:  
“We find people being able to articulate their own feelings and fears where once they were 
inclined to enactment… The old broadcasting of complaints continues; a sort of public 
rendering—literally a ‘publication’, a making public, of grievance. This is no doubt healthy 
and it coincides with traditional practice… The public airing of grievances is a safety valve—
and it invites intervention by restraining, caring hands. The role of the Commission might be 
seen in that way—as a place for airing grievances…”  
The qualitative evidence also indicates that CYIM may play a specific role in helping to overcome 
violence associated with humbugging, particularly in family-violence situations (also see section 
6.4.2 Qualitative evidence concerning the impact of CYIM on ‘basic needs’). For example:   
 “…It’s a little powerful little card, you know? It’s got capability, and one of the main ones is 
to feed our kids and to protect women from domestic violence, you know?” (Mossman Gorge 
Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. l0) 
“[Without CYIM] …You’d have more domestic violence because the partner is expecting the 
woman to give him money so he can go and buy, spend it on whatever he wants, you 
know?...” (Aurukun Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 27) 
“The women love it because the kids are getting fed so they’re not being coerced into handing 
over money or having no control over what comes into the house.” (FRC Registrar in 
Interview 2, 2018, p. 6) 
In particular, anecdotal accounts indicated that CYIM is a useful means by which (mainly) female 
victims can take better control over the family budget, while redirecting their partner’s frustration or 
anger towards the FRC rather than towards them. For instance, the same Mossman Gorge Local 
Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 10) elaborated, “So the Commissioners can take that 
violence, you know?”  
In this regard, the option of voluntarily entering into CYIM can be useful, but there also appears to be 
merit in having the ability to ask to be placed on a compulsory CYIM order. In at least some 
instances, the perception that the client has had no choice but to be placed on CYIM can be useful for 
them, because it can reduce the potential for reprisal.   
“…We have women coming into the conference asking to be put on the BasicsCard and 
requesting us to tell their partners that the FRC made them go on the Card, so that they can 
                                                     
39 The Ending Family Violence programme was delivered between 2010 and late 2013, including, for at least some of this 
time, through a partnership between the FRC and Queensland Corrective Services (FRC, 2010b, 2010c, 2011c, 2013e, 
2013d). Since delivery of the programme ceased in late 2013, Local Commissioners have regularly called for an alternative 
service to fill the resulting gap but it appears that none have been implemented to date (e.g. FRC, 2016e, 2017b, 2017d; 
IPNRC, 2017) (also see section 7.2.3 Service delivery).   
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have money for food and rent every week…” (Local Commissioner in von Sturmer and Le 
Marseny, 2012, p. 16) 
“…And the lady defacto is scared to tell her partner that she was income’d. [sic.] She comes 
to the Commission saying she wants to be voluntary, to save this money for my children, but I 
want to tell my children [and partner] that you guys have put me on…” (Hope Vale Local 
Commissioner in Focus Group 2, 2018, pp. 1–2) 
It has been proposed elsewhere that the lack of flexibility in some compulsory IM schemes can be 
problematic because it reduces the level of choice available to victims of family violence (Marshall, 
2011; Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), 2012). For example, victims may require cash to 
flee a violent relationship. However, rather than disempowering victims (ALRC, 2012), it appears that 
CYIM is often used as a tool of empowerment.  
The ALRC (2012) recommended that voluntary IM is most appropriate for individuals experiencing 
family violence, but the experience on Cape York suggests that many derive value from the 
perception of being compulsorily placed on CYIM because there is less fear of reprisal. Thus, the fact 
that the FRC has both options available appears to be important in supporting different clients’ 
individual needs. The fact that the FRC can apply CYIM on a case-by-case basis, taking in the 
individual circumstances and needs of the client, is also undoubtedly a positive point of difference 
when comparing CYIM against other schemes.40   
6.3.4 Trends in reported assaults 
Trends in reported assault rates were explored as one indicator of violence in Aurukun, Coen and 
Hope Vale (see Figure 5). (Disaggregated data was not available for Mossman Gorge.)  
  
                                                     
40 The ALRC (2012, p. 272) also recognised that the CYWR model of IM offered greater flexibility than other Australian 
models, and suggested that it provides “…an instructive model for the Australian Government… because of its flexibility in 
the approach to income management and a focus on the individual needs of the person.”  
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Figure 5 Trends in reported assault rates for Aurukun, Coen, and Hope Vale  
The difference-in-difference analyses between the intervention areas and the combined comparison 
areas did not suggest a positive impact of the intervention, with the three communities showing no 
effect of the intervention. The assault rate decreased on average across each of the combined 
comparison groups and the divisions of Aurukun, Coen and Hope Vale following the intervention; 
however there was no significant difference between the reduction seen in the comparison and treated 
areas, suggesting no impact of the intervention in these areas.  
Overall, the meta-analyses of the interrupted time-series analyses for assault indicate that only 
Aurukun’s assault rates saw any reduction immediately following the intervention, but that this was 
not sustained over the long term, and that there was no significant change in trend following the 
intervention in either the pooled intervention areas or the pooled comparison areas. The results of the 
time-series analyses for assault support the results of the difference-in-difference analyses. The 
immediate reduction in the assault-rate in Aurukun is promising, but the fact that this was only 
sustained until 2015 (a period of seven years) before it returned to pre-intervention rates requires 
further exploration.    
The results of the regression analysis showed that Aurukun had a (barely) significant relationship 
between the number of IM clients in the community and the assault rate in the corresponding police 
division, whereby an increase in the number of CYIM clients corresponds with an increased rate of 
assault. However, there was no overall significant relationship between IM and assault in the pooled 
intervention divisions, with no significant variability between communities. One possible 
interpretation of the association between increased assault and increased numbers of clients on CYIM 
in Aurukun, is that CYIM can be a response to court proceedings, therefore the relationship between 
CYIM and assault may be an artefact of the FRC response to violence. 
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6.3.5 Trends in breaches of domestic violence orders 
Breaches in domestic violence orders (DVOs) provide a proxy indicator for the general level of 
domestic violence in the communities. It is, however, limited by fluctuations in community members’ 
willingness to report breaches, as well as changes in policing approaches over time. Trends were 
reported for Aurukun, Coen and Hope Vale (see Figure 6). (Disaggregated data was not available for 
Mossman Gorge.) 
 
 
Figure 6 Trends in reported breach domestic violence protection orders for Aurukun, Coen, and Hope 
Vale 
Immediately following the intervention, both Aurukun and Coen saw a significant reduction in 
breaches of domestic violence orders; however, this effect was also common to five of the 12 
comparison areas. The decreases in Aurukun and Coen were not significantly different to those seen 
in the comparison areas. Conversely, following the intervention Coen demonstrated a significant 
increase in the trend in domestic violence protection orders breach offences, but this effect was also 
not significantly different from the increase seen in the pooled comparison areas.   
Overall, the meta-analyses of the interrupted time-series analyses for domestic violence protection 
orders breach offences indicate that there was no significant difference between the pooled 
intervention areas and the pooled comparison areas in initial level of offending, pre-intervention trend, 
immediate post-intervention change, or post-intervention change to trend. 
The results of the regression analysis showed only Hope Vale had a significant relationship between 
the number of CYIM clients in the community and the rate of breach of domestic violence protection 
order offences in the corresponding police division, whereby as the number of CYIM clients 
increased, so too did the breach rate. There was an overall significant relationship between CYIM and 
breach offences in the pooled intervention divisions, with CYIM having a negative relationship to 
offences, with no significant variability between communities. Similarly to assault, it is possible that 
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this relationship is as a result of placing clients on CYIM if they breach a domestic violence 
protection order. 
6.3.6 Summary of findings 
Overall, the evidence concerning the impact of the FRC and CYIM on violence is mixed. The 
qualitative data suggest a general feeling that violence has reduced as a result of the introduction of 
the FRC and CYIM. The role of CYIM in this regard has been particularly in its ability to reduce 
expenditure on alcohol and drugs, which then ostensibly reduces the frequency and severity of 
violence (e.g. FRC, 2012e, p. 79). However the impact of the FRC’s other functions, including 
conferencing and referral to other services, also appear to play critical roles in this regard.  
For example, stories from FRC clients indicate that violence can also be reduced as a result of 
experiences in the conferencing environment (in particular the ability of Local Commissioners to 
challenge social norms around violence) and take up of external support services. This highlights the 
importance of ensuring there are appropriate services in place to which the FRC can refer clients for 
support in reducing violence (as further discussed in section 7.2.5 Service delivery).  
There is also some qualitative evidence that CYIM can support victims of humbugging, including 
victims of domestic violence, to take greater control over household finances. Although the option of 
voluntary CYIM can be useful in this regard, the ability to request a compulsory CYIM order also 
appears to be valuable. In particular, some clients receive benefit from the perception that they have 
had no choice but to be placed on CYIM, because it reduces the potential of reprisal. Therefore, the 
fact that the FRC has both options available appears to be important in supporting different clients’ 
individual needs.   
Qualitative data regarding overall reductions in violence were only partially supported by the 
quantitative analyses. For example, the average rate of reported assaults decreased in Aurukun, Coen 
and Hope Vale in the post-intervention period. However, there was no significant difference between 
the reduction seen in the comparison and treated areas, suggesting no impact of the CYWR 
intervention in these areas.  
Time-series analysis offered further insight. For example, immediately following the intervention, the 
rate of assault in Aurukun dropped significantly more than in the comparison area (by 458 offences 
per 100,000 p<0.05). This decrease was not sustained, and following the intervention the assault rate 
grew in Aurukun by an average of 5.2 offences per 100,000 which is significantly greater than the 
control area where no significant trend was observed.  Thus, whilst there was an immediate impact, by 
early 2015 assault rates had returned to pre-intervention levels.  
It is impossible, however, to delineate between the impacts of the intervention versus other factors, 
like the closure of the Aurukun tavern in 2008; realistically, the early reduction in assaults may have 
been the result of a combination of these (and perhaps also other) factors. This could provide a more 
nuanced understanding of why assaults then crept back up. For example, it may be useful to further 
consider the role of ‘sly grog’ in this regard. Theoretically, if the supply of alcohol gradually 
increased since the closure of the tavern, this may have contributed to the trend in assault rates. This 
would emphasise the important role played by other community-driven reforms in also reducing 
violence. However, further research is needed in this regard.   
Finally, the quantitative data did not provide evidence for any significant impacts of the intervention 
on DVO breach offences in Aurukun, Coen or Hope Vale, beyond the changes seen in the comparison 
areas. (No comparable data was available for Mossman Gorge.)  
6.4 Money for basic needs 
6.4.1 Focus on CYIM for basic needs under CYWR 
Under the CYWR, it was foreseen that CYIM could help some families to cover basic needs, 
especially for vulnerable family members, like children. In particular, CYIM was viewed as a way to 
“…encourage individuals to take responsibility for themselves and others in their family and 
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community” (Cape York Institute, 2007, p. 67). It was also intended as a means of addressing the 
negative aspects of humbugging.  
6.4.2 Qualitative evidence concerning the impact of CYIM on ‘basic needs’ 
There is strong anecdotal evidence that the FRC and CYIM have assisted families to budget and pay 
for basic needs, like food, clothing and basic furniture. FRC Local Commissioners report that many 
have received this benefit from the BasicsCard.  
“[Community members] are saying it [the BasicsCard] is good because they know they have 
money for food…” (Hope Vale Local Commissioners in FRC, 2009e, p. 15) 
“The biggest change though, has been that people can now have the things they want, things 
such as white goods in the home and food for their family and children in the fridge and 
cupboard. This is possible because of the BasicsCard, they can manage their money and save 
for the things they want…” (Local Commissioner in von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 
16) 
Some community members self-report that the BasicsCard has made budgeting easier, and ensured 
money is available for food and other necessities. This has included being able to afford important 
household items, like fridges and washing machines.   
 “…the BasicsCard makes it easy to budget and now after the bills and food are paid for, there 
is money left over for new things like clothes and kids toys, there is less for grog, but that’s 
OK” (FRC client in FRC, 2010e, p. 26) 
“…Being on the BasicsCard has changed me, because now I can buy food, clothes and other 
things I need…” (FRC client in KPMG, 2010, p. 74) 
“[One FRC client spoke about]… how initially she was angry at being made to have the card, 
but how she had quickly adapted to using the card. It helped her to manage her money and 
save for significant household items, including a fridge, washing machine and lounge suite...” 
(von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 10) 
“…My kitchen is now complete with a fridge and a microwave. My house is gradually filling 
up with furniture…” (FRC client in FRC, 2010e, p. 71) 
In one case, a client (in FRC, 2009e, p. 40) who cares for four children stated,  
“…You know what else, I am buying a fridge and a freezer … If I have a fridge I will not 
have to walk to my auntie’s house to get the food. I also want to buy the kids a bed each.”  
A Mossman Gorge Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 7) stated that they noticed the 
biggest difference in one of their clients when the BasicsCard was lifted after a period of voluntary 
CYIM.  
“I see the difference and the improvement or the effect of the BasicsCard when—when it’s 
lifted. Because he [the FRC client] did it voluntary one time and it was lifted, it expired, and 
then you can see the difference [and] transformation within a month. He was drinking, and his 
clothes was marked. [sic.] You know when he had the BasicsCard, he had new clothes, he 
had, you know, food, so that’s the evidence I could see…”  
Another client admitted their bank account was constantly overdrawn before she was placed on 
CYIM; she now spent more money on her children’s needs and had ‘transformed’ her family 
(Karvelas in FRC, 2014e, p. 20). The client (in FRC, 2014e, p. 20) stated,  
 “I’ve done everything to make sure my children have better health and a better education…”   
Overall, anecdotal accounts indicate that the BasicsCard has been helpful in ensuring clients can 
afford basic needs. The fact that some FRC clients also ask to remain on CYIM, or move onto 
voluntary CYIM, after experiencing benefits from the BasicsCard is also a further endorsement of the 
scheme’s ability to help families manage household budgets.  
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“We take them off income management. Sometimes they say ‘No, no, we want to stay there. 
‘We want to buy a new fridge, a new washing machine. We’ve got food in the cupboard all 
the time for our kids.” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 2) 
 “…The respondent had told the FRC in the conference that she wanted to keep the 
BasicsCard and had asked to be placed on the Card on a voluntary basis because it made 
managing her money and her life easier.” (von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 10) 
 “Some members are now voluntarily seeking income management as a means to provide for 
the priority needs of their families.” (FRC, 2009c, p. 2) 
In some cases, CYIM may not only assist clients to cover basic needs, but also to establish savings 
accounts. This may support some clients to make longer-term plans for improving their living 
standards, for example, by planning to move into larger homes to reduce overcrowding.  
“…having my income managed means that I always have money on my BasicsCard to buy 
food and I have opened a savings account… It feels good to have little bit of extra money 
tucked away for a rainy day… I am planning for the future which includes moving out of the 
house that I share with extended family members and I want to move into my own house…” 
(FRC client in FRC, 2009a, p. 34) 
“…I am now saving for some Pride of Place41 work on my garden. I have also talked to my 
family about saving as a group so we can move into a bigger, newer house because our house 
is very crowded…” (FRC client in FRC, 2010e, p. 71) 
“When we first made decisions to put people on the BasicsCard, people did not like the idea 
but they are now telling us they have more savings and there is less arguing over money.” 
(Coen Local Commissioners in FRC, 2010e, p. 16) 
It appears that one of the primary ways that CYIM helps clients to manage their income and (in some 
cases) establish savings is by enabling them to decline humbugging requests in a way that is more 
culturally appropriate.  
Anecdotal accounts of humbugging tend to highlight its frequency, as well as the cultural difficulty in 
refusing to give ‘loans’ of (predominantly) money when asked.42 For example:   
“I’ve seen a Grandmother go into a shop to pay for her stuff, and knowing that her pensions 
fallen in, she’s gone and they’ve told her ‘you’ve got no money in your account’, because 
they’ve gone online, one of her family members have gone online and transferred her pension 
and used it, and she’ll starve, without her knowing.” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in 
Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 20) 
“…the woman asks if she can be income-managed, because she’s ‘sick of being put on by 
[another community member] for cigarette money.” (Account of an FRC client conference in 
Ford, 2012, pp. 27-28)  
CYIM, including in both its compulsory and voluntary forms, is frequently cited as a useful way to 
circumvent humbugging. For example:  
“The BasicsCard has assisted in reducing… the ability for family members to humbug for 
money to buy alcohol…” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, p. 79) 
                                                     
41 Pride of Place is one of a suite of programmes introduced under the broader CYWR initiative.  
42 Sutton (in Ford, 2012, p. 28) also emphasised that the ability to provide money or other goods when requested was an 
important form of social capital because it established reciprocity. Sutton (in Ford, 2012, p. 28) stated, “One can no longer 
respond ‘properly’ to requests for money from kin when one has less money. This can affect relationships negatively.” 
However, there was no evidence of this in the qualitative data relied upon for this review. It should also be noted, however, 
that the issue was not intentionally raised by facilitators in any of the focus groups or interviews relied upon here.   
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“[Voluntary IM] …is a feasible antidote to family and social pressure to hand over cash for 
non-essential items and contraband.” (FRC, 2009c, p. 13) 
In response to humbugging, some clients request voluntary CYIM, while others will request that the 
FRC places them on a compulsory CYIM order, so that they can maintain the appearance that they 
have no choice but to be on CYIM (e.g. FRC, 2010c, 2011c; von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012).43 
CYIM may also be voluntarily sought to protect more vulnerable community members, especially 
where there are power imbalances in their relationships. For example, it has been cited as being 
important in preventing humbugging of (particularly) women in domestic-violence relationships (also 
see section 6.3.3 Qualitative evidence concerning the impact of CYIM on violence and crime), as well 
as Elders.   
“In March 2016 there was talk of an increase in humbugging of our Elders. In response we 
decided that our Elders may benefit from participating in voluntary income management… 
Three Elders were interested and signed up to voluntary income management in the weeks 
following the presentation, with a further three people signing up by the end of the financial 
year.” (Coen Local Commissioners in FRC, 2016e, p. 33) 
“And with Coen, we have a lot of elderly people who just come in and volunteer [to go onto 
IM] because it’s stopping the younger ones taking money off them.” (Coen Local 
Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 3)  
When asked who typically used voluntary IM, one Aurukun Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 
2018, p. 3) responded:  
“Well, we have people who have mental issues, they want to go on BasicsCards because they 
have family members who torment them for their money—and which, one of the, one of the 
gentlemen who has mental issues told me that he loves the BasicsCard because with the 
BasicsCard he buys food for himself and he helps the household…  
Before that, he, his family used to have problems with him because he never used to buy food 
for the house. He was spending his money on gambling and buying drugs, and then, which, 
when he asked to go on BasicsCard it had stopped.” 
It has been suggested that compulsory CYIM schemes elsewhere are a poorly directed response to 
countering humbugging because demands can also be aimed at goods (in addition to cash), and non-
quarantined components of an individual’s income (e.g. Altman, 2011). There remain methods of 
circumventing the BasicsCard (as discussed in section 7.2.1 Circumventing the BasicsCard), which 
can limit its effectiveness in protecting more vulnerable community members. For example, a Hope 
Vale Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 20) indicated that, even where elderly persons 
are on the BasicsCard, they can still be humbugged.  
 “But the abuse is in the house, they’re pressured for their password, for their PIN numbers…”  
Ultimately, if a person hands over the pin number to their BasicsCard, it can be used by anyone, like 
any key card. However, notwithstanding this fact, the qualitative evidence on Cape York indicates 
that CYIM has been useful overall in supporting community members to be able to refuse 
humbugging demands in a manner that is less culturally problematic. This appears to be at least part 
of the reason it has also helped families to better afford basic needs and manage their household 
budgets.  
6.4.3 Summary of findings 
The qualitative evidence suggests that, as one component of the FRC’s work, CYIM has enabled 
some clients to better manage their money, redirect their spending towards basic needs, and 
establish/build savings. It appears that CYIM can also be helpful as a means of responding to 
humbugging demands in a more culturally appropriate way.  
                                                     
43 Also see section 6.3.3 Qualitative evidence concerning the impact of CYIM on violence and crime for further examples.  
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There are many accounts of community members asking to be placed on compulsory CYIM orders, as 
opposed to entering a voluntary agreement, especially to avoid humbugging or to ensure basic 
household needs are met in situations where there are power imbalances in the home (e.g. where 
domestic violence is a factor). The perception of choice is important in these cases; some community 
members derive great value in the perception that they have had no choice but to be income managed. 
Thus, this provides further evidence that there is value in having both options available.   
6.5 Schooling 
Average school attendance rates in Far North Queensland are lower, on average, than for the rest of 
Queensland (Department of Education and Training (DET), 2017a). Average attendance in the 
CYWR communities is also generally poorer than the State average (DET, 2017a, 2017b).  
Average attendance in Coen is traditionally the highest amongst the other CYWR communities. For 
example, average attendance at Coen primary school between Term 1 2014 and Term 2 2017 was 
90%, just below the typical State average of 91.5% (DET, 2017a, 2017b). In some instances, it 
exceeds the State average (e.g. attendance of 96.5% in Term 1, 2015) (DET, 2017b). Conversely, 
attendance at Aurukun, Hope Vale and Mossman Gorge is typically lower.    
At least partially as a result of poorer historical attendance, rates of educational achievement on Cape 
York are also lower than State and National averages. For example, according to the most recent 
Census data (ABS, 2016), 36.7% of Indigenous Cape York persons had completed Year 12 or above 
compared with 62.3% of all Australians.  
6.5.1 Focus on schooling under CYWR 
The Cape York Institute (2007, p. 18) recognised that poor school attendance had become a negative 
social norm across many Cape York communities. It stated, “School attendance in Cape York 
averages 75.4 per cent, and Aurukun community averaged 46.4 per cent in First Term, 2006” (Cape 
York Institute, 2007, p. 19). The reasoning was that there were fewer incentives for remote-living 
students to commit to studying because of limited availability of jobs and the availability of a 
relatively easy pathway into a previous work programme (Community Development Employment 
Projects (CDEP))44 rather than employment in the free economy. However, there was also feedback 
from early consultation with the CYWR communities that parental engagement and willingness to 
send their children to school should also be targeted (e.g. feedback from Mossman Gorge’s Bamanga 
Bubu Ngadimunku Inc. (BBNAC) in Cape York Institute, 2007, p. 48).  
The CYWR design subsequently incorporated an FRC trigger for school attendance, which results in a 
notification when a child has three (or more) unexplained absences from school during a school term 
(Cape York Institute, 2007; FRC Act, s40). As a result of a school-attendance notification, a child’s 
parents/carers are usually required to attend an FRC conference.  
6.5.2 Other policies and programmes 
As part of CYWR, the Cape York Aboriginal Australian Academy (CYAAA) took over the 
management of the primary schools in Aurukun (in January 2010), Coen (in January 2010) and Hope 
Vale (in January 2011) (Limerick, 2012). There is some evidence that this resulted in positive changes 
to the school environment in those communities, which may have also influenced school engagement 
and attendance.  
The inclusion of cultural activities as well as a different pedagogical approach as part of the CYAAA 
curriculum may have also impacted engagement and attendance (FRC, 2012e; von Sturmer and Le 
Marseny, 2012). However, CYAAA reluctantly forwent management of the Aurukun Primary School 
in early 2017 (Cape York Academy, 2016).   
                                                     
44 CDEP ran from 1977 until it gradually began to be phased out in 2007. It was eventually completely removed in 2015. It 
has been replaced with a series of employment programmes—the current of which is the Community Development 
Programme, CDP—which have a stronger emphasis on mutual obligation requirements and stricter compliance regimes.   
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In addition to the operations of the schools, student case managers may also have had an impact. They 
began operating in the four CYWR communities between 2008 and 2009, supporting families and 
school students to overcome obstacles to attendance (Limerick, 2012).  
An additional programme called the Student Education Trust (SET) was also introduced into Aurukun 
(in August 2008), Coen (in March 2006), Hope Vale (in January 2008) and Mossman Gorge (in early 
2007) to help parents/carers save for their children’s educational needs (Limerick, 2012; Cape York 
Partnership, 2017). At December 2017, SET donors from the four CYWR communities had 
voluntarily set aside >$2.96M towards children’s educational needs through SET, and 1,062 children 
had been involved in the programme (Cape York Partnership, 2017). It appears to have assisted some 
parents to budget for their children’s schooling needs. For example,  
“they [the Local Commissioners] told us about putting money away for my kids school things 
(Student Education Trust) and I am very thankful for that… I see [the] kids enjoying 
themselves…” (FRC client in FRC, 2009e, p. 42) 
ABSTUDY mobility requirements were also amended under the CYWR to enable students to bypass 
local high schools and board elsewhere if they chose to do so (Limerick, 2012).  
Beyond the CYWR initiative, Department of Education Transition Support Service (TSS) officers and 
The Cape York Institute’s Cape York Leaders Program also support Cape York students, including in 
the CYWR communities, to transition into secondary school, usually by attending boarding options 
throughout the State (Limerick, 2012; Cape York Partnership, 2017).  
These additional policy and programme changes in the CYWR communities have undoubtedly also 
influenced outcomes since the FRC and CYIM were implemented in 2008. It is, therefore, difficult to 
distinguish between outcomes of the FRC, CYIM, and these (and also perhaps other) interventions. 
Nevertheless, the following sections summarise the available data and attempt to draw out specific 
connections with the FRC and CYIM wherever possible.   
6.5.3 Qualitative evidence concerning the impact of CYIM on schooling 
Since the FRC and CYIM were introduced, perceptions about the role and importance of schooling, 
including parental engagement in education, appear to have improved.  
“We have seen an improvement in the engagement of both students and parents in the 
schooling curriculum. We recognise and commend the enthusiasm with which children, 
parents, carers, teachers and the community have embraced the need for education and the joy 
of learning...” (Hope Vale Local Commissioners in FRC, 2011e, p. 18) 
“We see our community now respecting the rights of children to go to school and have a 
future with improved education outcomes.” (Hope Vale Local Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, 
p. 30) 
“And now those mums and dads… they’re looking forward to going and sitting in the classes 
with their children, or taking their children to the school. Or they jump on the school bus to 
go and pick their children up. If they not at school when they came back from work, they 
going to get these kids coming to their classes and it’s working real well.” (Hope Vale Local 
Commissioner in Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 3) 
“…many [students] now wear uniforms… [and] Some parents now accompany their children 
to school and sit in the classrooms to watch the lessons…” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in 
FRC, 2012e, p. 74) 
In some cases, the FRC has been described as being pivotal in changing these perceptions.  
“[The FRC has] definitely put the responsibility back on the families to send their children to 
school and encouraged families to see the importance of schooling.” (Year one teacher at 
Aurukun Primary School in van Vondren, 2010) 
“…The Commission explained that it was important for my youngest to go to the Kindy a few 
days a week. She is going and she has a special teacher helping her. This has made it easier 
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for her to learn and she is better behaved. She is used to going to Kindy now…” (FRC client 
in FRC, 2009e, p. 17) 
“[Since the FRC] …There has been a very significant shift in the attitude of community 
members towards sending their children to school… the general attitude of community 
members towards school being a priority has increased.” (FRC client in von Sturmer and Le 
Marseny, 2012, p. 14) 
This appears to occur primarily through the FRC’s expectation-setting role.   
“…We continue to emphasise to parents and carers the importance of school attendance and 
prompt arrival times.” (Hope Vale Local Commissioners in FRC, 2011e, p. 18) 
“…The need to keep our children in school requires continual reinforcement, and 
unfortunately at present we are having difficulties with the high school and boarding 
students.” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, p. 74) 
As well as setting high expectations, the FRC continually challenges those who do not conform. 
“I myself went before the Commission because of my grandson… I ask myself why my 
grandson has not gone to school. This is what the FRC challenges me with. I can’t keep on 
coming up with excuses. This puts me in an awkward position…” (FRC client in von Sturmer 
and Le Marseny, 2012, pp. 14-15)  
“The Local Commissioners used strong words and the message was clear we must send our 
kids to school. I know now that I have to tell the school if my kids are not going…” (FRC 
client in FRC, 2009e, p. 36) 
The FRC also works closely with the schools to better understand the reasons behind some students’ 
poor attendance, and develop strategies to support them and their families to help them attend (FRC, 
2010b, 2011c, 2015e, 2016e, 2018a). This includes bringing attention to behavioural issues, including 
allegations of bullying.  
“…Like school, with the behaviours they have. They [parents/carers] say ‘I’m not sending my 
kids to school because my kids get picked on all the time, there’s always bullying.’ So we call 
the headmaster in and we tell them the issues that are being brought up at conferencing and 
talk about that, and what the parents are using. We [also] try to find out if it’s really 
happening, or if it’s just an excuse…” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in Focus Group 2, 
2018, p. 16)   
Local Commissioners regularly attend school assemblies to address students (FRC, 2011c, p. 29), sit 
in classrooms to encourage good behaviour (FRC, 2010b, p. 22), and donate and present awards to 
high-attending students (FRC, 2010e, 2011e, 2012a, 2013a, 2014a, 2016a, 2017e). Some Local 
Commissioners also spend time walking their communities during school hours to encourage children 
who are not attending to go to school (FRC, 2010e, p. 25; Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 5).  
Since 2013, the Hope Vale Local Commissioners have also had an ‘adopt-a-class’ programme 
arranged with their local school (FRC, 2013e, p. 33; FRC, 2014, p. 32). They visit their class once a 
month to deliver cupcakes to celebrate children’s birthdays and hold picnics at the end of each term. 
They also invite their class to visit the FRC conference room, speak with the Local Commissioners, 
and discuss the FRC’s approach (FRC, 2016e, p. 38). The aim of the programme is to “…motivate 
these students to dream big and aim high”, including seeing the importance in achieving educational 
outcomes (FRC, 2016e, p. 38).  
In addition to these strategies, there is also some indication that CYIM has helped to improve 
students’ readiness for school, as well as their attendance. This appears to occur in two primary ways:  
1. CYIM assists families to cater for basic needs (as described in section 6.4 Money for basic 
needs), which means students are better prepared to attend school, and  
2. CYIM (or the threat of CYIM) motivates parents/carers to send their children to school.  
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With regards to the first mechanism, the Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners (in FRC, 2012e, p. 
78) reported that the BasicsCard had redirected funds that would otherwise be spent on alcohol 
towards food, which had positive impacts on school students’ readiness to attend.45 In some cases, 
money that was otherwise directed towards alcohol is now redirected towards children. For example, 
one Aurukun FRC client had given up drinking when she was placed on CYIM. She stated:  
“They put me on a BasicsCard and income management and it helped me a lot. That’s why 
the kids are going to school every day now… [I can] provide food for them, and clothing…” 
(FRC client in Carney, 2011) 
With regard to another client, one Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 16) stated:  
“…I’ve seen her—this is before welfare reform came to our community—she used to drink a 
lot. When she was on BasicsCard during the period from 2008 ‘til now, she got her kids to 
school, she—we asked her what the BasicsCard did to her and her friends, and she said, 
‘BasicsCard did a huge change in my life. [sic.] Yes, food on the table for my kids; new 
clothes; we have new fridge, freezer; beds for the kids to sleep on.’ So it made her, it took a 
long time to change her life around…”  
For other clients, the simple act of being placed on CYIM provides motivation for them to improve 
their children’s school attendance relatively quickly. For example, a Hope Vale Local Commissioner 
(in Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 13) described the experience of one FRC client as follows:  
“…we had one guy, probably twenty years old. He’d had a second domestic violence arrest. 
We’d served him three times, he didn’t want to come, put him on Basics Card, and that got 
him to come and see me. ‘What do I have to do to get off Basics Card?’ Two of his kids 
weren’t going to school, they were about 40–50 per cent attenders [sic.], I just had the 
conversation with him, you know, I said, I can put you in for a time to meet the 
commissioners, but if you haven’t got your kids to school, or you get arrested again, you’re 
probably going to be incarcerated, you’re not going to get your money back.  
About two months later, he came back and he said he was ready to see the commissioners. So 
I booked him in. We got the report from the school, and his school kids had missed one day in 
[the previous] two months, and done really well. And he walked out of there and the 
commissioners gave him back his money and he was stoked. Pretty happy with himself.”  
There is also evidence that, even if parents/carers comply and send their children to school simply to 
get off CYIM (as opposed to seeing intrinsic value in their schooling), there is sometimes still a 
longer-term benefit when children begin to settle into the school environment.   
“…Some chronic kids stay at home. Their parents been income managed, the kids go to 
school. They only do that because down the track, they want their money back. And the kids 
started settling into school—reports from the school say that the chronic kid is now settling 
in… give them their money back.” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in Focus Group 2, 2018, 
p. 3) 
As discussed in section 5.2 Penalising and incentivising behaviours and decisions, the FRC also uses 
CYIM as an incentive, particularly with regard to motivating clients to improve children’s school 
attendance. For example, if a client is placed on 75% IM because their children have not attended 
school, Local Commissioners can agree to lower the quarantined amount incrementally where school-
attendance milestones or targets are met (FRC, 2016e, p. 53; Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 8). There is 
evidence that this has been an effective strategy (FRC, 2015c, 2015e; Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 8).   
Overall, the qualitative data indicates that general perceptions about the importance of schooling have 
improved, at least in part due to the Local Commissioners’ wide-ranging efforts to convey and 
                                                     
45 The Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners also pointed to the establishment of a food club at the Mossman State School, 
which had also assisted in ensuring school students, including those from Mossman Gorge, received lunch every day (FRC, 
2012e, p. 78). 
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reinforce this norm. The specific impact of CYIM probably only accounts for a smaller portion of this 
overall change. However, it appears that it has nevertheless also been an important additional tool in 
some cases to both coerce and incentivise parents/carers to send their children to school. In other 
cases, it appears to have assisted parents/carers to redirect spending towards children’s needs, which 
can also result in them being better prepared to attend school.  
6.5.4 Trends in school attendance 
Trends in annual school attendance rates were explored for the years 2013 to 2017 (see Figure 7). 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Trends in school attendance for schools in Aurukun, Coen, Hope Vale, and Mossman 
Publicly available school attendance data for all students at each school was only available for 2013 to 
2017, and it was not possible to disaggregate data by age or Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander status. 
Because of the short time series available, it was not possible to analyse changes in attendance 
immediately after the CYWR intervention was implemented. The results of the meta-analysis of the 
regression of attendance over time indicated significant variability in both the level of attendance in 
2013 and the subsequent trend over time. None of the CYWR intervention area schools showed any 
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significant change in attendance rate over time. Indeed, only three schools (all comparison areas) had 
a trend over time that was significantly different from zero (no change), with one declining and two 
increasing. Overall, no significant differences were seen between the attendance trend over time in 
intervention area schools and comparison area schools. 
These findings provided a contrast with those reported in the earlier CYWR Evaluation, which 
showed improvements over a shorter timeframe immediately following the CYWR intervention 
(2008–2012) (SPRC and FaHCSIA, 2012). The SPRC and FaHCSIA (2012) reported that there were 
statistically significant improvements in school attendance at Aurukun and Mossman Gorge following 
the CYWR intervention, while similar trends were not detected in comparison communities.   
6.5.5 Summary of findings 
The qualitative evidence indicates that general perceptions about the importance of schooling have 
improved, at least in part due to the Local Commissioners’ wide-ranging efforts to convey and 
reinforce this norm. It appears that the specific impact of CYIM has been more limited. However, 
there are cases where CYIM has helped redirect spending towards basic needs, which has resulted in 
children being better prepared to attend school. In some other cases, the act of simply being placed on 
CYIM was enough of a motivator for parents/carers to improve their children’s attendance.  
There are also other ‘pull’ factors that determine whether or not children will attend school, like the 
school environment and curriculum. Local Commissioners appear to work closely with their local 
schools to encourage attendance and engagement, but there are also factors that undoubtedly affect 
school attendance and engagement that are outside of the influence of the FRC and CYIM.   
Despite general perceptions in the CYWR communities that school attendance has improved, the 
trend over the 2013 to 2017 period indicates that there has been no significant increase in school 
attendance in that time. Unfortunately, data was not publicly available to investigate the possibility of 
a significant improvement having occurred shortly after the intervention. However, this was 
previously investigated as part of the CYWR evaluation, and it was found that statistically significant 
improvements in school attendance were recorded in Aurukun and Mossman Gorge immediately after 
the intervention, which did not correspond with an overall trend across other similar communities 
(Limerick 2012; SPRC and FaHCSIA, 2012). The 2012 CYWR evaluation also linked the school 
attendance of a sample of Aurukun students with FRC records and found a statistically significant 
reduction in unexplained school absences after an FRC conference with the parents/carers of the 
students (SPRC and FaHCSIA, 2012). However, the strength of the effect diminished over time. Due 
to linked data being unavailable for this review, we have been unable to re-test this scenario.     
6.6 Children’s health and wellbeing 
6.6.1 Focus on children’s health and wellbeing under CYWR 
A primary aim of CYWR was to improve the welfare of children (Cape York Institute, 2007). This 
involved improving opportunities for access to education, but also improving health and reducing the 
factors that precipitated child abuse and neglect, which were identified as one of the seven so-called 
‘dysfunctions’ on Cape York (Cape York Institute, 2007). The Cape York Institute (2007, p. 19) noted 
that, at that time, Queensland Indigenous children were nearly five times more likely than non-
Indigenous children to be the subject of a child protection order.  
Subsequently, the FRC and CYIM were viewed as key means through which parents and carers could 
be encouraged to increase responsibility for their children. The Cape York Institute (2007, p. 34) 
stated,  
“Functional ‘home bases’ are critical so that children born and raised in the communities are 
able to fully develop their capabilities, so that they can have real choices in time…”  
To this end, the FRC trigger for child safety notifications was intended to bring parents/carers who 
were not meeting their child-rearing responsibilities to the attention of the FRC, where they could be 
conferenced and potentially also have CYIM applied.  
 57 
 
6.6.2 Qualitative evidence concerning the impact of CYIM on children’s health/wellbeing 
Some perceive that children’s overall wellbeing has improved since the introduction of the FRC and 
CYIM. For example, McMahon (in Interview 3, 2018, pp. 10–11), who was a police officer in 
Aurukun before taking on his current role of Senior Government Coordinator, described the status of 
child welfare in Aurukun before and after the intervention as follows:  
“Well before they… [introduced the FRC and CYIM] I could walk in there and I could see a 
kid with a runny nose, broken arm, plaster on or skin off, bark all off him, fed like the middle 
of the street and I’d see that just daily. I’d go into the house and I’d spend most of my time 
putting my feet on cockroaches while I was talking to the people in there, stamping on them, 
because that’s how bad things were.  
Now you don’t see—you see very few kids wandering the street… So the health of a child is 
just massively improved. Like you don’t see those really run down kids that are just 
struggling to get a feed every day. There’s still a few but that’s—I think everywhere there’s 
always a few and they get picked up pretty quick anyway. But the whole concept of how you 
should treat your child has been picked up, because you get your money taken off you, and a 
local person is telling you I saw your kid. What are you doing? You didn’t take them to 
school… you don’t see those unhealthy kids around anymore… [Also] Sexual violence for 
kids, it was rife… It’s just not around, it’s very rare now.” 
Positive changes are often described in terms of children now being fed and clothed, and having their 
health-care needs met, where this was not always the case before (e.g. Local Commissioner in von 
Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 16; FRC, 2014e, p. 20).46 For example:  
“We had a visit from Child Safety Services because our children had bad teeth. This came up 
at my next conference with the Commissioners. They all growled at me and said looking after 
teeth was very important. I went to the clinic and found out what to do.” (FRC client in FRC, 
2013e, p. 21) 
A reduction in expenditure on alcohol and drugs as a result of the BasicsCard is also often associated 
with improved child welfare.47  
Coen Local Commissioners (in FRC, 2012e, p. 76) remarked that, particularly through the FRC, there 
has been a “…push for parents to be accountable for their actions.” There is also a general view that 
parents, especially younger parents, have developed a better understanding of the role of parenting 
through the FRC and other support programmes, and are better able to support their children.  
“Some of our young parents have in recent years gained a better understanding of parenting. 
We believe this has been due in part to the work we have done in the community as Local 
Commissioners.” (Coen Local Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, p. 76) 
“We’re here talking about the rights of children. Your children have a right to a good night’s 
sleep, to have food in the fridge, food in the cupboard…” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in 
Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 11) 
As a result, some believe that the level of intervention by Child Safety has reduced.  
“Over the past four years we see that… there are fewer community children subject to 
substantiated child protection notices.” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, p. 26) 
“The community has become quieter and it would appear to us that… Child Safety Services 
are required to visit the community less frequently.” (Coen Local Commissioners in FRC, 
2011e, p. 16) 
                                                     
46 Also see section 6.1 Alcohol and section 6.2 Drugs.  
47 Also see section 6.4 Money for basic needs.  
 58 
 
Conversely, however, Aurukun Local Commissioners (in FRC, 2012e, p. 74) also noted that there was 
an increase in reporting of child-safety concerns in the community, “…due to an increased 
understanding of how our children should be nurtured and how the system works.”   
In some cases, clients proactively seek out the support of the FRC and request CYIM to prevent or 
reduce the extent of child-safety intervention. For example, 
“[One FRC client stated] ‘We knew there would be some trouble for our kids if we did not 
take some action… There had been trouble in the house and the police had to be called, there 
was violence and the children were all around and very upset… We knew that Child Safety 
and the Commissioners would be notified of what happened, so we asked if we could come 
and see the Commissioners next time they were having a conference. We had been there 
before when the kids did not go to school, so we knew we could talk about things.’  
After discussing the situation… a case plan was agreed. The couple asked to be income 
managed and referred to support services. [Both parents started attending support services.] 
The subsequent investigation by Child Safety Services found the children happy, healthy and 
attending school on a regular basis, the house was clean and the fridge and cupboards were 
full. The mother was receiving counselling and support regularly and spoke openly of the 
improved family life and increased responsibility of the father towards the children… Child 
Safety Services took no further action and is working with the family and the Commission to 
help them stay on track…” (FRC, 2010e, p. 26)   
For another client, who had attended FRC conferences and been placed on CYIM already, the catalyst 
for her to take up further support and change her behaviours was a final threat of intervention by 
Child Safety. She received guidance from the FRC about how to navigate Child Safety and CYIM 
was also used as a means of demonstrating to Child Safety that the client’s children were able to be 
adequately cared for.   
“In the three years previously, the respondent had been to a number of FRC conferences for 
child related matters, had been put on a… [compulsory IM] order, and had her children 
removed by the police and Child Safety Services to the safe house within the community 
pending final assessment of the situation. If the final assessment had been negative the 
children would have been removed from the community and placed with alternate carers.  
At this point she said: ‘I was desperate to avoid losing my children, I went and saw them 
every day at the safe house at 9:00am and worked really hard. The FRC helped prevent the 
children being taken from me, by helping me to know what to do… I had to do a parenting 
course here in Aurukun. I graduated about two months ago and I had lots of other work to do, 
too, I had to go onto the BasicsCard to show them there would be money for the children, and 
that I would pay my rent and everything. Now my kids are good and I am happy. Life now is 
a little bit OK. I still go to the clinic and talk to others and get support. I am going to write a 
letter to the FRC and tell them what a good job they do, and they are helping the 
community’.” (FRC client in von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 12; also see case study 
17 at Appendix 2) 
There are also other examples where families have been able to be reunited with their children after 
having contact with the FRC and being placed on CYIM. In the following example, this also appeared 
to be primarily due to the FRC’s ability to support clients to navigate and comply with the child-safety 
system.  
When the child safety notification was received, the Department of Child Safety had not yet 
removed any children from the household. However, they subsequently removed a child the 
day before an FRC conference could be held with the parties involved. The FRC 
Commissioners “…were able to calm the family and explain the necessity for the Department 
to remove the child.  
As a result the family agreed to attend a parenting programme and the Wellbeing Centre to 
receive counselling for domestic violence and anger management and to comply with the 
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Department of Child Safety’s expectations and any re-unification plans developed by them. 
As a result of the above, the child was subsequently re-united with the family, and all 
participants in the agreements brokered by the Commission are attending services and 
complying…” (FRC, 2009a, p. 14)  
Despite some success stories, there are still issues with child welfare in the CYWR communities. For 
example, the following observation was recorded in Aurukun in 2012:  
“[The child of one FRC client] …Little Dap hangs about town, unsupervised and filthy, 
presently with a broken arm in a cast that’s split and ragged and no longer doing its job. The 
youngest child also wanders where he pleases…” (Ford, 2012, pp. 26–27; also see case 
studies 12 and 13 at Appendix 2).  
Nevertheless, there is a general feeling that the FRC and CYIM have been good for the communities 
in terms of improving the general welfare of children.  
6.6.3 Trends in child safety notifications 
Data concerning child-safety interventions provides a high-level proxy indicator of children’s 
wellbeing, but are also strongly influenced by other factors. For example, changing policing strategies 
can mean that harm to children is more likely to be detected at some points in time than others, but 
this may not correlate with underlying levels of harm. It is also possible that education and public 
outcry around child-safety concerns can heavily influence community members’ willingness to report. 
In this regard, the introduction of the CYWR and focus of the FRC may actually serve to encourage 
more frequent reporting of child-safety matters.  
Aurukun Local Commissioners (in FRC, 2012e, p. 74) commented that a better understanding of the 
Child Safety system had led to increased reporting in their community. The FRC (2017a, p. 13) also 
reported, for instance, that a ‘Speak Up, Be Strong, Be Heard’ project, led by the Queensland Police 
Service, was increasing community awareness around child safety reporting obligations. Changes in 
methods of reporting can also influence the data.  
One of the Queensland Child Protection Commission of Inquiry’s (QCPCI, 2013) recommendations48 
was to reduce stress on the Child Safety system by creating a dual community-based intake pathway, 
which would provide an alternative avenue through which mandatory (and other) reporters could fulfil 
their obligations. Subsequently, the Family and Child Connect community-intake pathway was 
implemented and acts as an additional reporting ‘layer’. The FRC (2015b, p. 13) recognised that this 
additional intake pathway had the potential to impact child-safety data; it later reported a reduction in 
child-safety notifications received across all CYWR communities because under the FRC Act, 
notifications were only able to be provided to the FRC from Child Safety Services, not Family and 
Child Connect (FRC, 2016c, pp. 13–14). These limitations should be kept in mind when considering 
the following analyses.           
Publicly available child safety notification data for the relevant communities was only available for 
the period 2010 to 2016. The trend in child safety notifications between 2010 and 2016 was analysed 
for the intervention communities and comparison communities (see Figure 8 for intervention area 
trends).  
                                                     
48 Recommendation 4.5 suggested that “the Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services establish a 
dual pathway with a community-based intake gateway that includes an out-posted Child Safety officer as an alternative to 
the existing Child Safety intake process” (QCPCI, 2013, p. xxviii).   
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Figure 8 Trends in child safety notifications for Aurukun, Coen, Hope Vale, and Mossman Gorge 
The meta-analyses of the regression analyses of child safety data indicate a high level of variability 
among intervention areas in terms of both the level and trend of child safety notifications. Conversely, 
the comparison communities showed no significant variation between communities. Of the 
intervention communities, only Coen showed a significant decreasing trend in child safety 
notifications since 2010, over and above any change seen in the comparison areas. Aurukun, Hope 
Vale and Mossman Gorge did not demonstrate significant trends over time.49 These results indicate 
that in Coen, there is significant improvement over time.  
6.6.4 Summary of findings 
There is anecdotal evidence that the general circumstances and welfare of children has improved in 
the CYWR communities since the FRC and CYIM were introduced—particularly in terms of visible 
evidence of neglect. The FRC has likely played a role, particularly by role modelling and enforcing 
social norms. For example, reminding parents of their responsibilities to their children, and 
encouraging them to take children to medical appointments.  
Where Child Safety Services have been involved, the FRC Local Commissioners have played an 
important role in helping some families navigate the system and fulfil their requirements. CYIM 
appears to be helpful to this end insofar as it offers a means through which some families can 
demonstrate to Child Safety that they are able to provide consistent food and accommodation for their 
children. There are some instances where this has meant that children have been able to remain with 
their families, rather than being removed.  
There is limited quantitative evidence to suggest that, except for in Coen where notifications are 
significantly decreasing over time, child safety notifications are changing at a rate beyond any 
                                                     
49 Although visual examination of the data for Mossman Gorge does suggest a steep trend in the data, this trend is not 
statistically significant, largely due to the small number of observations in the data series. 
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corresponding change in comparison communities. It is important to note that Coen only had data 
from 2011 to 2014, so these results should be interpreted with caution; however, given that Coen had 
the highest initial rate of notifications, these results are promising. 
6.7 Relationship between CYIM and individual breach notifications – Quantitative evidence 
6.7.1 Prevalence and incidence of breach notifications 
Individual history data was available for 1,842 FRC clients from the communities of Aurukun, Coen, 
Hope Vale, and Mossman Gorge50, with records ranging from one month to 121 months in length 
(average = 62.3 months). Table 2 describes the proportion of clients who had at least one recorded 
breach notification (prevalence), along with the average number of breaches per client during their 
history (incidence), by the type of breach notification.51 Standard deviations are provided to describe 
the variability of the data. 
Table 2 Prevalence and incidence of breaches, by type 
  Prevalence  Incidence (all clients) 
Incidence  
(clients with at least one 
breach of that type) 
  (Ever Breached)  (Number of Breaches) (Number of Breaches) 
Type of Breach % with breach Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Magistrates Court 79% 0.79 0.41 3.33 3.63 4.23 3.59 
Dept Education 47% 0.47 0.50 6.51 11.00 13.97 12.46 
Child safety 42% 0.42 0.49 1.14 1.97 2.69 2.24 
DV Order  21% 0.21 0.41 0.26 0.56 1.22 0.55 
Housing  15% 0.15 0.36 0.30 0.90 1.98 1.41 
DVO 
Breach52  7% 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.30 
1.15 0.38 
School Enrolment 6% 0.06 0.23 0.07 0.33 1.29 0.58 
District Court 4% 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.25 1.20 0.53 
Childrens Court 1% 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.18 1.43 0.67 
 
The most prevalent breach notification type is from the Magistrates Court. The results show that 
almost four out of five (79%) FRC clients had at least one Magistrates Court breach, with an average 
of 3.3 breaches per person. However, the highest incidence of breaches is from the Department of 
Education. Almost half (47%) of all FRC clients had recorded a Department of Education breach, 
with an average of 6.5 breaches per person. Furthermore, Table 2 demonstrates that once an 
individual client has a breach of one type, they are likely to have multiple breaches of the same type. 
This clustering is particularly apparent for Department of Education breaches, where the average 
number of breaches for clients who have had at least one breach of this type is 14. 
                                                     
50 See Appendix 3 for details of the data. Records for clients who were resident in Doomadgee or who were deceased were 
not included in the analyses. 
51 It is important to note that individuals have had different lengths of time at risk for breaching, therefore these data are 
purely descriptive. 
52 Note the distinction between a Domestic Violence Order (where a domestic violence perpetrator has been placed under a 
Domestic Violence Order by a court), and a breach of a Domestic Violence Order (where a domestic violence perpetrator 
has been prosecuted for failing to meet the conditions of the Domestic Violence Order).  
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Approximately a third (36%) of all FRC clients had breaches of only one type during their history, 
whilst the majority (64%) of clients had more than one breach type. A total of 16% of clients had four 
or more of the eight possible breach types. There is a statistically significant relationship between 
multi-agency breach histories and the likelihood of having had at least one period on CYIM 
(Chi2(6)=208.28, p<0.001). 
6.7.2 Type of breaches most predictive of CYIM 
A multilevel logistic regression model was conducted to analyse the type of breach notification that 
was most predictive of CYIM. This model used longitudinal data at monthly intervals, and controlled 
for each of the different types of breaches and the community of residence. Eight of the nine breach 
types were significantly associated with CYIM. 
Six breach types were significant predictors of increased odds of CYIM:  
• A history that included at least one Magistrates Court breach doubled the odds of CYIM 
(OR=2.011, p<0.001) 
• A history that included at least one Child Safety breach increased the odds of CYIM by 
89.5% (OR=1.895, p<0.001); 
• A history that included at least one Department of Education breach increased the odds of 
CYIM by 57.9% (OR=1.579, p<0.001) 
• A history that included at least one School Enrolment breach to date increased the odds of 
CYIM by 28.3% (OR=1.283, p<0.001); 
• A history that included at least one Domestic Violence Order increased the odds of CYIM by 
26.9% (OR=1.269, p<0.001) 
• A history that included at least one Housing breach increased the odds of CYIM by 25.1% 
(OR=1.251, p<0.001) 
Two breach types were significant predictors of decreased odds of CYIM:  
• A history that includes at least one District Court breach reduced the odds of CYIM by 33.9% 
(OR=0.661, p=0.007) 
• A history that includes at least one breach of a Domestic Violence Order reduced the odds of 
CYIM by 28.8% (OR=0.712, p=0.002).53 
There was no significant impact of Childrens Court breaches.  
6.7.3 The impact of CYIM on time between breach notifications 
A discrete time event history analysis was conducted to evaluate the impact of CYIM (number of 
CYIM spells and time since the last CYIM spell) on the time between breach notifications. This 
model used longitudinal data at monthly intervals, and controlled for service referrals, age, sex, and 
community. All of the variables included in the model were statistically significant. 
The number of CYIM spells that a person had experienced to date had the effect of extending the time 
between breach notifications. After controlling for all other variables in the model, each additional 
spell of CYIM in a client’s history extended the time since their last breach notification by an average 
of 2.3 months. There is also a significant positive (but curvilinear) relationship between the time since 
the end of the last CYIM spell and the time since the last breach notification. On average, for every 
month since the end of the last CYIM spell, the time since the last breach notification is extended by 
approximately a week. This effect slowly lessens over time, but at an effectively trivial scale. 
Together these results indicate that, on average, a client who has been on CYIM at any point will have 
a longer time between breaches than an otherwise equivalent client who has not been on CYIM, and 
that the effect is sustained over time. These effects are in addition to the impact of referring the FRC 
client to services. 
                                                     
53 The difference between a Domestic Violence Order and a breach of a Domestic Violence Order is that the first refers to 
the making of an order and the second is the breaching of that order. 
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There was also a significant positive relationship between the number of times that a client has had 
services referred and the time since their last breach notification. Controlling for all other variables in 
the model, each additional set of service referrals in a client’s history extended the time since their last 
breach notification by an average of 2.1 months. The time since a client had last been referred to 
services also had a significant relationship to the time since their last breach notification. On average, 
for every month since the last service referral, the time since last breach notification is extended by 
approximately ten days. This effect slowly lessens over time, but at an effectively trivial rate. 
Together these results indicate that, on average, a client who has been referred to services will have a 
longer time between breaches than an equivalent client who has not been referred to services (over 
and above the effect of periods of CYIM), and that the effect is sustained over time.  
The results also show that clients who had voluntarily taken on CYIM have an average of 39 
additional months between breaches, compared to involuntary clients with otherwise equivalent 
CYIM and service provision histories. Older clients are likely to breach more frequently than younger 
clients, with each additional year of age reducing the time between breaches an average of 3.7 
months. Finally, women have a shorter length of time between breaches than otherwise equivalent 
men, with a reduction of 3.4 months, indicating that, on average and controlling for all other variables, 
women are more likely to breach than men. It is likely that this sex difference is because the majority 
of notices originate from the Department of Education, and because women are seen as the caretakers 
of children they are more likely than men to be listed in school attendance notices. 
6.7.4 Summary of findings 
Overall, the results of these individual longitudinal analyses indicate that whilst CYIM does not 
necessarily eliminate repeat breach notifications, its use does appear to increase the time between 
breaches.  
6.8 Conclusion 
Evidence concerning the outcomes and impacts of CYIM is mixed. In some cases there is qualitative 
evidence that the FRC and CYIM have contributed to a reduction in alcohol (and in particular, 
problematic consumption of alcohol), drugs, violence and crime. There is also evidence that outcomes 
have improved in terms of children’s overall health and wellbeing, and engagement with school. 
However, these are not always supported by the quantitative data.  
The quantitative analyses found that there is a great deal of variation in the impacts of the intervention 
among communities; however, the most consistent finding is that there is no evidence of an impact 
across the majority of aggregate measures, over and above any changes in the comparison areas. 
Table 3 (below) summarises the results of analyses examining the impact of the intervention on 
offences, school attendance, and child safety.   
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Table 3 Summary of results of quantitative analyses examining the impact of the intervention 
 Impact of FRC intervention Relationship to number of IM clients 
2001-2018 Aurukun Coen Hope 
Vale  
Overall Aurukun Coen Hope 
Vale  
Overall 
Assault         
Sexual offences         
Offences against the 
person 
        
Offences against property         
Drug offences         
Liquor, excl drunkenness         
Breach DVO         
Good order offences         
Public nuisance         
Traffic and related offences         
Drink driving         
 
 Aurukun 
 
Coen Hope 
Vale  
Mossman 
Gorge 
Overall 
School attendance 
2013-2017 
     
Child safety notifications 
Aurukun, Hope Vale 2010-
2016 
Coen 2011-2014 
Mossman Gorge 2010-2015 
     
  No evidence of impact     Some suggestion of positive impact     Some suggestion of negative impact  
  Positive impact     Negative impact  
The analysis of individual quantitative data indicates that whilst CYIM does not eliminate breaching 
behaviours and notifications, there is a positive impact whereby breaching is reduced. The impact of 
CYIM spells on breaching is of a similar magnitude to the impact of service referrals by the FRC.  
A number of factors, including limitations in the datasets, could have caused the disjuncture between 
the positive results of the qualitative and individual-level quantitative analyses, and the mixed results 
of the community-level quantitative analyses. However, the data does indicate that the FRC, including 
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its ability to apply CYIM, have gone some way in creating a context that is at least conducive to 
positive outcomes. For example, it appears that there is considerable benefit from the abilities of 
Local Commissioners to establish and reinforce new social norms, as well as challenge those who do 
not adhere, especially in the conference setting. Theoretically, this may also have a positive impact on 
overall social capital54 in the communities, which may support improved outcomes.55 While further 
research is needed, there were some indications of improved social capital in the qualitative data. For 
example: 
“I have been visiting the community of Aurukun for over 15 years now. I visited it last week 
and I can testify that the community has never looked better… I have never seen more local 
people engaged in their community, engaged in the political process, engaged in what is 
going on and wanting to see their community grow and prosper…” (Former member for 
Cook, O’Brien, speaking about Aurukun in Queensland Parliament, 2011, p. 3382) 
“I have sat in many conferences and have witnessed my community gain strength, with 
people… taking more responsibility for their families.” (Coen Local Commissioner in FRC, 
2012e, p. 45) 
“…fathers and partners are taking a much bigger interest in their children. Before the FRC 
this was a very chauvinistic place. Males were not involved with their children, my partner 
was not involved in raising any of our children, now you see fathers walking their children to 
school and supporting their partners when they have difficult times with the children.” (FRC 
client in von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 16)  
“…when we first started it [was] just the female coming before us and the kids for not turning 
up to school… We’ve seen huge changes. We’ve seen fathers walking kids to school, we’ve 
seen fathers going to the school to sit in reading classes with their kids. That didn’t happen in 
the community before.” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 2) 
“We still have a couple of households within Mossman Gorge that like to party and disobey 
the rules. Importantly, the community now has the confidence to come together and 
communicate to these households that it’s not acceptable behaviour, rather than deferring to 
outside controls as we did in the past.” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners in FRC, 
2013e, p. 34) 
Notwithstanding the fact that CYIM appears to be important in reinforcing Local Commissioners’ 
authority, it seems that its primary impact lies in influencing how money is directed and used. This 
can also reinforce the social norms set by the Local Commissioners. For instance, there is some 
evidence that CYIM enabled money to be redirected away from alcohol and drugs, and towards 
children, food, and basic household items. In some cases, this has resulted in families having food in 
the cupboards and basic furniture like beds and fridges, where this was not the case before they 
moved onto CYIM. However, overall, the greatest benefit appears to come from the structure of the 
FRC itself, as well as the roles played by Local Commissioners, rather than solely from CYIM. This 
aligns with the Cape York Institute’s (2007, p. 179) original vision regarding the potential of CYIM:  
“Conditional government transfers must not be seen in isolation from other policies in Cape 
York, nor must they be seen as a panacea to dysfunctional behaviour. They can only be 
viewed as one instrument in a comprehensive approach to improving capabilities.”   
                                                     
54 That is, “…features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, 1995, p. 67).  
55 Elsewhere, improved social capital has been shown to have a range of positive effects, which can ameliorate the effects of 
socially disorganised communities. For example, potential outcomes include improved health and wellbeing, reduced crime, 
and reduced poverty (e.g. Murayama, Fujiwara and Kawachi, 2012; John, Headey and Jensen, 2005; Akçomak and ter Weel, 
2012; Moore and Recker, 2016).    
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Although CYIM does play an important role in assisting and supporting Local Commissioners to 
carry out their functions and apply different behavioural levers, depending on individual needs, it is 
questionable whether CYIM alone would have as much of an impact. Thus, a key lesson from the 
Cape York experience is that the context within which IM is delivered is crucial. The empowerment 
of local authority structures holds many benefits, which mean CYIM can be delivered in a way that is 
potentially more palpable and useful than if it were to be delivered as a standalone intervention.  
 67 
 
7. Ongoing challenges of CYIM 
7.1 Ideological challenges 
Some continue to challenge the ideological underpinnings for CYWR, the FRC and/or CYIM in the 
broader literature. These challenges are overwhelmingly focused on two key perspectives. The first is 
that the interventions are based on neo-colonial notions of assimilation rather than self-determination 
and are, therefore, discriminatory (e.g. Campbell, 2016, 2015; Smyth, 2011; Bielefeld, 2016, 2018). 
The second is that the CYWR, FRC and CYIM unfairly target and problematise welfare recipients 
(e.g. Dee, 2014; Altman, 2016; Klein, 2016; Bielefeld, 2018). It is not the purpose of this review to 
deeply engage with these fundamental ideological questions. However, it is worthwhile noting some 
key points that arise from the qualitative data. 
The below sections provide an overview of the qualitative data as it relates to these two views. It finds 
that the first view is not supported. In fact, the available data suggests that the CYWR, FRC and 
CYIM instead, in many ways, support self-determination. The neo-colonial argument also fails to 
recognise the agency of Indigenous people themselves in instigating, supporting and continuing the 
CYWR initiative.  
Alternatively, there is some support for the second view, though potential strategies to address this in 
future models require further deep and careful consideration.     
7.1.1 Neo-colonialism  
The argument that the FRC and CYIM are neo-colonial constructs assumes that there has been no 
community support for the social norms agreed under the intervention; that these have been imposed. 
There is evidence that some community members and leaders felt dissatisfied by the consultation and 
implementation of CYWR, the FRC and CYIM, and/or proffered and then withdrew their support at 
different times (for reasons that are often not clear, based on the available data). However, CYWR, 
the FRC and CYIM were nevertheless preceded by an extensive 18-month consultation and 
engagement period, which included documenting widespread support in each of the communities and 
formal agreement and sign up by community leadership (as described in section 3.1 Implementation 
process and section 3.2 Educating and building trust over time).   
The Cape York Institute (2007, p. 45) stated that the obligations that were attached to welfare 
payments under the trial were selected because,  
“…they are consistent with the values expressed by community members… they relate to 
behaviour which, if allowed to continue, would have a negative impact on child wellbeing… 
[and/or] the existing legislative and service delivery mechanisms aimed at addressing these 
dysfunctional behaviours in Cape York are unable to realise the desired outcomes.”  
Over time, overall support from the communities and leadership appears to have gradually 
strengthened.    
While the qualitative data drawn upon for this review is not representative of all views in the CYWR 
communities, there was no indication of any fundamental disagreement with the objectives of CYWR, 
the FRC or CYIM. Even some individuals who opposed the FRC and CYIM for other reasons still 
agreed with the social norms and behavioural objectives of the model, particularly around the need for 
children to attend school—a social norm that could, arguably, most aptly be described as a neo-
colonial construct. For example:   
“This respondent was referred to the FRC by the Magistrate’s Court for fighting and received 
a $500 fine. He does not agree with the FRC structure and thinks it should go. As to how well 
the Commissioners are doing their jobs this is irrelevant. It’s not the point. It’s the whole 
structure that is at fault. This takes in the referral system, the necessity to appear before the 
Commissioners, and the BasicsCard. He agrees that children should go to school but does not 
agree with the referral to the Commission of the primary carer in cases of school non-
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attendance either…” (Reflection on the views of an FRC client in von Sturmer and Le 
Marseny, 2012, p. 11)56 
Another client was asked if there had been any bad points about the FRC, and responded “No, 
no real bad points, education is really important and anything that gets the kids to school is 
really good.” (FRC client in von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 10) 
Other accounts indicate practical concerns with how the FRC and CYIM operate, rather than an 
indication of fundamental disagreement with the CYWR’s underlying principles and in-built social 
norms.  
With regard to CYIM specifically, it could be argued that an entirely voluntary scheme would enable 
greater individual self-determination. For example, von Sturmer and Le Marseny (2012, p. 6) reported 
that, from the clients they spoke with, there was a, 
“…view that the card should operate on a voluntary basis—and not tied to punitive regimes. 
It should itself be seen more positively.” 
It is unclear how widespread this view was, but it contradicts the views of at least some individuals 
who appear to receive benefit from compulsory CYIM. In these cases, it is often the perception that 
CYIM is compulsory that matters, and which can be a useful tool in declining humbugging requests in 
a more culturally-appropriate manner. The authors also went on to state, 
“…On the other hand the notion of compulsion is useful to those people who wish to claim 
that their voluntary self-assignment under the income management scheme is compulsory.” 
(von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 6) 
Contrary to some views (e.g. ALRC, 2012), there are examples where FRC clients, particularly those 
in relationships where there are power imbalances, seemingly derive a level of empowerment out of 
having the compulsory CYIM option available.  
Finally, the argument that CYWR represents neo-colonial paternalism also presupposes that it seeks 
to supplant Indigenous culture. However, there is a sense that the interventions have, instead, 
represented a resurgence of culture in at least some ways. For example, through the re-emergence of 
local authority and leadership (see section 4.1 Rebuilding local Indigenous authority), and through 
other aspects of CYWR that have celebrated local culture and custom (e.g. the integration of local 
culture into primary-school curricula and the invitation of Elders into the classroom to teach language 
and lore). Arguably, the FRC has acted as an additional mechanism through which culture and lore 
can be maintained and transmitted.  
“…we have a greater appreciation of our culture and the lessons of our childhood. We apply 
our culture in all our decision making.” (Coen Local Commissioners in FRC, 2012e, p. 29) 
“I make sure the men know what their responsibilities and obligations are under both culture 
and law.” (Aurukun Local Commissioner in FRC, 2012e, p. 38) 
“I care very much about our culture and it is important to me that it is passed on to the young 
men so they can take the lead that is necessary for the community to prosper.” (Coen Local 
Commissioner in FRC, 2012e, p. 45) 
“…an ongoing concern for us is the loss of tradition and culture. The answers to this concern 
lie with our Elders who have the knowledge, the understanding and the spirit which can draw 
                                                     
56 It appeared that, based on the interpretation of von Sturmer and Le Marseny (2012, p. 11), this client was particularly 
concerned with what he perceived to be a ‘double jeopardy’ problem with the FRC. He had already been prosecuted through 
the Magistrates Court, but he also had to attend the FRC for the same matter. In response to this argument, a Hope Vale 
Local Commissioner (in Focus group 2, 2018, p. 10) emphasised the FRC’s supporting (rather than punitive) role: “We say 
‘you’re not getting double punished, we are trying to assist you. If you don’t pay this [fine], that’s where you are going to 
end up [i.e. in gaol].”   
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us back to our traditional ways. We may live in two worlds, however, it is always the 
traditional ways we call upon when we are unsure, or in times of need. Elders play an 
extremely important role in our families as role models, care providers and educators. Their 
guidance is provided throughout our everyday life and their teachings are often done 
subconsciously; we follow, we observe and we go on to teach our own families.” (Aurukun 
Local Commissioners in FRC, 2013e, p. 28) 
While there is no doubt that the structure of the FRC is ‘artificial’ insofar as it is anchored in and 
derives its power from an external legislative instrument, it nevertheless seeks to, and ostensibly has 
to some extent, empower local authority in a way that echoes traditional Indigenous leadership 
structures. In this way, it could be argued that it seeks to re-establish the social structures that existed 
before colonisation, and as a means of filling the ‘gap’ that was left when colonial authority rapidly 
departed (Campbell, 2015, p. 123).  
Overall, the neo-colonial argument fails to recognise the agency of Indigenous people themselves in 
instigating, supporting and continuing the CYWR initiative. It also fails to recognise the potential for 
the reforms to support aspirations for cultural revival — a significant part of which is the restoration 
of Indigenous local authority. The CYWR governance mechanisms have enabled Indigenous people 
to take control of the policies that affect their communities in a way that has rarely been seen in recent 
decades (Bailey and Smith, 2012). At the very least, these issues mean that the neo-colonial argument 
cannot be universally applied to the Cape York model. At worst, the neo-colonial argument ironically 
undermines a framework that seeks to improve Indigenous self-determination, agency and 
empowerment. 
7.1.2 The role played by passive welfare 
The concept of the ‘welfare pedestal’ provided the foundation for CYWR. Cape York Institute (2007) 
argued that the size of welfare payments often exceeded those available through entry-level work, but 
that the long-term implications of remaining on welfare did not provide the opportunities that were 
available to those who stepped off the ‘pedestal’ and into the workforce (e.g. pay increases over time, 
work benefits like superannuation, and general health and wellbeing improvements associated with 
work). 
“The structure of income support payments in Cape York has set up a poverty pedestal where 
perverse incentives encourage people to move to welfare and remain on it. Apart from 
depriving people of a real income, this has serious psychological and social effects that are 
very hard to reverse.” (Cape York Institute, 2007, p. 22)   
This focus on welfare recipients has been criticised in the broader literature on the basis that it 
unfairly stigmatises them (e.g. Bielefeld, 2018; Campbell, 2015, 2016). For example, Bielefeld (2018) 
argued that “The stigmatisation of welfare recipients as financially incompetent individuals or 
deviants indulging in anti-social behaviour has been a key rhetorical device used to justify 
increasingly punitive policies for those who are now subject to compulsory income management.” 
(Bielefeld, 2018, p. 752) The Cape York Institute (2017, p. 3) stated, however, that the CYWR  
“…model does not assume all welfare recipients are dysfunctional, and Income Management 
is not universally applied. Income Management in Cape York is applied as a tool only to 
support the most at-risk individuals and families, on the basis of criteria that were developed 
out of community engagement…”  
Nevertheless, the qualitative data reviewed for this study indicate that there is a growing sense of 
unfairness that there are segments of the CYWR communities who are outside of the FRC’s 
jurisdiction because they do not receive welfare.57  
                                                     
57 Although the total number of welfare recipients in the communities at present is not clear based on publicly available data, 
there were around 3,000 individuals of working age living in the CYWR communities at the beginning of the trial; in 
February 2008, (then) Premier Anna Bligh stated that around 1,800 (~60%) of these were, at that time, receiving welfare 
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“The respondent put the view strongly that the differentiation of people between those under 
Centrelink and those in normal employment was unfair and discriminatory (another 
respondent expressed similar sentiments, noting that people on Centrelink benefits are 
potentially subject to sanction via the BasicsCard because of school absenteeism but parents 
who are employed are not. This is a major loophole in the system if it is supposed to be 
geared to child welfare). ‘Those receiving Centrelink benefits or entitlements could be subject 
readily to the FRC ‘big stick’, but there should be one law for everybody’.” (FRC client in 
von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 13) 
“Include everyone from our community, not just welfare participants.” (Hope Vale Local 
Commissioner in Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 18) 
“The only thing that the government failed in the first place with the program is that it’s only 
set up for welfare, welfare reforms. People on welfare. A lot of people that are not on welfare 
get through the net. They can do whatever they like. But the people on welfare do get 
caught.” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 12) 
“The other side is it only deals with someone who's on the dole. So you've got to not have a 
job. If you have a job and you're not feeding your kid and you're spending all your money on 
the grog and you're still getting charged, the FRC has no control over you…” (McMahon in 
Interview 3, 2018, p. 15) 
The CYWR is broader than the FRC and CYIM; these broader elements seek to change social norms 
for all community members, including those receiving welfare and those not receiving welfare. 
However, if the FRC and CYIM are intended as key CYWR mechanisms to also improve overall 
outcomes for families and children, it is questionable that jurisdiction only extends to those receiving 
welfare. Implicit is the assumption that it is only welfare recipients breaching the social norms, but the 
anecdotal evidence indicates that this does not hold true. For example:   
“The—the latest lot of grog that came into Aurukun was those group of young fellas that got 
paid who are not on the BasicsCard, but they decided it might be fun bringing a lot of grog 
home into communities” (Aurukun Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 25) 
“[Non-welfare recipients’] ... children are the ones that are not attending school, a lot of the 
time.” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in Focus Group 2, 2018, p. 12) 
“…We’ve got other people, like full-time workers, and other people that don’t have 
jurisdiction. They now don’t go to country [to smoke cannabis]… And the card itself is just 
like—the card can only affect the person that’s on Centrelink, you know…” (Mossman Gorge 
Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 20) 
This is a serious tension in the model, which needs to be further considered. Although passive welfare 
dependency is cited as a primary cause of poor social norms in the CYWR communities (Cape York 
Institute, 2007), greater explanation is needed around the circumstances in which non-welfare 
recipients also breach the social norms. According to the above accounts, further consideration needs 
to be given to how the communities can also constructively respond to those beyond the FRC’s 
jurisdiction. For instance, this may be through extending the FRC’s jurisdiction, or through broader 
efforts beyond the FRC.  
There appears to be at least some level of support for all community members to be brought before 
the FRC, despite whether they are welfare recipients or not.  
“We also become very frustrated with community members who create trouble, but are not 
within the jurisdiction of the Commission. Our people view the Commission as having proved 
its success in the community; they trust us and feel these trouble makers should also be 
                                                     
payments or (then) CDEP funding that would mean they may fall within the remit of the FRC (Bligh, 2008). Thus, 
approximately 40% of the communities’ populations were, at that time, beyond the FRC’s jurisdiction.  
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brought before the Commission so their behaviour can be addressed.” (Coen Local 
Commissioners in FRC, 2014e, p. 31) 
However, the practicalities and implications of different options need to be carefully considered. For 
instance, a model that includes jurisdiction over working people might not be able to include CYIM. 
It may also be the case that the above accounts simply further demonstrate the importance of 
community-wide efforts, beyond the FRC and CYIM, to also promote and build positive social norms 
more broadly.    
7.2 Practical challenges 
7.2.1 Circumventing the BasicsCard 
As indicated in section 6 Outcomes of CYIM, there is evidence that the BasicsCard is effective in 
stabilising household expenditure and reducing the purchase of alcohol and drugs. However, there are 
also accounts that some individuals are able to circumvent the BasicsCard through different means 
(though it is not possible, based on the available data, to determine the frequency with which this 
occurs).  
“…We thought this card was pretty secure, but it’s got little leaks in it.” (Mossman Gorge 
Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 6) 
This has also been identified as an issue in other Australian jurisdictions (e.g. Bray et al., 2014; Katz 
and Bates, 2014; Orima Research, 2010). Many of these cases appear to revolve around the ability of 
people to use BasicsCards that are not their own.      
“Because some of our community members will starve, because aunty or cousin or whatever, 
will hold the card, you know… Somebody else is filling up their own cupboard, and not 
filling up the rightful person who holds that card.” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioner in 
Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 10) 
“[Some community members say] Oh, I can do this, I can do that, I can take my brother here, 
I can do all the shopping. But, one thing you don’t know is that they’re only using that brother 
or the sister or the grandmother or the grandfather because when they’ve got money in their 
pocket, they’re gambling or drinking. But they got the BasicsCard in there, they’re buying 
food for their own tenants, for their own house…” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioner in 
Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 12) 
In response, some have suggested that photographic ID should be added to the BasicsCard.  
“…And if the card had identification, personal identification… that [humbugging] would 
largely stop.” (Commissioner Glasgow in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 12) 
“Might need some tightening up with some of the loose ends, but it’s still a good idea… 
Yeah, because once upon a time with the Mossman Commissioners, wanted—not wanted—
but there was an idea with a photo. Because I can’t go and deal with [Mossman Gorge FRC 
2]’s card, and say I’m, you know, because, you know, we’re both [Commissioners have same 
first name], but, you know, I can’t say I’m [same first name]. Because the card with the 
picture say otherwise, you know. That was sort of my dream. A wish…” (Mossman Gorge 
Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 6) 
Although photographic ID, which was also recommended by a recent review of the FRC (Dav’ange 
Consulting, 2017), may help to reduce the number of people using others’ cards, there are also other 
issues that it does not address. For example, cases where individuals use the BasicsCard to buy 
groceries, but then swap these for cash.  
“Very smart! With the BasicsCard they go to the shops they can buy cartons of drinks… 
Cartons of soft drinks, chips. They sell it to little kids. And what money they make, they’ll go 
and buy smokes… Or they go and take the cash to the gambling.” (Aurukun Local 
Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 15) 
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“You know, these people who are on BasicsCard, get together, go to the shops, buy soft 
drinks, chips, lollies, so that… And then they make the cash money out of it…” (Aurukun 
Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 24) 
With regard to methods of overcoming this issue, some have suggested widening the array of goods 
that are prohibited under CYIM. However, the types of items that could potentially be traded for cash 
are limitless. Thus, this may prove to be an impossible task.  
The colour of the BasicsCard has also been recognised as a potential problem, because of reports that 
some individuals had used it (or had attempted to use it) to obtain cash from some shops. In this 
respect, shop keepers play a key role in regulating the use of the card.   
“Yeah, change the look of it… Because a couple of times, you know, people tried to walk in 
to the shop to buy cigarettes and then tried to take the cash out from the cash register, but they 
have local people that works there at the shop, they know the colour of Bendigo Bank and the 
BasicsCard. Should change the colour of the BasicsCard.” (Aurukun Local Commissioner in 
Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 6) 
 “…Also, it was the same colour as the Bendigo Bank card, so people would go and pretend it 
was a Bendigo Bank card and get cash out of it. We could never get Centrelink to change the 
colour… It should look like a card, but not the same as a bank. Because what happens, people 
carry it and go to Woolworths and people assume it’s a Bendigo Bank card and give them 
cash.” (Commissioner Glasgow in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 6) 
“Well we’ve got problems in our community because we’ve got Bendigo Bank in our 
community… Yeah. Should look different…” (Aurukun Local Commissioner in Focus Group 
1, 2018, p. 6) 
“…I was there when I seen it [sic.], she had a BasicsCard, and she quickly put the BasicsCard 
in her pocket and I said to the lady at the cash register don’t give her the smokes, she’s just 
put in her—her BasicsCard in her pocket.” (Aurukun Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 
2018, p. 6) 
It was reported that in Coen, shopkeepers often ask people to bring the owner of BasicsCards to the 
shop before purchases can proceed (Coen Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 7). 
However, there is still a perceived issue with some clients changing pins on other peoples’ 
BasicsCards.  
“…you could ring up the call centre and get somebody interstate and they, you know, they 
wouldn’t know. They change it around, they even come to Cairns. You know, because some 
young people that are smart, they’re doing this to other people’s BasicsCard. And then you 
got to keep across the changing PINs…” (Coen Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, 
p. 7) 
Others again highlighted the importance of Local Commissioners in being able to reduce the misuse 
of the card in at least some instances.  
“The people in Aurukun and the other communities, they survive on their streetwise skills.  
So they can outmanoeuvre the way those cards work.  But they're still limited on it, and 
having local commissioners that are so good, they get them—they stop that manoeuvring 
around it and they certainly have done some things along the way and some things they still 
want to…” (McMahon in Interview 3, 2018) 
At least some of the practices described above—particularly the use of other peoples’ cards without 
consent—amount to fraud. Thus, as von Sturmer and Le Marseny (2012, p. 21) warned, there is a real 
possibility for “…well-intentioned welfare reforms to extend zones of criminality.” The authors gave 
the similar example of sly grog running in AMP zones, which has criminalised behaviour that is legal 
in most other parts of Australia (i.e. alcohol carriage and consumption) and increased convictions of 
(primarily) Indigenous peoples under relevant liquor laws (e.g. see Clough et al., 2017).  
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It is not possible, based on the available data, to examine whether or to what extent fraud cases linked 
to the misuse of the BasicsCard in the CYWR communities have been prosecuted. In at least some 
cases, it appears that reports are made to the police about misuse of the BasicsCard, though they may 
not regularly be pursued.   
“…it does get reported to the police, but usually the family member doesn’t want to, you 
know, put a charge on the other family member so it stays contained within that family…” 
(Mossman Gorge Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 12)   
Regardless, these loopholes open up the possibility of increasing Indigenous contact with the criminal 
justice system. In closing these loopholes, these possible zones of criminality may also be reduced. 
7.2.2 Dependency on the BasicsCard 
In at least two instances, the potential for clients to develop a level of dependency on the BasicsCard 
was raised. For example, when asked if clients were able to learn to budget when they came off the 
card, one Coen Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 14) responded:  
“No, because some of them is not very good on the computer or anything [sic.]. So, they just 
stay on that. And… It just does it for them and they don’t have to worry about their 
expenses…”  
It is not clear how many clients the Local Commissioner was referring to. Further, von Sturmer and 
Le Marseny (2012, p. 13) indicated the potential for some to become dependent on CYIM, as well as 
the broader CYWR intervention. However, aside from these references, this potential was not 
otherwise raised as a significant problem in the available qualitative data. Another Coen Local 
Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 14) also added that relying on the BasicsCard to manage 
funds can actually be beneficial in some instances, for example by ensuring that community members 
avoid defaulting on their bills during periods of time spent on country:  
“…It’s good in a way because some of the—our clients when they attend court they’re forced 
to go on homelands, so while they’re away their money and rent is still continuing and going 
through with payments.” 
Dependence on the BasicsCard may also be circumvented to some extent on Cape York (as opposed 
to other IM schemes across Australia, where it has been raised as an issue (e.g. Bray et al., 2014)) 
because CYWR also involves wraparound services to deliver financial literacy support through the 
MPower programme.58  
Participation in the MPower programme may serve as a buffer against long-term dependency on the 
BasicsCard in the Cape York context, because it offers another avenue through which clients can 
improve their financial literacy. It may have also influenced, at least to some degree, IM recipients’ 
responses about their ability to budget and save on IM (as described in section 6.4 Money for basic 
needs)—i.e. at least part of this savings/budgeting behaviour may also be attributable to the MPower 
programme, though it is impossible to delineate these causes for the purposes of this review.   
7.2.3 Out of jurisdiction 
Community members may fall outside of the FRC’s jurisdiction because they do not receive welfare 
(as discussed in section 7.1.2 The role played by passive welfare) or because their usual place of 
residence is not a CYWR community area, and they have not lived in a CYWR community area for at 
least three months since the commencement of the FRC Act. However, some have expressed concern 
                                                     
58 MPower is delivered by the Cape York Partnership as part of the broader CYWR initiative. It works with community 
members (15+ years of age) across the four original CYWR communities to support improved financial literacy and 
budgeting skills. The FRC (2017e, p. 51) only referred 25 clients to MPower during the 2016-17 financial year. However, 
community members can also decide to join up without a referral. Cape York Partnership (2017) indicates that 1,846 
members of the four original CYWR communities (15+ years) were members of the programme at the end of June 2017.  
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over this—particularly in Mossman Gorge (the only community that is situated very close to a nearby 
Township).      
“The community still suffers the impact of people from other regions visiting us and abusing 
our boundaries by ignoring or pulling down dry house signs, drinking and partying with loud 
music, fighting and causing disruption. It is a difficult task for us to challenge these people as 
we have no power to conference outsiders.” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners in FRC, 
2015e, p. 39)  
“Commissioners expressed concern that visitors can enter community and cause disturbances, 
yet cannot be dealt with as they do not fall within the Commission’s jurisdiction…” (FRC, 
2014e, p. 44) 
“Once they off [sic.], they live in town, they live outside but they use our community, that 
same community, they still use it for party, for drugs…” (Mossman Gorge Local 
Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 23) 
“[there are] …people we can’t touch who come into community and run amok, and think they 
can stay there as long as they want, causing trouble, without no discipline. [sic.] You know, 
like, everyone else in the community [is] under the jurisdiction of the FRC, you know, but if 
someone comes from another community, or Brisbane or whatever and cause—we get that 
problem, eh…” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioner in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 7) 
“It’s walking distance from town and the problem being in the past that taxi drivers for 25 
bucks… would deliver cask wine to a house, right? And the local young people in Mossman 
Gorge, when… the pubs close, [they] would come out and freeload anytime, freeload on 
everybody out there… So, what’s happened in Mossman Gorge, basically, Mossman Town 
permeates out to the Gorge because it’s the place to go and hide away from the cops… the 
people causing the problems are the ones from outside, in by and large.” (Commissioner 
Glasgow in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 21) 
This relates to an issue raised by von Sturmer and Le Marseny (2012, pp. 17–18), that the geographic 
boundaries of the communities as sites for CYWR do not necessarily align with cultural ‘ecospheres’.  
“It would be an interesting issue to see how it positions Hope Vale in relation to relations 
living in Cooktown and further afield: what we might call the Guugu-Yimidhirr diaspora. 
Also, in terms of its relations with Wujal Wuja[l], its ‘sister community’ under the Lutheran 
Mission and given the generally close links with the Gugu-Yalanji world. It’s useful 
conceptually to think of the Guugu-Wara, Guugu-Yimidhirr and Gugu-Yalanji as constituting 
a single cultural block, with many shared concepts and actual social and historical dealings.  
This signals a conceptual problem with the Welfare Reform programme, that its field of 
operation or jurisdiction does not coincide with the Guugu-Yimidhirr ecosphere. It is very 
much community-centred or focussed rather than seeking to match the actual dimensions, 
dynamics and modalities of the life world…”  
The fluidity of the (artificial) boundary between Mossman Gorge and Mossman Township (as well as 
other surrounding areas) is, arguably, another example of this.  
Local Commissioners perceive these individuals as having “…slipped through the net of welfare 
reform” (FRC, 2012e, p. 61). As a result, the FRC has suggested legislative changes are required to 
enable the FRC to have jurisdiction over any welfare recipient living in their communities, even 
where they live there for less than three months.  
“In order to close what they view as a gap in reforming behaviour they would like to see the 
FRC Act amended to delete the requirement of three months residency in determining 
jurisdiction. They would like the Commission to have jurisdiction over any welfare recipient 
as long as they live in a house in the community. In essence, all people in community should 
adopt the community’s values.” (FRC, 2014e, p. 44) 
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Whether or not these changes are made to the current model and Act, the different interrelationships 
between the individual, family, cultural groupings and ‘communities’ should, perhaps, be further 
considered in any potential future iterations of the model (or similar models). This context would 
undoubtedly change and shift over space and perhaps also time.     
7.2.4 ‘Hard to reach’ clients 
A common theme represented in the qualitative data was the concept of a ‘hard to reach’ group of 
FRC clients who had made little progress under the CYWR, FRC and CYIM.   
“There is frustration with the momentum of change and degrees of commitment by some…” 
(Commissioner Glasgow in FRC, 2010e, p. 10) 
“The challenge… [is] how the Commission can influence community members who continue 
to display anti-social behaviour and remain recalcitrant to change.” (FRC, 2012e, p. 60) 
“…it is time to consider strategies to meet the continuing problems it faces with recalcitrant 
people and families within the welfare reform trial communities.” (FRC, 2013d, p. 12) 
Limerick (2012, p. 2) estimated that this group made up approximately 25% of Aurukun’s population, 
and somewhere between 8–15% of the populations of the other three communities. However, a 
Mossman Gorge Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 1, 2018, p. 22) recently stated,  
“There’s… I would say, 30 per cent of families that haven’t even improved. You know, 
they’re stuck in that circle, you know…”  
McMahon (in Interview 3, 2018, pp. 13–14) indicated that there were approximately 150 people in 
Aurukun who had not appeared to receive benefit from the FRC or CYIM.   
“…I would say all of our trouble in Aurukun occurs roughly with about 150 people. All the 
rest are there but they're the ones that you're continually going to.” (Brendan McMahon in 
Interview 3, 2018, p. 13) 
With regards to school attendance in Aurukun, Commissioner Glasgow (in Interview 1, 2018, p. 11) 
stated,  
“…there is a group of people in this community who have children who do not send them to 
school regularly, so we’re talking about 45 families in Aurukun—some drift in and out of 
that. Some will have one boy that might go to school 90 per cent of the time, and three other 
children who go intermittently from 10 to 30 per cent…” 
Some FRC clients have participated in multiple FRC conferences and had extensive contact with the 
FRC and CYIM59, but to little effect. 
“Commissioners have… identified a significant number of families that have chronically 
truant children and despite the efforts of parents the children do not attend school. Some 
families have attended conferences up to eight times to discuss with the Commissioners 
strategies to address the truancy…” (FRC, 2010c, p. 7) 
“Many of these clients have been on a case plan for at least one 12 month period and have 
shown limited behaviour change despite the opportunity to engage with service providers 
under the case plan provisions.” (FRC, 2012c, p. 9) 
“…our work has been hard and repetitive, at times dealing with the same clients.” (FRC, 
2016e, p. 36) 
“…there was still a small percentage of clients who have been issued notices and income 
management orders who still refuse to engage, regardless of any sanctions.” (Hope Vale 
Local Commissioners in Dav’ange Consulting, 2018, p. 40) 
                                                     
59 By the end of October 2017, there was a group of 88 FRC clients who had been placed on compulsory CYIM orders 6–12 
times since 2008 (FRC, 2017d, p. 11).  
 76 
 
However, in some cases, these clients are ostensibly experiencing multiple and deeply entrenched 
symptoms of disadvantage.  
“In her case there is a pattern of flight—possibly of outlasting one’s welcome; in other cases 
there is a desire for flight not always acted on, if at all. There are the drifters or floaters, and 
the would-be floaters and drifters. In her case the pattern was probably established early on by 
having at a very young age to fend for herself and being abandoned. She now repeats that 
pattern of abandonment—but at the same time attempting to create new attachments that she 
is almost certain to undo or compromise. The question: how to stabilise the life conditions of 
such people?” (Reflection on an FRC client in von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 12) 
“S [is] a painfully thin yet heavily pregnant young woman whose dimmed gaze suggests she’s 
not quite reachable. She’s accompanied [to an FRC conference] by a case manager, who helps 
to elaborate on the detailed court documents before the commissioners. S, the commission is 
told, is a victim of extremely serious assaults by her partner who, as a consequence, is now on 
remand. S is to be referred to a parenting program, and counselling services for alcohol abuse 
and budgeting. She is facing a difficult birth, requiring specialist care. The domestic assaults 
on S have included spitting, threats of murder, punches to the face that rendered her jaw 
unworkable because of swelling, a machete blow to the back of the head that caused a 7-
centimetre laceration, and boiling tea thrown into her face. All while she was pregnant…” 
(case study 15 at Appendix 2) 
To enable greater leverage against ‘hard to reach’ clients, the FRC has trialled an Active Family 
Pathways framework (implemented in late 2010, though this appears to have since lapsed (FRC, 
2010d, p. 7; FRC, 2011d)) and an ‘FRC Link’ model, which aims to “…give clients and their families 
who have disengaged with the FRC process an opportunity to talk with Local Commissioners in more 
depth, outside the formal conference environment.” (FRC, 2016b, p. 13) Whether or not these 
approaches have been successful in improving outcomes for hard to reach clients is unclear.  
The introduction of 90% CYIM was also intended, in part, to increase the FRC’s leverage against this 
group. 
“[90% IM]… has given Local Commissioners an additional tool to encourage those members 
of the CYWR communities who show significant resistance to measures already placed upon 
them to comply with orders.” (FRC, 2014a, p. 2) 
This additional lever appears to have improved engagement for some people.  
“…We have witnessed over the past year that some of our mob who were placed on 90 per 
cent income management along with a case plan tend to slowly come around and eventually 
attend conference.” (Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners in FRC, 2015e, p. 39) 
However, it is unclear whether the clients the Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners are referring to 
(above) also sought further help after conferencing and experienced positive outcomes. There also 
remain others for whom 90% CYIM has also, apparently, been less helpful.  
“As it has in Hope Vale and Mossman Gorge, the application of income management appears 
to have lost its impact over time in the case of some [Coen] families. The Commissioners 
explained there are families in the Coen community who have been on 90% income 
management for a reasonable length of time and their children were still not attending 
school.” (Dav’ange Consulting, 2018, p. 20) 
“…we found that those that were being hit with the 90 per cent after they’d been on income 
management for a long time, made very little difference.” (FRC Registrar in Interview 2, 
2018, p. 5) 
It may be the case that, at least in some instances, these individuals have not received benefit from the 
service-delivery framework surrounding the FRC.  
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“The greatest impact has been on individuals who have been before the FRC and have 
accessed support services. The residents exhibiting the least improvement are in a ‘harder to 
reach’ category of individuals who are being repeatedly called before the FRC but are not 
accessing any of the support services or opportunities that might improve their lives…” 
(Limerick, 2012, p. 2) 
“Service providers are not obliged to engage referred clients, therefore those clients who do 
not wish to attend the service provider do not receive a benefit from the services on offer…” 
(FRC, 2012c, p. 9) 
In some cases, like that described in case study 15 (at Appendix 2), circumstances for some 
individuals are so severe that may not be in a position to take up further support, even where it is 
available. However, there may also be problems with the services on offer, and gaps in service 
delivery (as explored in section 7.2.5 Service delivery). It may also be the case that these individuals 
require different intervention functions and mechanics of change (Michie et al., 2011), beyond the 
remit of the FRC. It may be helpful to further explore these considerations to inform possible future 
models.  
7.2.5 Service delivery 
The performance of service providers in each of the CYWR communities is critical to the operation of 
the FRC (Focus Group 2, 2018). A key part of the FRC’s theory of change is that clients are able to be 
referred to and case-managed across multiple support services to address intensive and longer-term 
needs. Therefore, the success of FRC clients will also, at least partially, depend on the utility and 
efficacy of the services they are referred to.  
The FRC has been described as a valuable “…conduit for the work of many Queensland Government 
services agencies” (IPNRC, 2017, p. 4). In many cases, the FRC works closely and effectively with 
other service providers (e.g. IPNRC, 2017; FRC, 2009b, p. 16; FRC, 2010b, p. 2; FRC, 2015e, p. 35; 
von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 17; McMahon in Interview 3, 2018, pp. 6-7). For instance, 
McMahon (in Interview 3, 2018, pp. 6–7) indicated that the strong relationship between the Aurukun 
Local Commissioners and Aurukun police made it easier for police to do their work.  
There are examples in the qualitative data of FRC clients being referred to and receiving great benefit 
from some services (e.g. see case studies 1, 3–8, 11, 16, 18, 23 and 24 at Appendix 2). However, 
concerns have also been raised about the approach and efficacy of others.  
The FRC has consistently reported difficulty in receiving timely, accurate and appropriate feedback 
from some service providers about FRC clients’ participation and progress. This hinders the FRC’s 
ability to appropriately case manage some clients.  
“This quarter has seen a decline in the commitment of service providers to provide monthly 
progress reports in a timely manner and the information provided has been sparse and 
relating to the operational processes of service providers rather than focussing on client 
engagement and progress.” (FRC, 2009d, p. 6) 
“The Commission continues to experience difficulties with consistent and accurate monthly 
reporting from some service providers...” (FRC, 2011c, pp. 16-17) 
“…Sometimes we have received advice from the Wellbeing Centre that the client has met 
all requirements, but in conference the client states that they have never been to the referral 
agency. Aurukun people when asked will tell you the truth, so agencies that tell untruths in 
reports are not doing themselves any favours…” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 
2012e, p. 26)60 
                                                     
60 Since this comment was made, management of the Aurukun Wellbeing Centre, which was previously the responsibility of 
the Royal Flying Doctor Service, has been transitioned over to Apunipima Cape York Health Council (2017). Apunipima 
also took over responsibility for the Coen, Hope Vale and Mossman Gorge Wellbeing Centres at the same time, in April 
2017.    
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“[some services would] …tick someone attended when the [Local] Commissioner would 
say no he’s been living in Mapoon for the last 12 months…” (Commissioner Glasgow in 
Interview 1, 2018, p. 16) 
“We’ve really struggled with our service providers over the years to get any meaningful 
information from them about how our clients are progressing.” (FRC Registrar in Interview 
2, 2018, p. 7) 
Mossman Gorge Local Commissioners (in FRC, 2017e, p. 39) also recently reported that they rarely 
received notices of tenancy breaches despite fielding community “…complaints about the misconduct 
of tenants”. The Local Commissioners (in FRC, 2017e, p. 39) explained,  
“We have had difficulty understanding some of the actions of the Department of Housing 
and Public Works, Housing and Homelessness services who continue to determine which 
clients will be breached, seemingly based on their relationships with clients rather than the 
breach itself. We feel that this department does not take our positions and the work we do 
for our community seriously… Although we have the power to deal with clients who 
breach tenancy conduct conditions, we rarely receive notices of breach.” 
In response, the Queensland Government has indicated that “…all Notices to Remedy breaches… are 
reported to the FRC [but that]…there are times when a breach notice for anti-social behaviour is not 
appropriate and a verbal or written warning may be issued…” and/or that in some cases, community 
members may be reluctant to make complaints about anti-social behaviours to the Department of 
Housing and Public Works.61 The Cape York Institute has provided the following remarks in relation 
to the Queensland Government’s (above) response:  
“This statement fails to address the importance issue raised by the FRC Commissioners. 
The Cape York Institute has spoken further with BBNAC about the tenancy management 
arrangements in Mossman Gorge and there are 10 houses on the Indigenous Reserve side 
of Mossman Gorge that are wholly controlled and managed by DHPW. BBNAC 
(Housing) and the FRC Commissioners have no control over tenant behaviour in these 
houses other than via referrals for tenancy breaches made to the FRC.  
Both BBNAC and the FRC Local Commissioners have frequently complained to DHPW 
about ‘party’ houses on the Reserve that are managed by DHPW but with no referral to the 
FRC or change in behaviour. BBNAC has a long and proud history of effectively 
managing its 22 houses on the freehold side of Mossman Gorge. In several cases BBNAC 
has been forced to evict tenants from its houses due to repeated breaches and wilful 
damage. These tenants have in several cases simply moved into DHPW managed houses 
on the Reserve and there continued their antisocial behaviour.”62 (Personal communication 
with Cape York Institute, 19 October 2018).  
The FRC has also demonstrated concern over the cultural capability of some service providers, as 
well as their willingness to work collaboratively with communities and lack of knowledge about 
community protocols.  
“Commissioners voiced significant concerns regarding service providers and the lack of 
cultural appropriateness and perceived arrogance when entering CYWR communities. 
Commissioners expressed their disappointment at the lack of respect that many service 
                                                     
61 The Queensland Government has provided the following fuller response to this issue, raised by the FRC: “The Queensland 
Government confirms that all Notice to Remedy Breaches from the Department of Housing and Public Works (DHPW) are 
reported to the FRC in Mossman Gorge.  However, there are times when a breach for anti-social behaviour is not appropriate 
and a verbal or written warning may be issued, which will not be referred to the FRC. In some cases, community members 
may be reluctant to make complaints about anti-social behaviours to DHPW. 
62 Cape York Institute noted that this feedback was based on their personal communication with BBNAC on 16 October 
2018. 
 79 
 
providers show when in their communities and the ‘one size fits all’ approach to working 
in Indigenous communities commonly displayed by large agencies.” (FRC, 2009d, p. 7) 
“We encourage service providers [to] not come to our community with their own agendas, 
but to listen to our people and consider their ideas…” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in 
FRC, 2016e, p. 35) 
“[some service providers] …live in compounds, they live in fortresses—so how do you 
build a relationship with the community when you won’t go out and you go home there, 
you don’t go to Church, you don’t [go] to the house openings, you don’t go to funerals 
because that’s too dangerous, you don’t go out fishing with everybody… we did that all the 
time.” (Commissioner Glasgow in Interview 1, 2018, p. 23) 
This may increase barriers that some community members already experience when trying to access 
support services and, in some cases, lead to client disengagement.   
“All too often we see a client fall away and go back to their old ways because navigating 
the complexities of the agencies is too difficult and challenging. We don’t need more 
barriers for our people; they have enough of their own…” (Coen Local Commissioners in 
FRC, 2012e, p. 76)  
Concern has also been raised about the quality and suitability of the services delivered by some 
providers.  
“Government and non-Government agencies are at times ineffectual and casual in carrying 
out their responsibilities.” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 2017e, p. 30) 
“The Commission has been unable to issue the anticipated number of Show Cause notices 
due to a lack of improvement in the level and quality of services to the Commission’s 
clients as previously reported. This is an area that requires significant improvement if the 
CYWR program is to achieve its anticipated outcomes.” (FRC, 2010a, p. 2) 
“A number of areas of concern have been identified by the Commissioners with regard to 
method of service delivery [by the service provider] to its clients, which affects the 
Commission’s ability to case manage effectively.” (FRC, 2010c, p. 6) 
“The capacity of the Commission to conduct early interventions or to source appropriate 
solutions to complex situations has been adversely affected by the lack of suitable service 
provision in all of the communities.” (FRC, 2010e, p. 51) 
Staff turnover and resources are perceived as an ongoing problem (FRC, 2011b, p. 6, 25; FRC, 2012e, 
2014e; Dav’ange Consulting, 2018, p. 28). In some instances, poor staff retention makes it difficult 
for providers to build rapport and trust with clients, which means service provision is hampered (FRC, 
2012e, p. 77). In other cases, the FRC cannot refer its clients because services do not have the 
capacity to receive and assist them (FRC, 2011b, p. 25). The FRC also reports that some providers 
find it difficult to engage clients, or do not use appropriate engagement methods (FRC, 2017e; 
Dav’ange Consulting, 2018).  
In addition to service provider performance, the FRC also reports ongoing service delivery gaps that 
hinder its ability to link clients up with appropriate support. These reports have been consistent, from 
the time the FRC began until the present. For example:  
“The Commission continues to encounter gaps in service delivery, coordination and 
cooperation between government agencies, service providers and non-government 
organisations in each of the communities” (FRC, 2009d, p. 6) 
“…the release of an intended suite of referral services and programs for clients still 
remains incomplete…” (FRC, 2010c, p. 5) 
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“The Commission has identified the lack of a fully functioning parenting program in 
Aurukun as a significant barrier to the case management of clients...” (FRC, 2011c, p. 4)63 
“All communities have advised a lack of child counselling service provision significantly 
impacts on the community maintaining strong school attendance rates and low rates of 
truancy.” (FRC, 2011c, 31) 
“A current gap in the trial’s reach relates to young people of high school age who have 
exited boarding school. The trial has few support services or opportunities to cater to their 
needs.” (Limerick, 2012) 
“We would like to see more support for our children and their parents and care givers in 
preparing for boarding school and university.” (Hope Vale Local Commissioners in FRC, 
2013e, p. 33) 
“The focus of the Commission is to promote the interests, rights and wellbeing of children 
and other vulnerable persons living in the CYWR trial communities but the lack of child 
and youth centric support services and coordinated agencies has continued to impede the 
implementation of the Commission’s objectives.” (FRC, 2013e, p. 47) 
“Mental health assistance for our young people is still very lacking and is much needed, 
especially for those engaged in drug and alcohol abuse, and for those that have suffered 
prolonged domestic violence.” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 2014e, p. 28) 
“…there remains the need to source practical programs to be made available to provide 
domestic violence counselling for both perpetrator and aggrieved, sex offender treatment 
programs, and programs focussing on early childhood development.” (FRC Registrar in 
FRC, 2016e, p. 43) 
Consistent unanswered requests for additional services have led to a sense of exasperation by some 
Local Commissioners.  
“We have limited referral options and limited faith in some service providers. We are tired 
of talking and waiting to get improved service delivery. It would seem to us that there are 
no ears to listen.” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 2014e, p. 29) 
“For years we have been told that successive Governments were going to do something 
about the disengaged young people in Aurukun…” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in 
FRC, 2016e, p. 34) 
In order to fill one service-delivery gap, the FRC partnered with Queensland Corrective Services 
(QCS) to deliver the Ending Family Violence Program (FRC, 2010b, 2010c, 2011b, 2013b, 2013d, 
2014a). However, it has since ceased delivery of this programme on the basis that this was not part of 
its core function, and the subsequent gap has yet to be filled.  
“Hope Vale families only have access to the Cooktown Women’s Shelter, 45 kilometres 
away. Whilst services in communities are able to provide general counselling, there are not 
often sufficient resources for specialised professionals or programs specifically targeting 
domestic and family violence. There is no structured support for either perpetrators or 
victims when perpetrators are returning to community on release from prison and wish to 
re-enter community life and the family home.” (FRC, 2016e, p. 32) 
“Clients scheduled for conference on domestic violence matters are currently referred to 
the Wellbeing Centre for counselling. We would like to see specific programs available to 
perpetrators and victims of abuse.” (Coen Local Commissioners in FRC, 2016e, p. 34) 
                                                     
63 This gap was later filled through the provision of the It Takes a Village programme, which was later rebadged as Strong 
Families (Cape York Partnership, 2017).  
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“We are waiting to see specialised domestic violence programs to support our referrals…” 
FRC, 2016e, p. 40) 
A recent review of the FRC by the Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources Committee 
(IPNRC, 2017, p. 6) also re-emphasised the need for domestic-violence related services to support the 
FRC’s role.  
“The committee understands that the Wellbeing Centres in the Welfare Reform 
communities have received no additional funding or expansion of services, and have 
minimal capacity to deal with the new Domestic Violence Order (DVO) referrals.  
The lack of additional resources and support for domestic violence influence the work of 
the FRC… The committee believes that domestic and family violence is a significant issue 
in the communities in which the FRC works. The committee appreciates that solutions are 
socially complex and generational, but encourages further support be considered to deal 
with the additional DVO referrals in these communities…” 
Enhancing the capacity of Cape York communities to prevent and respond to domestic and family 
violence (DFV) is a priority of the Queensland Government. The department of Child Safety, Youth 
and Women allocated $5.9 million to DFV services in Cape York in 2018/19. Services include: 
domestic and family violence shelters, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander DFV services, 
counselling for both adults and children. Specifically, there are:  
• Domestic and family violence shelters and related services in nine communities Aurukun, 
Coen, Cooktown, Kowanyama, Pormpuraaw, Thursday Island, Lockhart River, Weipa, the 
Northern Peninsula Area  
• Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander DFV services in five communities Cooktown, the 
Northern Peninsula Area, Thursday Island for the Torres Strait, Pormpuraaw, and Weipa. 
(A further service in Mount Isa for Mount Isa / Gulf communities).  
• As a part of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Family Wellbeing Services, 8 
Men’s Support Services in Cape York assist Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander men 
aged 16 years or older, identified as being affected by alcohol and other substances and 
violence, including as perpetrators of domestic and family violence in relationships as 
defined under the Domestic and Family Violence Prevention Act 2012. The case 
management requirements of the Men’s Support Service require a co-ordinated response 
across more than one service provider. These services are provides at Pormpuraaw, 
Kowanyama, Napranum / Weipa, Wujal Wujal, Mapoon, Lockhart River, Lockhart River 
and Bamaga.  Two more Men’s Support Services are provided at Doomadgee and 
Mornington Island in the Gulf area.  
DCSYW commissioned an Indigenous consultancy organisation (Winangali in collaboration with 
Ipsos) to explore strategies to support Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander women affected by 
domestic and family violence, to remain safe at home. The research was funded under the 
Commonwealth Government’s Women’s Safety Package and involved collaboration with the 
communities of Doomadgee, Coen and Pormpuraaw. Doomadgee was then selected to engage in a 
further co-design process to implement an initiative identified through the consultation process. 
This community led process identified the need for a Strong Women’s Group to be established in 
Doomadgee and for women to have a safe place to come together for cultural activities and to discuss 
ways to support community safety for women and children. The Strong Women’s Group is in its 
formative stage and women from the community will take part in a study tour of the Galiwinku 
community in the Northern Territory to meet with and learn from the women of that community who 
have come together to address family violence.  
Despite the Queensland Government’s commitment to improving the availability of appropriate 
support to reduce domestic violence (Queensland Government, 2016a, 2016b), this need remains a 
priority the CYWR communities.    
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Overall, the qualitative data indicate a strong need for the nature and availability of services in the 
CYWR communities to be reviewed. These findings are not unique to the CYWR communities; many 
of the problems highlighted by the FRC and others above have also been noted elsewhere (e.g. 
Queensland Productivity Commission, 2017; Productivity Commission, 2017). However, because the 
FRC is highly dependent on being able to refer clients to adequate services, these issues appear to 
deeply affect its ability to support its clients to achieve positive, sustained outcomes. As discussed in 
earlier sections of this Report, this context also appears to be incredibly important to whether CYIM 
can also work to support outcomes, or not.     
These findings indicate a need to ensure that any expansion of the programme in either its current or 
an amended format should consider the availability of services, including whether the FRC (or an 
FRC-like-structure) can be appropriately supported and embedded in existing service frameworks.  
7.2.6 Supporting Local Commissioners 
Although the Local Commissioners’ intimate knowledge of the CYWR communities holds many 
advantages, it also presents significant challenges.  
“…Our Local Commissioners juggle employment, family commitments, cultural fulfilment 
and community citizenship with their roles as Commissioners, interpreting legislation, 
balancing decisions on evidence and hearsay and sometimes supporting tough love on family 
and kin.” (FRC, 2009e, p. 17) 
The Coen Local Commissioners (in FRC, 2013e, p. 30) described their roles as follows:  
“We are always walking in two worlds. Sometimes they run together into one and sometimes 
they become wide apart as our feet go in different directions.” 
This requirement to ‘walk in two words’ and ‘wear many hats’ cannot be underestimated; it 
undoubtedly poses a key challenge for Local Commissioners, which is at times, emotionally 
confronting and distressing. For example, the considerable challenges posed by confronting family 
‘head on’ are demonstrated in case study 23 at Appendix 2. In this regard, it appears that the 
scaffolding and supportive structure of the FRC has been helpful in assisting Local Commissioners to 
navigate these challenges. This has included, for instance, ongoing professional development and 
annual Local Commissioner Development Weeks, where Local Commissioners meet and discuss their 
approaches and challenges.  
“The more time we spend with our fellow Commissioners, the more we can discuss how to 
improve our communities and the individual problems we face in our separate communities.” 
(Coen Local Commissioners in FRC, 2011e, p. 17) 
“Sharing stories of similar experiences and the ways each of us deal with these experiences 
has been, and continues to be, the most valuable part of development week” (Mossman Gorge 
Local Commissioners in FRC, 2016e, p. 41). 
It appears that this scaffolding and support of Local Commissioners provides multiple benefits in 
assisting them to overcome the inherent challenges that their roles involve.      
7.2.7 Future planning 
After it was implemented in 2008, the FRC was repeatedly incrementally extended through 
amendments to the sunset clause in the FRC Act (s152).  
“The Commission commenced operating on 1 July 2008… As regulated by the Act at that 
time the Commission was to cease operations on 1 January 2012. Each subsequent year until 
2014, following Australian and State Government consultations and budget allocations, the 
Commission was granted 12 month extensions…” (FRC, 2018) 
In November 2014, the sunset clause was removed under the Family Responsibilities Commission 
Amendment Bill 2014 (Qld). However, the uncertainty that the previous period created appears to 
have had an impact on the FRC’s functioning and transitionary arrangements.  
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“…we are concerned that only 12 month extensions for the Commission have limited our 
capacity for long-term planning.” (Aurukun Local Commissioners in FRC, 2014e, p. 29) 
 “The CYWR trial communities now look toward December 2012 with uncertainty…” (FRC, 
2012e, p. 60) 
 “…I don’t know what the future will bring when the Commission is finished…” (Aurukun 
Local Commissioner in FRC, 2012e, p. 39) 
“The ongoing uncertainty over the future funding by government of the FRC is very 
disappointing and must end. The FRC has spent six of its short ten-year life under a cloud of 
funding uncertainty yet I have lost count of the conversations I have had with local families in 
support of the FRC and with local leaders asking about how they can get this support for their 
people.” (Noel Pearson cited in personal communication with the Cape York Institute, 
September 2018) 
This includes the ability to identify and mentor new, younger leaders to carry on the work of the 
current group of Local Commissioners.  
“The challenge remains, with only a defined extension until January 2015, to identify and 
nurture new leaders with a passion to continue the work of welfare reform.” (FRC, 2013e, p. 
55) 
 “But that's another failing, and that's a Government failing, and I see it commonly in 
Government. They don't plan—they plan too short time blocks and that's no different in any 
things. So one would have liked to have seen more people coming in…they [Local 
Commissioners] need to start mentoring, have enough future that they can actually take 
people on board, mentoring younger people to be commissioners... The old ones haven't got 
long to go…” (McMahon in Interview 3, 2018, p. 8, 15) 
Nevertheless, there is a strong feeling that the FRC should continue to operate.  
“All Commissioners agree there is still work to be done and there is concern expressed that in 
the event the Commission ceases, those community members who are demonstrating 
improved social behaviour and proactively seeking solutions to improve their lives may lose 
hope and revert back to their previous lifestyles prior to welfare reform…” (FRC, 2012e, p. 
60) 
“If it stops it will gradually go back to the way we were. It will not happen overnight, but it 
will happen…” (Local Commissioner in von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, p. 17) 
“…I hope that when the little ones grow up the FRC is still here to help them, help the next 
generation, and the generation after that.” (FRC client in von Sturmer and Le Marseny, 2012, 
p. 12) 
 “What we hope is that the FRC is not going to close… If it’s going to close, we are back to 
square one where we started 10 years ago…” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in Focus 
Group 2, 2018, p. 2) 
“There is 100% support from the Local Commissioners interviewed for the continuation of 
the FRC.” (Dav’ange Consulting, 2018, p. 14) 
“…from all of us here this mob around here, we don’t want FRC to stop. The information 
you’re taking, you take our heart with you.” (Hope Vale Local Commissioner in Focus Group 
2, 2018, p. 27) 
“…the actual welfare reform concept is great. Could it be improved? Yes. Is there something 
better at the moment? I don't see anything there at the moment. In fact everything I see in all 
the meetings I go to now, people are still questioning everything, but no one’s come up with 
anything that’s of use. Here you've got a model that worked.” (McMahon in Interview 3, 
2018, p. 20) 
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Pearson (in FRC, 2016e, p. 6) stated, “The FRC was not intended to become a permanent fixture…” 
This was also reflected in the earlier views of Hope Vale Local Commissioners (in FRC, 2012e, p. 
77):  
“Eventually we will need to take a back seat and let other community members and 
organisations become more proactive. We will then have been successful in empowering our 
community to continue moving forward.” 
More recently, Pearson (in personal communication with Cape York Institute, September 2018) 
stated:  
“The focus for all partners must be firmly on the future and making the FRC the strongest and 
most effective vehicle of Indigenous agency and authority that it can possibly be. This means 
by necessity that the FRC must become a permanent entity and that clear thinking is applied 
to the grassroots collaboration between the FRC and Justice Groups, and extending the 
network of FRC support across Cape York and other regions in Queensland.”   
There is a clear view in the current CYWR communities that the FRC should continue in some form; 
presumably because this goal of community-wide empowerment has not yet been achieved. With 
regard to any continuation of CYIM specifically, a Hope Vale Local Commissioner (in Focus Group 
2, 2018, p. 26) stated,  
“My concern is that, you know, you got all the findings, you have picked our brain about 
what’s good, what’s bad what’s been, you know… and then the Government think they can 
do it [deliver CYIM] on their own. They cannot. That’s the clear message out of this. The 
Government cannot do this, without a body managing it on the ground…” 
This view is supported by the findings of this review; CYIM is able to overcome many of the 
problems with IM schemes elsewhere because it is delivered through the context of the FRC. This 
context is a key component of any ‘successes’ that can be attributed to the Cape York scheme.  
7.3 Summary of findings 
Although there are continuing debates in the broader literature about the ideological underpinnings of 
the CYWR and FRC, this review only finds partial support for these. The view that CYWR and the 
FRC are neo-colonial constructs, designed to continue the process of colonisation in the CYWR 
communities is not supported by the qualitative evidence. For example, there is no indication in the 
existing data of disagreement with the fundamental social objectives of the model (e.g. improving 
school attendance), though this may also be because these questions were not explicitly raised in the 
available data. It is also important to recognise that—notwithstanding that the initial CYWR 
consultations with the communities may have been improved—these formed the basis for the 
development of the FRC’s social triggers. Finally, while there is no doubt that the structure of the 
FRC is ‘artificial’ insofar as it is anchored in and derives its power from an external legislative 
instrument, it nevertheless has the objective of empowering local authority in a way that echoes 
traditional Indigenous leadership structures. There is strong evidence it has been successful in this 
regard (see section 4.1 Rebuilding local Indigenous authority).   
Nevertheless, there are some indications of support for the second common ideological argument, 
which questions the fact that welfare recipients in particular are targeted by the CYWR, FRC and 
CYIM. The qualitative data indicate that there is a growing sense of unfairness that there are segments 
of the communities who are outside of the FRC’s jurisdiction because they do not receive welfare; 
implicit is the assumption that it is only welfare recipients breaching the social norms, but the 
anecdotal evidence indicates that this does not hold true. This is a tension in the model that would 
benefit from further consideration. 
In addition to these ideological challenges, there are also a range of practical challenges concerning 
the FRC and CYIM that arise from the qualitative data. For example, there is evidence that some 
individuals are able to circumvent the BasicsCard, which may reduce its potency. Alternatively, there 
is also concern that some individuals may become dependent on CYIM, though this issue is likely 
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avoided to some extent on Cape York (as opposed to other IM schemes across Australia, where it has 
been raised as an issue (e.g. Bray et al., 2014)) because CYWR also involves wraparound services to 
deliver financial literacy support.  
The fact that some clients remain beyond jurisdiction of the FRC because of their living arrangements 
was also raised as a practical challenge of the model, alongside limitations with the service delivery 
system. This is particularly problematic; the success of the FRC model partially relies upon the ability 
of Local Commissioners to refer clients to suitable and effective support services. However, there is 
evidence of poor service delivery and continuing gaps in the types of services available. For example, 
the FRC and others have frequently highlighted a need for services for victims and perpetrators of 
domestic violence, but it appears that this gap in the service-delivery framework persists. 
Finally, qualitative data regarding the future of the FRC were briefly considered. These indicate 
strong support for the continuation of the FRC and CYIM in some format, as well as a need to support 
the mentoring and development of a new generation of leaders to ensure local authority remains 
strong. 
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8. Conclusion 
FRC’s approach to delivering CYIM 
Implemented in 2008, the CYWR initiative aims to address passive dependence on welfare and 
commit people in the communities of Aurukun, Coen, Hope Vale, and Mossman Gorge to resume 
primary responsibility for the wellbeing of their families and their communities. CYIM is one 
strategy used by in CYWR over the past ten years (2008–2018) in the original CYWR communities 
(i.e. excluding Doomadgee). Drawing on available qualitative and quantitative data (e.g. qualitative 
accounts in the existing literature, FRC reports and FRC client data), this review sought to understand 
the impacts of CYIM.  
After it was implemented in 2008, the FRC was repeatedly incrementally extended until the sunset 
clause was removed under the Family Responsibilities Commission Amendment Bill 2014 (Qld). 
However, the uncertainty that the previous period created appears to have had an impact on the FRC’s 
functioning and transitionary arrangements, including the ability to identify and mentor new, younger 
leaders to carry on the work of the current group of commissioners. This is one of many challenges 
for program delivery in remote communities and include service fragmentation and overlap; lack of 
capacity; interagency conflict and turf wars; different approaches and service philosophies among 
agencies; overlaps between providers, programs and policies;  implementation problems with 
administrative and operational systems; difficulties in recruiting and retaining experienced and skilled 
staff, made more difficult by limited funding timescales; and, displacement in which problems 
occurring in the target community decrease, but increase in other locations (SPRC and FaHCSIA, 
2012).  
A key part of the FRC’s theory of change is that clients are to be referred to and case-managed across 
multiple support services to address intensive and longer-term needs. Therefore, the success of FRC 
clients will also, at least partially, depend on the utility and efficacy of the services they are referred 
to. The FRC has consistently reported difficulty in receiving timely, accurate and appropriate 
feedback from some service providers about FRC clients’ participation and progress. Concern has 
also been raised about the quality and suitability of the services delivered by some providers. Staff 
turnover and limited resources also make it difficult for providers to build rapport and trust with 
clients, which means service provision is hampered. In other cases, the FRC cannot refer its clients 
because services do not have the capacity to receive and assist them. This may increase barriers that 
some community members already experience when trying to access support services and lead to 
client disengagement. It also has implications for the overall effectiveness of the FRC/CYIM model.    
There is a strong need for the availability of services in the CYWR communities to be reviewed. 
These findings are not unique to the CYWR communities. However, because the FRC is highly 
dependent on being able to refer clients to adequate services, these issues appear to deeply affect its 
ability to support its clients to achieve positive, sustained outcomes.  
CYIM was not implemented in a socio-political vacuum and any appraisal if its impacts have to be 
considered against an ideologically-driven and politically-charged landscape of Indigenous policy that 
is subject to contestation and conflict. Despite a significant community consultation process both 
before and during the implementation of the CYWR trial, there was much confusion and uncertainty 
associated with CYIM and responses to CYIM and the BasicsCard were often negative. There were 
also complaints that the model had been implanted, rather than agreed to. There is evidence that some 
community members and leaders felt dissatisfied by the consultation and implementation of CYWR 
and CYIM, and/or proffered and then withdrew their support at different times (for reasons that are 
often not clear, based on the available data).  
Local Commissioners were active in subsequent community engagement regarding the functions and 
purpose of the FRC and CYIM. This assisted in changing perceptions of CYIM in its early stages of 
implementation. And, although some individuals have withdrawn their support at different times, 
there is no indication in the available data that this has been due to any fundamental disagreement 
with the objectives of CYWR, the FRC or CYIM. Some individuals who opposed the FRC and CYIM 
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for other reasons still agreed with the social norms and behavioural objectives of the model. For 
example, it is widely agreed that the needs of children must be accorded a high priority.   
Nonetheless, there has been a persistent perception that the CYWR, FRC and CYIM are based on 
neo-colonial notions of assimilation rather than self-determination and are therefore imposed top-
down via external forces. There is little to no support in the available data for the ideological 
argument that CYWR, the FRC and CYIM are imposed neo-colonial constructions. Rather, the 
models were designed by and in close partnership with Indigenous community members and leaders, 
and were accepted and agreed to by those communities and leaders.   
There are claims that CYWR, FRC and CYIM unfairly target, problematise and stigmatise welfare 
recipients. There is also a growing sense of unfairness that there are segments of the communities who 
are outside of the FRC’s jurisdiction because they do not receive welfare. It is questionable that the 
FRC’s jurisdiction only extends to those receiving welfare. It is not only welfare recipients breaching 
the social norms. This tension in the model requires further careful consideration. With regard to 
CYIM specifically, it could be argued that an entirely voluntary scheme would enable greater 
individual self-determination. However, some individuals appear to receive great benefit from 
compulsory CYIM. There is also evidence that the FRC’s use of CYIM to coerce as well as 
incentivise is an important part of the model, and enables at least some clients to make significant 
positive changes in their lives.  
The argument that CYWR represents neo-colonial paternalism also presupposes that it seeks to 
supplant Indigenous culture. However, there is a sense that the strategies have, instead, represented a 
resurgence of culture and ostensibly empowered local authority in a way that echoes traditional 
Indigenous leadership structures. One of the many devastating effects of colonisation in the four 
CYWR communities has been the removal and/or destruction of traditional local authority structures, 
which originally maintained and enforced Indigenous social and cultural norms through traditional 
lore. The FRC Local Commissioners were intended in the original CYWR design to be a key 
mechanism through which local Indigenous authority and group norms could be re-established and/or, 
where they still existed, empowered. This empowerment of local Indigenous leaders to apply IM is a 
key distinguishing feature that sets CYIM apart from models that have been implemented elsewhere 
in Australia. There is considerable anecdotal evidence that this model has been successful in 
supporting and rebuilding local Indigenous authority to manage anti-social behaviour. Key to this has 
been Local Commissioners’ deep localised knowledge, which has allowed them to provide a service 
that is culturally sensitive and appropriate, as well as being matched to individual clients’ needs.  
Although the Local Commissioners’ intimate knowledge of the CYWR communities holds many 
advantages, it also presents significant challenges, such as the requirement to ‘walk in two words’ and 
‘wear many hats’. These challenges cannot be underestimated; the roles played by Local 
Commissioners are, at times, emotionally confronting and distressing. The scaffolding and supportive 
structure of the FRC has been helpful in assisting Local Commissioners to navigate these challenges. 
The forum within which CYIM is typically applied is the FRC conference. The conference 
environment is important in setting the scene for CYIM. In particular, it appears to improve clients’ 
access to natural justice and encourages them to take up case-managed support, both of which can 
support the intentions of CYIM. Once a client arrives at the FRC, the conference setting can be used 
both to chastise as well as to celebrate achievements and strengths. Similarly, CYIM is also used in 
both ways by the FRC—to coerce, but also as an incentive. The FRC draws on CYIM as one tool in 
its broader kit of options. Ultimately, only a relatively small proportion of FRC clients have ever been 
subject to a CYIM order. At its peak in 2008–2009 the percentage of FRC clients placed on a CYIM 
order was 20.7%, a figure which has declined annually to the 2017–2018 figure of 7.7%.   
The FRC has been described as being potentially more effective than formal, adversarial modes of 
justice, perhaps as a result of its restorative elements. There are many powerful stories of clients 
experiencing pivotal moments of realisation during conference sessions and making dramatic and 
positive changes in their lives. There are also others, for whom conferencing appears to have less of 
an impact. There is a small ‘hard to reach’ group of FRC clients who appear to have made little 
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progress under the CYWR, FRC and CYIM. In some cases, these clients are ostensibly experiencing 
multiple and deeply entrenched symptoms of disadvantage. To enable greater leverage against ‘hard 
to reach’ clients, the FRC has trialled an Active Family Pathways and an ‘FRC Link’ model. Whether 
or not these approaches have been successful in improving outcomes for hard to reach clients is 
unclear. The introduction of 90% CYIM was also intended to increase the FRC’s leverage against this 
group and appears to have improved engagement for some people. However, it seems that there are 
still some clients for whom this change has had little effect. CYIM alone is a poor response to 
addressing what are often complex needs. The FRC’s ability to link clients to a range of other support 
services is, therefore, an important aspect of its broader role, although there is evidence that the 
service framework could be further enhanced. 
There is evidence that the BasicsCard is a helpful tool for assisting community members to manage 
household budgets, provide for their families, and reduce opportunities for humbugging. However, 
there also remain some practical challenges with its use. There are accounts that some individuals are 
able to circumvent the BasicsCard. Many of these cases appear to revolve around the ability of people 
to: use BasicsCards that are not their own; or use BasicsCards to buy essential items, but then swap 
these for cash. With regards to methods of overcoming these issues, some have suggested widening 
the array of goods that are prohibited under CYIM, or including photographic identification on the 
BasicsCard. Some card circumvention practices amount to fraud, raising the possibility that well-
intentioned welfare reforms can also serve to extend zones of criminality. This may have the 
unintended consequence of increasing Indigenous contact with the criminal justice system, though it 
appears that cases do not often come to the attention of the police and/or are otherwise difficult to 
prosecute. Dependency on the BasicsCard was cited as a problem. However, participation in the 
MPower programme may serve as a buffer against long-term dependency on the BasicsCard in the 
Cape York context, because it offers another avenue through which clients can improve their financial 
literacy.  
Outcomes of IM 
There is a general feeling, both from the FRC Commissioners and from CYWR community members 
that their communities have improved since the introduction of CYWR, the FRC and CYIM. One of 
the specific outcomes of CYIM appears to be its ability to support clients to better manage and budget 
their income, as well as overcome ‘humbugging’, which enables them to cover basic needs. In 2007 
the Cape York Institute identified as series of ‘dysfunctions’ that had resulted from and also 
contributed to the perceived breakdown in social norms. Each were examined with regard to the 
impact of CYIM.  
The data suggest some level of impact of the CYWR and, potentially also the FRC and CYIM, on 
alcohol use. The qualitative data contain some accounts where individuals have made long-term 
changes to their drinking behaviours, either by giving up drinking, or choosing to drink in a way that 
has less of an impact on other family members, particularly children. There are some indications that 
the FRC and CYIM have impacted drug use in the CYWR communities, particularly by limiting the 
availability of cash. The quantitative data on substance abuse are mixed and provide only minimal 
support for the contention that the CYWR, FRC and/or CYIM have also resulted in positive 
community-wide changes to alcohol and drug-related offending.  
Overall, the evidence concerning the impact of the FRC and CYIM on violence is mixed. The 
qualitative data suggest a general feeling that violence has reduced as a result of the introduction of 
the FRC and CYIM. The role of CYIM in this regard is its ability to reduce expenditure on alcohol 
and drugs, which then ostensibly reduces the frequency and severity of violence. Qualitative data 
regarding overall reductions in violence were only partially supported by the quantitative analyses. 
However, the available quantitative data showed no significant impacts of the intervention on DVO 
breach offences in three of the communities. The impact of the FRC’s other functions, including 
conferencing and referral to other services, also appear to play critical roles in this regard. There is 
also some qualitative evidence that CYIM can support victims of humbugging, including victims of 
domestic violence, to take greater control over household finances. Although the option of voluntary 
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CYIM can be useful in this context, the ability to request a compulsory CYIM order also appears to be 
valuable. Therefore, the fact that the FRC has both options available appears to be important in 
supporting different clients’ individual needs.   
The qualitative evidence indicates that general perceptions about the importance of schooling have 
improved, at least in part due to the Local Commissioners’ wide-ranging efforts to convey and 
reinforce this norm. There have also been other efforts that may have influenced these perceptions, 
including the work of Student Case Managers, and the introduction of the CYAAA64 in Aurukun, 
Coen and Hope Vale. It appears that the specific impact of CYIM has been more limited. However, 
there are cases where CYIM has helped redirect spending towards basic needs, which has resulted in 
children being better prepared to attend school. There are also other ‘pull’ factors that determine 
whether or not children will attend school, such as the school environment and curriculum. These (and 
other) factors also undoubtedly affect school attendance and engagement, but are outside of the 
influence of the FRC and CYIM. The aggregate quantitative analyses show no significant change in 
the trend in school attendance rates in recent years (since 2013), relative to any changes seen in the 
overall comparison areas. This suggests that the statistically significant improvement in school 
attendance seen in Aurukun immediately after the intervention, as reported in the 2012 CYWR 
evaluation (SPRC and FaHCSIA, 2012), has not been sustained over the full period of CYWR and 
CYIM.   
There is a general perception in the communities that children’s overall wellbeing has improved since 
the introduction of the FRC and CYIM. Positive changes are often described in terms of children now 
being fed and clothed, and having their health-care needs met, where this was not always the case 
before. There are also other examples where families have been able to reunite with children who had 
been removed by Child Safety after having contact with the FRC and being placed on CYIM. Some 
clients also proactively seek out the support of the FRC and request CYIM in order to prevent or 
reduce the extent of child-safety intervention. The aggregate quantitative analyses show that there was 
a significant relative decrease in child-safety notifications in Coen since 2010. Aurukun, Hope Vale 
and Mossman Gorge showed no significant change in notifications relative to the comparison areas. 
These data are, however, limited by changes in reporting behaviours, methods and broader policies 
and programmes, and should, therefore, be interpreted with caution.  
Quantitative analysis of individual FRC client histories indicate that while CYIM does not prevent 
future breaching, it does reduce breach notifications, and extend the time between subsequent 
breaches. This positive impact of CYIM on breach notifications is over and above the impact of other 
service referrals that the client may receive.  
------------------ 
In sum, evidence concerning the outcomes and impact of CYIM is mixed. In some cases there is 
evidence that the FRC and CYIM have contributed to a reduction in alcohol, drugs, violence and 
crime. There is also evidence that outcomes have improved in terms of children’s overall health and 
wellbeing, and engagement with school. However, these are not always supported by the quantitative 
data. Results of the community-level quantitative analyses are mixed; however analysis of individual 
client histories indicate that CYIM reduces future breach notifications. This disjuncture could be 
caused by a number of factors, including limitations in the datasets. However, the data does indicate 
that the FRC, including its ability to apply CYIM, have gone some way in creating a context that is at 
least conducive to positive outcomes. For example, it appears considerable benefits are associated 
with the ability of Local Commissioners to establish and reinforce social norms, as well as challenge 
those who do not adhere to such norms, especially in the conference setting. Theoretically, this may 
also have a positive impact on overall social capital in the communities, which may support improved 
and ongoing positive outcomes and increase community resilience.  
                                                     
64 CYAAA operated in Aurukun from early 2010 until late 2016, and continues to operate in Coen and Hope Vale since it 
opened there in early 2010 and early 2011 respectively.  
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Social capital describes features of social organisation, such as relations of honesty, cooperation, 
reciprocity, engagement and mutual obligation that exist between people within social networks, 
social structures and social institutional arrangements (Putnam, 1993). It influences the ability of 
individuals to receive benefits by virtue of membership within networks and other social structures 
(Portes, 2000) and facilitates bonding and community integration. When social bonds fail to develop 
or are strained or broken, individuals will be motivated to engage in forms of deviance or criminal 
activities which ‘reward’ them. There are four elements of social bonding: attachment (emotional 
connection to others); commitment (accumulated relationships which provide a stake in conformity); 
involvement (participation in legitimate activities); and belief (the acceptance of the existing 
normative order). There are several indicators of social capital in the data considered in this review 
and, overall, the qualitative data in particular indicates that social capital has strengthened in the 
communities in question.  
One explanation for the discrepancies in the qualitative and quantitative data may be provided by the 
concept of collective efficacy, whereby the qualitative suggests improved social integration and 
strengthening social structures and institutions, while the quantitative data indicates fluctuating 
indicators of social engagement. Collective efficacy, which is closely aligned with social capital, 
describes the social cohesion among community residents combined with their willingness to 
intervene for the common good to prevent crime and disorder (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 
1997). Social capital facilitates crime control, rather than facilitating criminal or deviant activity. 
Social capital, in the form of collective efficacy, has been linked to crime prevention, especially with 
respect to violent and serious crime (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997). With respect to this, 
increased reportage of crime may be interpreted in a positive light as the community responding to a 
crime problem rather than ignoring or adopting an apathetic attitude.  
The greatest benefit of CYIM appears to come from the structure of the FRC itself, as well as the 
roles played by Local Commissioners, rather than solely from CYIM. This aligns with the Cape York 
Institute’s original vision regarding the potential of CYIM—in particular, that it was only one aspect 
of a broader model. Although CYIM does play an important role in assisting and supporting Local 
Commissioners to carry out their functions and apply different behavioural levers, depending on 
individual needs, it is questionable whether CYIM alone would have as much of an impact. Thus, a 
key lesson from the Cape York experience of IM is that the context within which IM is delivered is 
crucial. The empowerment of local Indigenous authority structures holds many benefits, which mean 
CYIM can be delivered in a way that is potentially more palpable and useful than if it were to be 
delivered as a standalone intervention.   
Cape York communities are looking to make a decision about evolving from CYWR towards new 
arrangements based on the empowerment/development model. There is an expectation from 
communities that this review will inform a decision about the future of welfare quarantining in Cape 
York and what role the current CYIM approach can/should have in any future models. Different 
communities have different needs and may come to different conclusions. Consultation and 
implementation are critically important to any future extension of the CYWR, FRC and/or CYIM. 
Consultation should be broad (involving a significant proportion of the community) and deep (i.e. 
cover not just theoretical models, but also the realities of how the models would apply in practice). By 
gaining widespread, informed endorsement of any future models, it may be possible to improve early 
take-up and support of any new models.  
Limitations of the data 
This review was conducted over a relatively short timeframe (June–September 2018) and as such there 
were strict limits to its scope. A strength and limitation of the qualitative data was that it drew 
primarily on one, albeit rich and well-placed, source of data—the FRC. Where possible, FRC data 
was balanced against that of broader literature. Limitations of the publicly-available data include that 
it is often not possible to isolate the impact of CYIM over and above the impact of the FRC more 
broadly (as well as other concurrent interventions), and that at times the administrative geographies of 
the data are not an exact match to Indigenous communities. Some data was also not available for the 
full ten-year timeframe.   
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It is important to note that CYIM is unique and, thus, conclusions arising from this review may not be 
able to be transferred to IM in other contexts. In fact, many of the conclusions depend on the unique 
IM delivery system that is peculiar to the CYIM model, rather than simply IM alone.  
Further, various measures used to assess IM are susceptible to changes in reporting, policing, and the 
impacts of other concurrent policies and programmes. For example, to take alcohol, it is difficult to 
distinguish between the impacts of CYIM and other concurrent policies, such as alcohol management 
plans (AMPs).   
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